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Abstract 
 
 Set in the context of wider problems of EU popular legitimacy, the thesis explores a participatory model 
of EU policy making based around business associations as agents of participation.   Policy participation 
implies public accountability, where there is an abundance of literature on the role of non-governmental 
organizations exercising mechanisms, but without a specific focus on business associations.   
This topic addresses the participatory role of business associations acting within an applied public 
accountability mechanism.  The analysis of the literature leads to the identification of an accountability 
model grounded in the origin of the mandate to act and to judge.  Applied to business associations, the 
model reveals newly combined conditions for the existence of public accountability, pointing notably to 
the reliance of external processes on internal means and the deliberate choice to act beyond legal 
compliance.     
The public quality of the outcome of the application of the model rests on structured deliberation with 
the wider EU public through active participation of civil society organizations and arises as questions of 
reputation management are addressed for business associations active in sensitive product or service 
sectors.  As the multiplicity of actors increases, the relationships within the public affairs networks will 
become more complex, and the dividing lines between private commercial interests, citizens, and the 
state more blurred.  The public accountability credentials of those actors operating through governance 
models in this specific context allows for clarification of purpose and transparency of outcomes, thereby 
providing for a model of engagement.             
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1. Background to the thesis : 
Accountability evokes notions of representation, transparency and legitimacy and has become an icon of 
good governance.  But what is the meaning and purpose of accountability?  How is it applied as a 
mechanism of public accountability and do private commercial interests such as business associations 
participate in accountability practices under conditions of EU policy participation?  This thesis addresses 
the existence, nature and function of public accountability as practised by business associations in the 
context of the multi level governance structure of the EU.  
 1.1.2. Contributions of the thesis    
Set in the context of wider problems of EU popular legitimacy, the thesis topic explores solutions aimed 
at identifying a participatory democracy model of EU policy making based around business associations 
as agents of participation.   Policy participation implies public accountability, a governance concept 
addressed in the literature but focused on a particular type of ‘non-governmental ‘transnational 
organization acting in the public interest.  This thesis addresses the participatory role of business 
associations acting within an applied public accountability mechanism and its potential to yield the 
desired outcomes.  To that end, the varied nomenclature of accountability is analysed and cross 
referenced with a focus on identifying when accountability questions arise as well as the rationale for 
the application of a process.                       
The analysis of the literature leads to the proposal of a generic accountability model then applied to 
transnational business organizations operating under particular conditions of EU participation where 
issues of reputation management present engagement challenges.   The quality of the process and hence 
the potential for legitimacy that it might yield rests in the public credentials of civil society organizations 
acting as proxies for the EU public.   
The selection of the units of analysis is deliberate, dealing with business associations currently applying 
monitoring processes under condition of EU policy participation.   The deep case analysis uses process 
tracing as the method to yield empirical data.  This method will permit the tracing of the link between 
the application of the proposed generic process of accountability and the outcome.   The results of the 
case studies reveal newly combined conditions for the existence of public accountability, pointing 
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notably to the reliance of external processes on internal means and the deliberate choice made by these 
EU business associations to act beyond legal compliance.   They also reveal the weaknesses related to 
the “public” nature of the process and the limited remit of its function within the EU policy development 
‘bubble’.  Public accountability within such a conceptual framework addresses deficits of democratic 
participation, via a process of internal monitoring and independent assessment submitted to public 
scrutiny.  The process applicable to transnational actors addresses the public vocation of private 
commercial interests and proposes a model for accountable democratic engagement in EU policy 
participation.  
The original contribution of the research to discussions on democratic participation in the EU lies first in 
the choice of business associations as the unit of analysis placed in the context of the EU.  Secondly, the 
literature on accountability deals with differing nomenclatures but as yet has not sought to define the 
context and set of circumstances of public accountability, or the rationale supporting the need for the 
practice of accountability.  Thirdly, this last analysis led to the proposal of a generic model of public 
accountability which is then applied to the units of analysis.  The results of this application in turn bring 
about a refining of the formula to reflect the elements which would increase democratic accountability, 
such as the use of independent audits, public participation in forums and the need for structured 
deliberation on the part of civil society actors with a public interest mandate.  Finally, the core data 
derived from actual accountability processes as practised is discussed to ascertain the extent to which 
the application of the process yielded the desired outcomes.                 
 1.1.3. Structure of the thesis:  
This introduction chapter deals with the original contributions of the research and sets out the logical 
thread underpinning the narrative.   The second part of this first chapter addresses the choice and 
justification of the research methodology applied.        
Chapter 2. 1., describes the context and focus of accountability and clarifies its meaning and rationale in 
the EU specific set of circumstances.  The EU political construct is uniquely supra national and suffers 
from a democratic deficit due, amongst other reasons, to weak democratic participation in policy 
making, and to which civil society organizations are sometimes identified as a potential means of 
solution (Heidbreder 2012).  This chapter first addresses the emergence of civil society in the EU polity 
and their expected role.  It then discusses the need for accountability of civil society actors and identifies 
varying types of such actors grouped under the nomenclature by leading authors, thus placing business 
3 
 
organizations acting in EU policy development.  This focus on business associations acting alongside CSOs 
reveals the challenge of reconciling private commercial interests with a public vocation.       
Chapter 2.2., first centres on the meaning and purpose of accountability by untangling the plethora of 
accountability denominations to distinguish between context and desired outcomes.  The argument is 
made for accountability as a governance choice lying beyond legal compliance, where internal processes 
provide the basis for external account giving.  Also, the case is made for the application of a generic 
process with modified emphases. In the second part of this chapter I track the shift from democratic 
accountability to public accountability as a process applied in a transnational context to EU business 
associations and ascertain where and when accountability questions arise to draw up a more accurate 
assessment of accountability measures.  
In Chapter 2.3., the constitutive components of a public accountability process are presented and 
discussed in some detail to gain an accurate understanding of the roles and stages of the process.  
Maybe the greater challenge is to derive a public element from the process for a private commercial 
interest specific organization.  The contention is made that this element is acquired through the 
composition or mandate of the forum.   The lack of enforcement of sanctions after the account giving is 
also highlighted.  The result of the analysis of the components is the proposal for a generic accountability 
process that can be applied to ascertain the existence of accountability in a given relationship.  The new 
emphasis of this process lies in the nature of the principal and the forum, and the origin of their 
respective mandates of the principal and of the forum.  The focus of this research on “public” 
accountability leads to the need to identify public elements within the mandates of these components.    
Chapter 3, describes the application of the generic accountability process to three case studies of 
business organizations acting under conditions of EU policy participation.   The analysis first seeks to 
ascertain the existence of the accountability process steps and then the type of accountability 
encountered.  The data derived allows for a greater understanding of the role of accountability and its 
legitimizing potential when practised by transnational actors in the specific circumstances of the EU 
political and legal structure.    
The choice of these units of analysis is deliberate in that each was expected to yield greater insight into 
the rationale behind and the consequences of the application of an accountability process.   The units of 
analysis are presented in detail in the methodology chapter at 1.2 below.    The first is UNESDA (Union of 
European Soft Drinks Associations), a hybrid membership organization encompassing national 
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associations as well as direct company membership (at Chapter 3.2.).  Its participation in the European 
Commission’s DG SANCO (health and consumer rights Directorate General) EU Platform for Action on 
Diet and Physical Activity is central to the accountability analysis.  The second unit is the European Public 
Affairs Consultancy Association, the members of who adhere to a code of conduct related to their 
professional activity (at Chapter 3.3.).  The third and last organization, the World Federation of 
Advertisers participates in a DG SANCO Forum on reducing alcohol related harm (at Chapter 3.4).  Each 
case study conclusion is presented at the end of each of the relevant subsections respectively.  These 
initial conclusions deal with the answers to the main study questions relating to the existence of an 
accountability process, the potential link with the public and the effectiveness in bringing about the 
desired outcome.  
Chapter 4 presents a cross case study analysis and final conclusions, first identifying how the identified 
accountability components play out in practice, identifying a link with the EU public and the source of 
the mandate from the principal to the actor and for the forum to hear an account and pass judgment.  
The origin of the public nature of the process and the importance of the activity and participation of pure 
civil society organizations are underlined.  The account giving element of the process and the nature and 
enforceability of the sanction is discussed.  The consequences or perspectives of the application of an 
accountability mechanism are presented before a final subsection that sets out the initial case study 
propositions against the findings.  
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1.2. Research methodology:  
1.2.1. Approach to research question: 
This Chapter 1.2. , on the research topic presentation and justification of the thesis subject, presents the 
qualitative research strategy and the approach to data collection, analysis and reporting.  The study is a 
case oriented comparison, focusing on a large number of characteristics in order to develop the 
application of the concept of accountability via a process.  This approach allows for causal complexity to 
be addressed through the “development of an extensive dialogue between the researcher’s ideas and 
the data in an examination of each case as a complex set of relationships” (Della Porta and Keating 2008 
p. 369).   
There is an adequate amount of both literature and empirical data on most key terms applied in the 
thesis subject, such as “EU policy participation” or “lobbying” or “business association”.  There is 
however no core data on accountability practices applied to EU business associations under conditions of 
EU policy participation.  A greater part of scholarly literature focuses on the need for increased 
participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) claiming to represent the priorities of the European 
public.  When business associations are examined in the light of accountability in the EU policy process, 
only certain aspects have been studied such as their transparency and presence in the public eye.   
Altides and Kohler Koch (2009) analyze the communication performance of certain business 
organizations by measuring the number of times they appear in selected publications but do not address 
the rationale supporting the need for accountability mechanisms nor how the constitutive elements of 
accountability are dealt with in practice.  Piewit et al (2010) also deal with the accountability of CSOs 
through observing its relations with members and beneficiaries.  The authors enumerated the differing 
types of procedures regulating the relationships described, though this did not include the public.  The 
organizations responding to the survey undertaken refer to complaints procedures, internal codes of 
conduct, mission statements or philosophical or religious values and even legal compliance.   However, 
the authors do not focus on accountability measures in business organizations, the rationale behind their 
adoption and the desired results of the link with the EU public in the context of the quest for greater 
legitimacy. There is also no evidence of the application of such accountability mechanisms observed in 
practice.           
In order to gain greater insight into the actual workings of accountability mechanisms in practice for 
business associations in the EU policy process and to probe the processes applied, I have developed the 
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basis for in-depth case studies of three different types of relevant associations. The selection of these 
units of analysis was made on the basis of their potential to yield salient outcomes and, is intended to 
illustrate the variety and depth of the accountability relationships in hybrid (direct company membership 
as well as association membership) or multilayered organizations (dealing with international, European 
and national alliances). The intended diverse associations participate in EU policy development through a 
process presenting the characteristics of public accountability.  This deliberate approach flows directly 
from the thesis subject and requires a business association to be engaged in an exercise contributing to 
EU policy process or development, where the ensuing discussions might involve the EU public, albeit 
sometimes represented by civil society organizations, and where the mechanism of engagement 
presents the elements of an accountability mechanism, including a sanction.   
I set aside some earlier identified units of analysis due to their missing elements of the above structure, 
in particular the presence of a formal, monitored engagement with the EU that includes a potential 
sanction mechanism, and the willingness to be subject to accountability to the EU public, whatever form 
that might take.  For example, the European Sugar Industry has promoted corporate social responsibility 
and social dialogue since 2004 which takes the form of a code of conduct and covers emission trading 
schemes, apprenticeships, aid to sugar producing developing countries and other trade issues.  Whilst 
the scheme is closely monitored by the industry which then reports to the European Commission, it 
failed to include the “public” element and was limited to the participation of both the industry and social 
partners.  
Similarly, manufacturing industries using silica (sand) such as in glass or ceramics have adopted a cross-
sectoral industry Agreement on Workers’ Health Protection through the Good Handling and Use of 
Crystalline Silica and Products containing it.  This Agreement arose as a response to the European 
Commission’s Scientific Committee for Occupational Exposure Limits’ recommendations and applies to 
workers across the EU.  However, as above, it does not include an element of engagement, for approval 
or sanction, with the EU public. 
The European Lighting Companies’ Federation representing 95% of the total European production of 
lamps focuses on climate change and energy efficiency and as such initiates and promotes schemes 
aimed at increasing the awareness of intelligent street lighting or switching from gas discharge lamps to 
the energy saving products.  This in turn gives rise to codes of conduct and monitored programs notified 
to the European Commission but not formally a part of the ongoing consultation for policy development.  
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More importantly, the engagement with partners outside the membership included technical and 
environmental stakeholders but no group that claimed to represent the voice of EU citizens.  
Finally, I also scrutinized the Federation of the European Sporting Goods Industry since some prominent 
members of that organization, notably Nike and Puma, maintain sustainable business performance 
targets against business, social and environmental goals.  The association does not however take up the 
representation of the industry sector for these initiatives which are also global and not limited to the EU 
policy process.  The case studies finally chosen are described at point 1.2.3.below.     
The choice of methodology based on case studies and empirical inquiry is due to the exploratory nature 
of the research and the methodology’s efficiency in identifying causal processes.  Accountability 
mechanisms, which are defined by their specific components and are described in detail in the next 
Chapter, might include a variety of known processes such as complaints panels or self regulation, 
however their existence and potential are as yet unrecognised.  Research is currently limited to 
discussions on the definition of public accountability and its role.  This state of affairs renders a 
quantitative methodological approach uncertain.  The qualitative approach however will yield grater 
insight into the role and potential of such mechanisms. The case studies will answer the questions of 
“how” and “why”, being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the researcher has no 
control, as per Yin (1994).  The design arises as a logical consequence that will connect the empirical data 
to the research questions and ultimately, the conclusions.  The procedure applied is that of process 
tracing, “designed to identify processes linking a set of initial conditions to a particular outcome,” (Della 
Porta and Keating 2008 p. 399).  Process tracing is particularly adapted to within-case analysis as in this 
research and allows for both the positivist and interpretivist research design where the goal is to analyze 
the relations between possible causes and observed outcomes.  Indeed, the accountability process 
identified sets out components and criteria tested against the practice of the units of analysis.      
1.2.2. Providing the framework and presenting the design rationale:  
The thesis seeks to ascertain the existence, nature and function of the public accountability of business 
associations under conditions of EU policy participation.  Three overriding questions are addressed 
hereunder prior to setting out the detailed breakdown of the research method, with a view to better 
framing the context of the research and pointing to the interesting complexities of the structured 
approach. 
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Internal and external accountability; how the puzzle fits: 
As described in the section above, the literature analysis mainly revealed the existence of discussions 
focused on public accountability predominantly debated in the context of democratic legitimacy where 
an elected politician becomes the “actor” or “agent”, the defined electorate or constituency is “the 
principal” and the sanction mechanism applied is the failure to be re-elected of the said actor.  Chapter 2 
of this work recounts the shift from this form of democratic accountability to the consideration of public 
accountability for private business interests.  For the association concerned, this shift reflects an 
application of internal accountability mechanisms to an external context, monitored by an EU created 
platform which acts as a meeting point between public and private interest oriented CSOs.     
Given the nature of the debate, the unorthodox choice of business associations as the unit of analysis;  
i. reflects the importance of the role of these organizations as participants in the EU policy 
process 
ii. seeks to provide a link between the mainly private commercial considerations of business 
organizations active in the EU context with an overriding public interest above and beyond 
that of members,  
iii. highlights the need for a sustainable internal governance structure tailored to the 
composition and mission of the organization and allows for an examination of the inter-
relation between internal accountability arrangements and mechanisms intended to bring 
about public accountability 
Point ii) would deal with accountability issues arising from the public impact of policy participation with 
the consideration of varying levels of interaction in a wider context.  Indeed, as an example, business 
organizations interact with other such organizations, with consumer groups, and with upstream and 
downstream stakeholders.  They also interact with the public, as specialists of that particular business 
topic, for example through trade magazines, or with non specialists, for example through general market 
standards.       
Point iii) anticipates the question of the existence or not of the need for public accountability of private 
commercial considerations.  But EU policy process participation entails an element of public 
“consideration” in view of the wider impact of policy decision making above and beyond the limited 
constituency of the association’s members and even identified stakeholders.   
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In a given interest representation exercise, the agent or “lobbyist” would be handed a mandate by the 
membership of the association, the “principal”, to convey a position to and seek to influence a decision 
maker. The association would no doubt have elaborated some form of reporting system to hold the 
agent to account and the general membership, acting in this case as a forum, would either approve or 
not the activities undertaken in their name.  A suggested sanction that might fall should the agent prove 
to have been lacking in any way would entail loss of mandate, removal from office and maybe loss of 
employment.  
 This internal process would maybe be enshrined in statutes of incorporation (or equivalent registered 
document containing the mention of the legal status of the organization whether for civil responsibility 
or fiscal reasons), the rules of procedure or operating guidelines and, or, the minutes of earlier such 
occasions which can be construed as constituting a practice of accountability.  Other documents of 
relevance for internal processes can include the contract of employment of the agent, service level 
agreements between members and the agent(s), compliance with given professional standards, and 
memoranda of understanding for alliance partnerships between two or more entities carrying out e.g. a 
combined interest representation campaign.  
A key proposition of the research methodology rests on the expectation that any public accountability 
mechanism identified in the case studies can only exist when carried out hand in hand with or reflecting 
an established internal process.   Indeed, the recording and documentation tracing required to provide 
an external account to a public would constitute the steps for an internal process.   The tracing arises 
from the need, for the public purpose, to provide answers to detailed internal questions as to who are 
the main players in the activities undertaken, the mandate and representation handed down and the 
existence and viability of enforcement of sanction mechanisms.  The questions of the case studies will 
therefore have a holistic purpose where the existence, nature of and relationship between internal and 
public mechanisms will be examined together.     
Focus on existence and practice of public accountability: the limits to assessing efficiency for legitimizing 
purposes:  
It is not the aim of the research to provide finite answers to the question of the legitimizing 
consequences for the EU decision making machinery of the participation in the EU policy process of 
publicly accountable business associations.  The matter of the EU’s democratic deficit and how it fits into 
this accountability debate is succinctly addressed at Chapter 2.1 of the thesis. 
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The purpose of the case studies as outlined in the propositions below is to:  
- identify the existence, if any, of public accountability mechanisms in the chosen units,  
- the context in which a need for this means arises,  
- how the mechanisms  are applied, and, 
- to assess the quality of the link with the public, and 
- if the application brings about the desired consequences. 
The context of the research presents accountability as a practice; a mechanism or process which is 
repeated and borne in mind as association leaders undertake relevant tasks.   The repetition of the 
process allows for an assessment over time, the possibility to monitor improvement and compare the 
“before” and “after” situations.  Bovens (2007 p. 462), captures this aspect, citing Aucoin and Heintzman 
(2000) when he writes that “accountability is important to provide a democratic means to monitor and 
control government conduct, preventing the development of concentrations of power, and to enhance 
the learning capacity and effectiveness of public administration”.  He develops three perspectives (2007 
p. 463) from which to assess accountability arrangements; democratic, constitutional and learning.  
These perspectives will be applied in the assessment of the case study accountability processes, however 
with the added consideration of the adequacy of the instrument in relation to the purpose for which it 
was created.  The questions thus arise; “even if the accountability mechanism applied allows for 
controlling government, preventing a concentration of power and learning from past mistakes, does it 
fully provide the answer as to why the association uses the accountability system in the first place? From 
where did the impetus to use one arise? Has this been adequately addressed by the accountability 
mechanism applied?”       
The nature of many business associations, a grouping of market competitors, can sometimes entail slow 
and cumbersome decision making procedures which discourage a regular adaptation of the internal 
operating rules.  It might be envisaged at this stage that a case study organization includes accountability 
rules in its operation that were placed there for a specific and limited purpose, which has now been 
widened to encompass other situations.   Conversely, a “one size fits all” accountability mechanism 
might not be the most appropriate and effective instrument to be applied by the organization.   
Therefore the adequacy or effectiveness in relation to its intended purpose will be taken as a key 
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analytical criterion, setting aside the question of legitimizing consequences for the EU for discussion as a 
desired outcome.          
Accountability in the EU policy process: differing levels, actors and mechanisms:  
Finally, the case study organizations have been selected to provide a cross sectoral insight into business 
associations.  They are diverse in their composition which therefore allows for interpretation based on a 
large number of characteristics.  Indeed, UNESDA is a hybrid European federation regrouping national 
associations from EU member States as well as direct company membership.  EPACA represents 
European consultancies or public affairs agencies which currently are all present and operating in 
Brussels, and offers direct company membership alone.  Finally, WFA is a global organisation with over 
70 of the biggest global marketers and some national associations.  Direct company membership is often 
found in highly concentrated sectors, while in other sectors it may be a choice based on a view that it 
allows the organisation to be more nimble in decision making and increases its geographical reach via 
the international activities of the member companies. Another important feature is the variety of levels 
at which they interact with the EU institutions and third party organizations, be it on a local or global 
level.   The federative structure allows for better grass roots engagement via national and local 
associations, such as for members of UNESDA. In contrast, the company membership composition of 
WFA ensures direct coordination on action related to the association’s goals without the extra 
involvement of national level associations. The point of interaction with the EU might vary from 
participation in a forum to discuss public health issues with other organisations from a business or public 
interest source, to direct interest representation to adapt legislative wording to allow for a business 
friendly market environment for the relevant service or manufacturing sector represented.  The 
deliberate choice of these business associations also rests in their potential to yield outcomes through 
application of an accountability process which reveals the public vocation of these private commercial 
interest groups.   The “public” element of the type of accountability researched calls for a link through 
EU policy participation with the public at large.  UNESDA’s link arises out of their claim to act in the 
public interest; WFA’s is derived from a self fulfilling mission which takes the form of self regulation to 
reduce alcohol related harm to the public; the link for EPACA rests in the nature of the professional 
activity itself in that lobbying impacts legislation, with which we must comply as law abiding citizens.             
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1.2.3. Research design components: 
The study’s key empirical questions are: 
  Is there evidence of the existence of an accountability process?  
What mechanisms of accountability internal and public are used in the organizations? How and 
why were these adopted and chosen? Are these applied in the context of EU policy 
participation? Which mechanisms matched with which participatory processes? How and when 
are they applied? 
 Does the accountability process link with the public?   
How the key players (actor, forum, public) are defined and involved in the process? To whom is 
the account to be rendered?  What is the quality of mandate from the public to the actor? What 
is the origin and quality of the mandate to pass judgment and to sanction?   
 How effective is the process in bringing about the desired outcome?   
What are the consequences / sanction derived from the process?  Is the process adequate?     
The study’s initial propositions:  
Though this is essentially an exploratory study, some initial propositions or expectations are set out 
below in order to better guide the questions for salient data collection and provide depth to the criteria 
for analyses.  They are derived from a consideration of the use of accountability and its expected value 
assessed from a focus on the actor, the business association.   
The first initial proposal is that public accountability mechanisms are desirable in particular given 
contexts of policy development dealing with issues of a sensitive nature for the public, combined with 
concerns of reputation management and a highly competitive interest representation environment e.g. 
lobbying of the EU institutions.    Reputation Management involves activities related to the 
organisation’s identity and perception in relation to stakeholders, including the wider public.  The term is 
derived from the sphere of public relations and is not clearly defined in academic literature although 
Hutton et Al (2001 p.247) refer directly to, “what is traditionally termed “public relations,” which in 
recent decades has become known commonly, in a corporate context, as “corporate communication,” 
“corporate affairs,” “corporate relations” and similar terms”.      
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The second initial proposal is that all business organizations that comply with public accountability 
arrangements boast internal governance structures which allow for accountability mechanisms to be 
applied.  
The third initial proposal is that business organizations have had little call for developing processes of 
public accountability and have been reluctant to assert a public role that might impact market stability.  
The fourth and final initial proposal is that existing accountability mechanisms in business associations 
engaged in EU policy participation were historically not widely promoted towards the EU public.        
Justification of the choice of units of analysis: 
The choice of business associations as a generic type of unit is addressed above at 1.2.1. .  These 
organizations are inherently complex and have a vocation to fulfil an increasing role in EU policy 
development, witnessed, amongst others, by the increasing number of association registrants to the EU 
Register of Interests and the EU’s growing role in a globalised business market.  Their rise in importance 
means that they must cater to a particularly varied nature of stakeholder or possibly “account holders”, 
and engage with the EU on actions that are intended for the public interest.  It is expected that this 
variety of “holders” will be central to the study in order to ascertain accountability types or required 
components common to all such processes, or to a given set of circumstances.    
The case study units described below have therefore been selected based on their participation in an EU 
policy process via a prescribed participatory structure, on the wide variety of association types and 
relationships they present and the potential for added value to the research scope:    
UNESDA the soft drinks association has a hybrid membership encompassing national associations as 
well as direct company membership.  It is one of the founding members of the DG SANCO EU 
Platform for Action, Diet, Physical Activity and Health to which it provides commitments that are 
independently monitored by third parties. The results are then presented to a forum including civil 
society organizations acting in the public interest and posted on the Commission’s web site. The 
actual case study that I have chosen to focus on provides relevant detail thanks to the internal 
organization and quality of monitoring involved.   The added value of this unit is its status as a 
founding member and hence the participation in the historical development of the platform, the 
prominence of the brands involved and a co-related response from civil society.  
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The European Public Affairs Consultancy Association deals with representing professional lobbying 
companies.  The employees of these companies represent interests and input into the EU policy 
process as professionals.  EPACA had adopted a code of conduct regulating the behaviour and 
standards of its members in its relations with the EU Institutions.  The particular case study used 
involves an NGO that registered a complaint against an EPACA member using the code of conduct, 
leading to the setting up of a disciplinary panel and a hearing.  The added value of choice of this case 
is that it demonstrates the impetus to use accountability means in this context.  It provides insight 
into a “living” shift in use of accountability mechanisms for a profession that suffers from a poor 
reputation.  Indeed, the results of the panel’s deliberations and closing of the case led to a voluntary 
widening of the scope of the code to all “stakeholders”.       
 The World Federation of Advertisers represents some of the most well known brands in the world 
today; four companies from the spirits sector and four from beer.  They are members of the 
European Alcohol and Health Forum and as such commit to the maintaining and development of 
high advertising standards in particular to identified sensitive audiences such as young adults.  The 
forum itself interestingly struggles with retaining relevant civil society organizations as members, in 
contrast with the first case study. The added value of WFA lies in the global nature of their remit, 
their prominence in the debate and ability to adapt to changing public attitudes.  Questions arise 
however with regard to their representativity of a sector, maybe more adequately covered by other 
organizations.                 
Following the initial document based investigation, the approach to the organizations will be mainly 
interview based and focus on ascertaining the role of the organization in the EU policy processes in 
which they operate and gaining an understanding of the frequency and depth of their participation 
  The logic linking the data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting the findings:  
 The data yielded by the case study questions will either support or set aside the propositions as 
presented above.  Since the study is essentially exploratory in nature, all relevant data provided will 
contribute to a better understanding of the thesis subject.  The propositions if supported will enable us 
to ascertain whether the existing mechanisms are mature and adequate enough to bring about 
legitimizing consequences. 
The criteria for interpretation of the findings will be based on the identified accountability components 
and conclusions on the consequences of the application of the mechanism (s).  The case studies should 
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reveal how the currently identified components play out in practice and shed light on the importance, or 
not, of the missing elements such as those related to;  
• The nature and frequency of the account to be given ; 
• The public nature of the exercise;  
• The mandate of the forum to question and pass judgment involving consequences; 
• The nature of the sanction and its enforceability; 
• The effectiveness of the identified accountability mechanism in bringing about the desired 
outcomes;   
• The appropriateness and adequacy of the chosen mechanism; 
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1.2.4. Case study method design:  
The method to be applied is adapted to multiple case designs but with a limited element of replication in 
that each unit of analysis has been chosen for its particular features for providing a widespread 
assessment of accountability mechanisms of business association participating in the EU policy process.   
Therefore, although there are three units, the list of case questions has a revelatory purpose, just as for 
single case designs.  
 
Definition and Design 
 
 
Preparation, collection and 
examination 
 
Analysis and Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 1: UNESDA  
Union of European 
Beverages Association  
 
 
 
 
Case study 2: EPACA  
European Public Affairs 
Consultancies’ Association  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 3: WFA 
World Federation of 
Advertisers 
 
 
Figure 1. Case study method design 
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1.2.5. Primary data collection and case study protocol:  
 Since each unit of analysis chosen for the case studies deals with a different organization, an initial 
primary data collection phase and analysis is necessary prior to the interview stage being carried out.   
The focus of the research question is on governance issues, and, after preliminary research leading to 
selection of the units of analysis, it is understood that formal documents can largely be obtained through 
public sources or the organization’s web site.  Such documents would include, where readily available, 
the articles or statutes of incorporation, the legal status, the mission and vision statements, the 
membership and fields of activity, organigramme, policy positions, alliance partnerships, rules of 
procedure / operating guidelines and annual program.    
In order to increase the validity of the case study research, the case study protocol set out hereunder will 
be used.  
Overview of the case study project: 
The case study is exploratory in nature and aims to reveal the existence and practice of accountability 
mechanisms in three associations.  The first complexity of the investigation lies in the identification of 
the components and roles of the mechanism.  The second lies in the assessment of the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the application of the mechanism.  
The purpose of the study is to ascertain the existence of these accountability practices and their 
effectiveness in relation to stated goals, in the context of EU policy participation.     
Procedures:  
The interviewees of each of the units of analysis are approached individually addressed within their 
formal roles linked to each case respectively. They are fully appraised in writing of the context and 
academic purpose of the request and the subject title of the thesis.  The scheduling of visits was 
undertaken as each case was analyzed in turn.   Interviews typically lasted one hour at a time.  
The review of the preliminary information was desk based with most salient information contained on 
the web sites of the respective associations and that of the European Commission.  The burdensome 
information gathering exercise involved in the fulfilling of the UNESDA commitments was not contained 
in detail on the association’s web site but was gathered thanks to their cooperation. The WFA site, as per 
that of UNESDA presented all the relevant wording for commitments undertaken but did not present in a 
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succinct fashion the ideal placing of the organization on an international level,  representing a majority of 
the European alcohol producing market. This positioning and its consequences for influence were 
apparent from conversations with the Director for Public Affairs.  I was also able to attend a plenary 
meeting of the Alcohol Forum at the European Commission’s DG SANCO in November 2013 with the 
purpose of observing interaction between participants and gaining a better understanding of the 
expected outcomes of participation.  The observations gathered are not however intended to describe 
continued practice since this cannot be derived from a single attendance.      
Finally, the EPACA web site was complete in that it contained documentation describing the history of 
the case brought by the Smoke Free Partnership as well as its consequences leading to the amendment 
of the statutes.   
With regards to the determination of persons to be interviewed, I selected first-hand observers of the 
processes examined, who were equally actors or decision makers.  For UNESDA, this involved the 
secretary general, the main consultant to the association and a key member.  For EPACA, I interviewed 
the defending firm representative who attended the hearing, the plaintiff NGO leader and the Chair of 
the professional practices panel.  Finally, for WFA, I interviewed the Director for Public Affairs, the 
equivalent role in Spirits Europe, and the Policy Director of the NGO Active Europe.  These discussions 
were complemented by further desk research on the sites of other participating organizations.      
Case study questions: 
The questions set out below are derived from three main enquiries linked to the propositions discussed 
at point III “research design components” above.  This list is not exhaustive but covers all key elements of 
the research and can be adapted to each case study. The purpose is to maintain this core set of 
questions for all 3 cases.   
How does your organization deal with accountability issues? Is there an understanding of both internal 
and external accountability issues? Is there a set process used to deal with internal accountability issues? 
Is there a set process used to deal with external accountability issues? What if any is the relationship 
between internal and external processes?  How are the two sets of circumstances related?   Has this 
been put into practice? When and how was the process devised and implemented?  
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Was the process applied in the context of EU policy participation? What type of participation, and at 
what level? What criteria of a given context call for the application or use of an accountability 
mechanism? 
 What and who are the components of the accountability mechanism? To whom is the accountability to 
be owed? Describe the public nature of the account giving? Can you qualify the obligation placed on the 
actor to provide an account? From where is it derived? What are its other features and characteristics 
such as timing, regularity, participants, follow up? How is the account given? How is the forum 
composed? How is it mandated to receive an account? How does the forum decide on the consequences 
that can ensue? How is the forum invested with the power/ mandated to pass judgment?  
Can the imposition of sanctions be effective in correcting behaviour or a process?  How does this play 
out? What is the mandate to sanction? What is the nature of the sanction?  How is it enforced?     Is the 
process adequate and does it bring about the desired results? Are you aware of any assessment of the 
process by other civil society organizations?  
Analysis plan and case study reports:  
The case studies were addressed individually and analyzed respectively based on descriptive and 
explanatory information.  The outline of the reporting follows this format:  
Mechanisms of accountability: existence, rationale, choice and application efficiency 
Constitutive components: the relationships, forum and public nature  
Process: appropriateness and limits  
Consequences: Sanctions mechanisms, enforceability and effects  
Other features       
 1.2.6. Collecting the evidence: 
The first stage of evidence collecting was based on documentation available to the public or, at least not 
restricted to members only.  The sources include legal documents such as articles of incorporation, 
statutes, operating rules / rules of procedure, fiscal status, alliance partnerships, memoranda of 
understanding, etc.  The web site of the association and where appropriate, of the European Commission 
yielded adequate levels of information with which to draw up data fiches.  Any further salient 
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documentation was requested of the interviewee.  The information gathered as such constitutes the 
descriptive information.       
The explanatory information gained through the interviews (the questions are set out above) sought to 
initially complement the descriptive type and then provide reasoning in support of the statements made.   
All data gathered is divided on the descriptive and explanatory lines as above.   This system also eases 
cross case analysis and rapidly highlights similarities, contrasts, missing evidence as well as any 
complementary questions to be put.   
1.2.7. Case study analysis: 
The analysis undertaken needs to address the most significant aspects of the case study and hence the 
study’s key empirical questions as set out under the research design components above.   The main 
purpose is to arrive at the answer to the question: is there an accountability mechanism that qualifies as 
“public” and is it adequate and effective in bringing about the desired consequences?  
The quality of the analysis needed to be high enough to produce compelling analytical solutions which 
are underpinned by the research design.  The method of process tracing yielded pertinent empirical data 
through tracing the link between the application of the proposed generic process of accountability and 
the desired outcome.  It allowed for the positivist perspective of the recognition of causal patterns, such 
as accountability mechanisms and the discovery of solutions, the interpretivist perspective through 
analysis of the outcomes.  The research therefore examines the “preferences and perceptions of actors, 
their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that face them” (Della 
Porta and Keating 2008, p. 414). In order to achieve this, all relevant evidence was taken into account.   
The analysis was undertaken per organization.  There were variations on the process applied according to 
the type of accountability outcome desired.  
 In order to gain an optimal understanding of the “process of accountability”, a mapping of each 
respective process is carried out per organization in the form of a flow chart at Figure 3. , which 
allows for ease of comparison per process, per organization.  
 Parallel to the above mapping, and in order to gain optimal understanding of the set of 
circumstances that call upon an accountability process as well as the identifying of relevant 
components (e.g. forum), a matrix of categories was drawn up and analyzed at Figure 4.  This 
allows for matching of content of process and set of circumstances giving rise to the said 
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process.   This same analysis will establish causal links between process and outcome and 
present the case study findings.  
  Bearing in mind the Bovens’ perspectives as described above; constitutional, democratic and 
learning, the propositions (at research design components above) needed to be verified or set 
aside.  This assessment was carried out using the elements revealed through the completed 
tools of flow chart mapping and pattern matching.  It is an overall assessment which takes into 
account the conclusions as a whole, and presents a more discursive tone. The propositions from 
the literature were evaluated against the findings such as the extent to which they measure up 
to the definitions highlighted in the literature analysis.  Further questions arising were addressed 
as to their application or set aside.  These include application of the denominations and typology 
derived from accountability authors and their juxtaposition to the context of the case studies.      
 Finally, the study’s initial propositions were compared to the findings from the three case 
studies.  The propositions mainly address the context in which the questions of accountability 
arise and how outcomes contribute to legitimation.     
1.2.8. Drawing up the case study comparison: 
This section of the research methodology will be limited to the stages and expected caveats.  
• Each case study report is addressed individually by identification of context, components and 
outcomes.  The focus of each case is on an actual process that is recorded, evidenced and 
analyzed.  Missing evidence was complemented by interviews.  After each individual conclusion, 
the reporting addressed the cross case analysis of the multiple cases. 
• The comparative structures are clearly set out.  The emphasis lies in identifying commonality 
across the context and components per process.  Where possible, findings are set against the 
affirmations derived from the literature as far as typology is concerned.  A verification of the 
roles of participants beyond the main protagonists is presented.   
• The drafting and composing of the report has been carried out at the earliest possible stage, with 
the gathering of primary data as a first step.  This allows for building an evidenced picture of the 
processes at hand and verifying initially if they reflect scenarios highlighted in the literature.    
• The validating procedure occurred with each interviewee (minimum of two per organization) 
examining his/her case, and then overall conclusions drawn from the case studies together.   
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Final comments address evidence gathered and verified against earlier findings.  The analysis of 
the conclusions addressed the existence or not of evidence of measures of public accountability 
for business associations under conditions of EU policy participation. It contributes ancillary 
findings and literature affirmations.  Finally, the analysis clarifies the context in which 
accountability questions arise and whether they yield the desired outcomes.     
This chapter has set out the research question and provided the focus for an original contribution.  After 
describing the thesis structure the research methodology and design was identified with a justification of 
choice and reference to relevance for the case oriented study at hand.   
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Chapter 2: CONTEXT AND FOCUS : WHAT IS ACCOUNTABILITY? 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the concept of accountability as discussed in the literature and its further analysis. 
The purpose is to lay the conceptual foundations for assessing the mechanisms of public accountability 
measures as applied to business associations in the EU policy context.  
There are three parts to this chapter. The first part identifies and analyses a framework for the concept 
of accountability in the context of the EU governance debate. It addresses in particular the role of civil 
society organizations, their characteristics and activities within this framework and assesses these with 
other actors such as business associations.   
Secondly, and in order to define accountability in the above context of analysis, I describe how the core 
concept sits with the distinctive or overlapping notions of responsibility, representation, transparency 
and legitimacy.  In the second part, 2.3.2., I discuss the definitions of accountability as presented by six 
authors, who have sought to qualify the nature of an accountability process in a given set of 
circumstances.  The definitions from the literature vary according to whether or not the concept is a 
mechanism – that is, holding an actor to account as part of a process – or, a state of affairs or mind – 
that is, simply being accountable.  A certain typology emerges according to the purpose of the process as 
opposed to another criterion such as the role of the actor. 
The above parts establish the context of the EU governance debate and discuss the core concept of 
accountability through an analysis of the literature. The third and final part, 2.4.,   breaks down the 
definition of accountability as a process to question the relevance of each stage in relation to reaching 
the goal of the accountability mechanism. It also identified outstanding questions on the detail of the 
process such as the composition of the forum and the content of the account giving. I focus on deriving 
from the literature the potential for the public nature of an accountability process and how this can be 
achieved for a business association in the EU policy context.                
 
 
 
 
24 
 
2.2. Contextualisation in the EU governance debate  
The political structure of the EU is unique both through its institutional design and supranational nature.  
It departs from the classical governmental structures of nation states where the key accountability 
relationship resides in the ability of the public to hold their representatives to account through the 
choices they make in national elections.  The participants in the EU’s multilevel governance  structure are 
both formal such as Member States and European institutions, mandated to act as such through statutes 
and treaties, and more interestingly, informal.  Advocates of participatory democracy have hailed non 
state actors and in particular civil society organizations as the potential solution to the EU’s democratic 
deficit.  These actors would address the deficit through participatory democracy.     
Whilst experience since the White Paper on Governance of 2001 (WPG) has revealed that the inclusion 
of civil society in policy making, albeit it in its inevitable form of organized civil society, has not provided 
the expected solution, the initiative has however shifted the debate to question the public quality of 
these organizations, their representativeness and accountability (Heidbreder 2012 p.8). 
 The legitimacy sought by the inclusion of civil society and the limits to that legitimizing potential are 
discussed in the first and second parts below at 2.2.1., and 2.2.2.   The third part deals with 
accountability relationships between CSOs and national and EU decision makers. In chapter 2.4., I focus 
on business organization type CSOs and highlight the conceptual “distance” between this interest 
specific type and the hypothetical EU public.  The fifth and last part discusses how a private commercial 
interest can render itself accountable to an EU public in the framework of an EU policy process.     
2.2.1. Participatory democracy and the emergence of “civil society”: 
The topic of civil society participation was formalized in the Treaty on European Union, signed in 
Maastricht in 1992.  This statute created the political union beyond its economic form and sought to 
address concerns of a growing democratic deficit. The treaty formalized different types of decision 
making including granting greater powers to the European Parliament, the only EU institution to be 
elected by direct universal suffrage, through the Article 189b co-decision procedure.  The treaty 
triggered further European integration and brought about the politicisation of decision making.  At the 
same time, the EU sought to reduce over regulation seen as costly to business and viewed unpopular in 
the respective national governments due to increased competence moving to Brussels.    
25 
 
The inclusion of civil society was structured through its interplay with the European Commission.  This 
relationship was provided for in the White Paper on Governance which set out a general policy of 
participation giving rise to various entrance points for civil society in particular in policy formulation.  
Magnette succinctly summarises the salient argumentation:  
“Participation is supposed to enhance both the efficiency and legitimacy of European 
governance: it is said to respond to ‘ the expectations of the Union’s citizens’ (p.35 WPG), it 
should connect Europe with its citizens’ (p. 3), help follow a ‘less top-down approach’ (p.4) and 
make the policy-making ‘more inclusive and accountable’ (p.8).  All this in turn, should enhance 
‘the quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies’, ‘create more confidence in the end result 
and in the institutions which deliver policies’ (p.10) and generate a sense of belonging to Europe’ 
(p. 11).  In other words, efficiency and legitimacy do not simply derive from the output dispensed 
by the system, they also depend ‘on involvement and participation’ (p.11).” (Magnette 2001 in 
Heidbreder, 2012 p.15) 
The inclusion of civil society was seen as a vehicle for promoting democratic legitimacy and increasing 
the acceptability of the EU’s output whilst ensuring the “public” accountability of decision makers and 
hence their decision making.  
The quality of that output derived from the inclusion of civil society rests partly on the expected 
deliberation brought about by participation and partly on the ability of civil society to act as a substitute 
for an EU public.  The actual practice of deliberation in this EU context and the quality of the 
representation of the civil society actors is however questioned by such authors as Kohler Koch (2010a) 
and Steffek et al (2009) thereby shifting the spotlight onto the heightened need for accountability of 
these participating organizations themselves.  
2.2.2. The limits to the creation of deliberative democracy through CSO participation:   
CSO participation intended to enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of the EU would have done so partly 
through virtue of a deliberative process.  Writing in the context of the EU, Tanasescu (2009 p.17) 
identifies a series of key elements conditional to deliberation:  
a) “Deliberation is about reason-giving about providing arguments for one’s position  
b)  All parties potentially affected by the decision or representing all relevant points of view need to 
be represented 
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c) Participants should be free and equal 
d) The outcome of the deliberative process should be a binding decision (deliberation is more than a 
talk show) 
e) Deliberations should be public, both for reasons of transparency and accountability”.  
 
The practice of deliberation in a decision making procedure can bring about a greater acceptability of the 
final result on the part of the dissenting minority. It would also lead to a more practical outcome in that 
the deliberation would not only include the principles underpinning the argument but also the 
implementation questions. In order to achieve a greater legitimacy of output however, the deliberative 
element carries several conditions clearly identified by Fischer (2012 p.464) discussing the constitutive 
components of participatory governance.   
In presenting the empowerment of participatory governance, Fischer points to principles and 
institutional design characteristics and the background condition that there should be rough equality of 
power among participants.   The political principles cover;  
1)”the need of such experiments (of deliberative democracy) to address a particular practical problem 
2) a requirement that deliberation rely upon the empowered involvement of ordinary citizens; and 
3) that each experiment employs reasoned deliberation in the effort to solve the problems under 
consideration”.  
Fischer’s institutional design characteristics specify: 
1) “the devolution of decision making and the powers of implementation to local action oriented units 
2)  that these local units be connected to one another and to the appropriate levels of state responsible 
for supervision, resource allocation, innovation and problem solving; and  
3) that the experimental projects can colonize and transform state institutions in ways that lead to the 
restructuring of the administrative agencies responsible for dealing with these problems”.  
Whilst the set up of the decision making bodies and the entities that input to the process as described 
might be identified in the EU context, an “empowered involvement of ordinary citizens” does not reflect 
usual practice.   Furthermore, the involvement of ordinary citizens implies an ability for effective 
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participation and therefore a reliance on individual effort, as well as a lack of entrance barriers such as 
the complexity of the EU governance structure.  
Upon a closer analysis of CSO participation in consultation procedures, Heidbreder (2012 p.16) remarks 
that, “despite the outreach to a European civil society at large, organized, professionalized groups 
remain the standard representation of civil society in EU policy making.  This is mainly due to the 
demands for expertise and resources – ranging from language skills, access to information, and time 
availability – needed to contribute in the procedures offered by the Commission’s traditional 
consultation regime”.  She notes later (2012 p. 16) that this situation appears to persist also in the online 
consultation system.   Smismans (2003 p. 491) adds to the argument by stating that civil society 
discourse shaped by the Commission and the European Economic and Social Committee favour a 
functional, output-oriented conception of civil society involvement. This would result in a greater 
number of contacts with Brussels based confederations of associations and stimulates the creation of 
large NGO networks covering a broad range of issues.  
Do CSOs interact with the EU public for the purpose of deliberation? In their study on 60 transnational 
CSOs, Steffek et al (2009 p. 31) claim that, “while CSOs’ members are involved in the long term strategic 
decisions, with regard to daily business and tactical issues, CSOs seem to rely more on their consultation 
with peers, namely other international CSOs, and the international secretariats often act autonomously”.  
They found little evidence of deliberation with citizens and their direct empowerment through 
participation.    
The Commission’s efforts in providing funding sources for civil society actors to redress a perceived 
imbalance in representation, has not brought about the desired consequences either.  To a certain 
extent it has impaired the CSO’s ability to deliver a “public message” and raised the question of 
legitimacy of input.  The complexity of the decision making procedures, as well as the sophistication of 
the means of influence, mainly through coalitions that are composed of individual groups catering to 
each level of decision making, require a level of education and professionalism which might be seen as 
elitist and a barrier to participation itself.    
Kohler Koch notes (2010c p. 335), “the promise of ‘involving civil society’ has not bridged the gap 
between Europe and the people, but rather sponsored a Brussels based CSO elite working in the 
interests of deeper integration”.  Civil society organizations would need, on the one hand, to be highly 
professionalized Brussels activists and, on the other, remain deeply rooted in their respective national or 
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local stakeholder contexts. As Heidbreder states (2012, p.19), “in brief, the conditions civil society has to 
meet to participate limit the very virtues for which the Commission pursues its normative and material 
activation strategy”.  
The absence of the expected engagement with the EU public and even more so the ruling out of a lateral 
equivalence between CSOs and the EU public leads to a discussion on the potential role of an  European 
Public Sphere, according to Habermas (1998).  Habermas considers CSOs as the institutional core of civil 
society.  The expected debate and deliberation created by CSOs in their diverse roles of inputting to and 
interaction with the EU institutions – be it with peers or grass roots activists - might contribute to the 
composing of the deliberative character of a European Public Sphere, when underpinned by an 
accountability mechanism.    
2.2.3. The role of CSOs and the accountability conundrum: 
The governance debate switched the focus from public actors and hierarchical decision making to the 
interaction of both public and private actors and their peer based political structures.  Civil society as 
such has no “actor” quality; this role is taken up by organized civil society.  CSOs might claim a role 
contributing to input legitimacy, through limited discourse and interaction in the public sphere, and 
output legitimacy with the technical quality of public policies since they give some societal interests a 
voice.  
 
What is the defining role of CSOs?    According to the wide definition of Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 
(1999), democratic representation is achieved when the outcome of politics matches the interests of the 
represented, as they see it. This model can better be applied to a nation state but does not reflect the 
EU’s disconnected structure or diversity of opinions due to lack of a common language and culture.  
 
In the European political structure, the European Parliament (EP) derives its political legitimacy through 
democratic representation and universal suffrage. The Council from the principle of federal 
representation, through the democratic legitimacy of nation states and both are subject to democratic 
accountability.  The Commission has no such direct link, hence their need to rely on CSOs to remedy their 
representational deficiencies.  Indeed, the Commission has been the main driver in giving CSOs a key role 
in EU governance.  
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In their output, CSOs would express citizen preferences to the Commission which would take these up in 
policy formulation. Responsiveness at both stages – input to the CSO position, and then its own input to 
the Commission – would underpin the democratic legitimacy of EU governance.  Accountability can be 
described as being the mechanism with which to induce the responsiveness of the actor.  But there is no 
formal accountability link between the Commission and civil society.  There is horizontal accountability 
between the EU institutions in that the EP and the Council ensure that the Commission acts in 
accordance with the Treaties.  And what of the responsiveness of the CSO to citizens at input stage? 
What of the representativeness of the input procedure itself? 
A perceived bias in the representation of interests and their influence has been a concern for CSO 
researchers.   An example of this is the study undertaken by Dür and de Bièvre (2007) on NGOs and 
business groups in European Trade Policy which found empirical evidence to support their proposition 
that newly mobilized societal interests in the form of NGOs did not influence the policy.  The focus of 
research however has now moved away from scrutinizing the transparency and responsibility of 
individual business organizations to examining the transparency of representativeness of all CSOs, 
notably through the EU Transparency Register.  
The criterion of representativeness needs to be assessed in relation to the plurality of societal actors and 
not just per each individual organization.  The current representativeness of actors is said to be uneven 
due to market/economic considerations related to the history of the EU, though the data derived from 
an analysis of the Transparency Register below questions this assessment.  Despite providing funding 
and making attempts at redressing the imbalance, representation of societal interests is qualified as still 
weak by Steffek in 2010, referring to Transparency Register statistics.  
 
In fact, Kohler Koch (2010a, p.112) believes that “the rhetoric of CSOs and the explicit request of EU 
institutions convey an image of representation that is in contrast with reality.  European CSOs are distant 
from stakeholders, in the case of NGOs even more so than in the case of trade associations and direct 
communication down to grassroots level is – except for extraordinary events – marginal (Altides and 
Kohler Koch 2009)”.   
On a national level, CSOs are formally organized and national decision makers are subject to political 
accountability processes.  This is not the case for the European Commission.  Kohler Koch (2011 p. 266 in 
Heidbreder 2012 p.19) believes that European NGOs are not delegated to implement the interests of 
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their organizational members but, “see themselves as executers of a mission to communicate with their 
member organizations and a basis to fulfil the mission together”.   
Indeed, civil society has no formal decision making role in the EU.  The consultation regime to which 
CSOs input does not carry with it an obligation on the part of the Commission to justify inclusion or 
exclusion of a given position. Mainly viewed as useful sources of industry or issue specific expertise, CSOs 
cannot hold the European Commission to account in relation to public participation in policy making 
procedures.   There is no process, nor forum, for asking questions and demanding explanations of the EU 
executive.  There are also no sanctions or other consequences.  
Short of being able to hold the executive to account and therefore act as a public hold on the activities of 
the European Commission, could CSOs emphasize the legitimacy of their own input to the EU policy 
process by application of accountability measures  ? As Lord and Pollack ask, “if the Commission, during 
the drafting of a legislative proposal, consults civil society groups and /or representative associations, the 
question is how the individual citizen can hold those groups to account” (2010 p. 983).    This salient 
question assumes an existing link between the individual citizen and the civil society organization in 
question.  Knowledge of the CSO and its activities would be a pre requisite to any citizen holding that 
CSO to account.  Whilst it might be assumed that an EU citizen is aware of the existence of say, Amnesty 
International, the same cannot be assumed for business related non state actors or CSOs such as 
Business Europe.   Therefore, in the context accountability relationships, establishing a link between the 
wider public and the private commercial interests of a business association constitutes a greater 
challenge.    
Accountability authors have not as yet focused on the accountability of business associations in their CSO 
role but have drawn some comparisons between types of civil society actors in relation to the scope of 
their interest or income sourcing.  Kohler Koch, for example, in her description of “two level social 
accountability”, compares NGOs and market organizations to point out that, “market related actors have 
a long history of dealing with the EU and their predominantly hierarchical structure makes 
communication across levels easier.  Furthermore, it is also quite evident that those who have a specific 
interest and have existential economic and professional stakes are more attentive than those with a 
diffuse interest”, (Kohler Koch 2010 b, p. 1129).   
Organisations with a specific interest also enjoy a certain independence of finance and direction, tending 
to be membership supported and driven.  As Piewitt et al remark (2010 p. 254) in their analysis of 
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transnational CSOs, “One type of CSO is usually exclusively member financed: special interest groups (i.e. 
social partners including business associations and trade unions)”.   Also, these interest groups such as 
business associations, due to the market sensitive nature of their members, practice a strict application 
of EU competition law rules.  This in turn, coupled with culturally ingrained business organization 
methods, makes for highly regulated associations operating under strictly applied guidelines and 
sometimes codes of conduct.  Governance issues tend to rate high on the agenda of business 
organizations, both for cost efficiency/ effective use of time reasons and to aid in avoiding liability for 
legal non compliance.      
2.2.4. Business organizations and CSOs:  
Some authors might argue that pure civil society organizations campaign for a public interest cause or 
one that is clearly rooted in the public domain, such as health.  However, in the EU context due in no 
small part to the complexity of the EU procedures and the level of education  required to interact 
effectively with the EU institutions, civil society has become “organized” into interest groups with 
differing remits and constituencies.  The Transparency Register is an increasingly precise reflection of 
that organized civil society which encompasses special interest groups such as business associations.  
This upcoming section first deals with clearly establishing business associations as falling under the 
heading of CSOs.  Then, an analysis of the Transparency Register provides insight into some 
characteristics of the respective types of CSOs; those focused on the public interest and those dealing 
with private business interests.   
Data generated by research into the publicly accessible Transparency Register (Greenwood and Dreger 
2013) reveals that there were, at 6th January 2013, 1710 “trade, business and professional associations” 
registered and 1304 “non-governmental organizations”.  Paradoxically, business associations are of 
course also “non-governmental”, though they do not usually espouse the commonality of NGO causes 
and remain “specific” in their business related interest.  Moreover, Belgian law, applied to all Brussels 
based organizations which constitute a majority of the registrants, requires that business associations be 
incorporated as “not for profit” organizations.  Also, the official definition of CSOs includes organisations 
representing economic players as set out at page nine of the Opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee on, “The role and contribution of civil society organisations in the building of Europe”(OJ 
C329, 17.11.99 p.30).  In line with this formal definition, up to this section and henceforth, my reference 
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to CSOs is inclusive of all types of CSOs, business organizations included.  I refer to “pure” CSOs when 
indicating organizations with a public cause at the core of their activity.    
Greenwood and Dreger compare the spending and lobbying personnel data of producer organizations 
and NGOs.  They found that (2013 p. 151), “each of the 104 organisations in the NGO category claim to 
have more than 50 people engaged in EU lobbying activities; by way of comparison, the best staffed EU 
business association, CEFIC, is at the high end in a declaration of 72 such staff”.   When comparing the 
last two categories of entrants to the Register and focusing on the Belgian based registrants only, the 
authors found that 88% of Category II (business related and trade union interests) had between one and 
ten lobbying personnel, whereas Category III (NGOs) had about 82% of entrants with lobbying personnel 
of between one and ten people.  
Upon examining the data on EU institutional grants and the declared recipients, narrowed down to the 
constituency of organizations with a Brussels address and a European interest field, the authors revealed 
that 41.2% or 169 NGOs received a grant during the previous 12 months.  Only 10.7% or 84 
trade/business/professional associations “received an EU grant in the preceding 12 months, although 
these mostly relate to participation in the EU’s research and technology development programmes, 
often alongside University partners”.  One Brussels based NGO called Food and Water (Watch) Europe 
receives grants totalling 6.4 Million Euros from the EU, constituting 96.7% of its total budget (2013 p. 
154). 
Finally, to complete a data based and current (January 2013) picture of interests in Brussels actively 
seeking to influence EU policy outcomes, Greenwood and Dredger estimate that around 75% of business 
related organizations, “active in engaging EU political institutions are in the Register”, with around 60% 
of NGOs with a European interest (p.147).       
These figures reveal fundamental similarities between NGOs and business organizations – in particular in 
the number of lobbyists per organization.  They also point to differences in funding sources with some 
“pure” CSOs depending sometimes heavily on Commission funding.     
A further fundamental difference comes to light when assessing the accountability relationships of the 
respective types of organization. Organisations claiming activities “in the public interest” should have the 
ability to demonstrate accountability to that public.  As we have noted from above though, several 
obstacles, not least questions raised about the level of deliberation and representation, might impair 
that claim.   However, as Steffek et al observe (2009 p. 35), “Many transnational CSOs have at least some 
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grounding in the citizenry and some potential to establish a communicative transmission belt between 
citizens (understood as their members, supporters and beneficiaries) and international organizations”.  
Business associations are tagged as special interest groups with a private commercial focus.  Their 
independence from governmental bias is not questioned. Moreover, they do not usually suffer from a 
lack of representativeness or transparency due to the business concerns of their members and the need 
for trust between direct business competitors.   For the same reasons, they might enact procedures, 
codes of conduct and follow stringent guidelines regulating the daily activities of the association, with 
governance structure preferences that reach beyond mere legal compliance. But what is the quality of 
their accountability if any to the EU public?  These organizations clearly have a say in the development of 
legislation or policy which then affects the daily lives of EU citizens.  Their participation in the policy 
process implies public accountability. 
2.2.5. A private cause and public vocation: 
In this last part of subchapter 2.2. , I discuss the potential for the accountability of business associations 
in their roles as CSOs, and identify the need to establish a public link for a private cause, such as that 
which drives a business association.  I refer to academic works by Piewitt and Steffek which are the two I 
can currently identify providing quantitative information on the existence of governance measures, 
which might bring about the public accountability sought, in CSOs participating in the EU policy process.     
The case studies in the second part of this work explore a possible public accountability link in given EU 
policy input circumstances for business associations.  This link must be verified by the application of an 
accountability process or mechanism.  The public element might take the form of a “public” 
representative taking part in a complaints panel.  It might come about also when “pure” CSOs together 
act as a forum.  The verification can only take place ex post facto and should assess not so much that an 
actor has acted in an accountable way but has knowingly acted in such as way as to be held accountable.  
But what instruments exist and are used by CSOs as accountability measures?   
In their focused study of 2009 on 60 CSOs, (including NGOs and business organizations and their 
beneficiaries, Steffek et al ask which formal processes were used as accountability measures, such as 
codes of conduct.  They found that ten out of 60 CSOs had no code of conduct, and that 12 did.  Out of 
these, eight had internal organizational codes of conduct, three CSOs had signed the INGO Accountability 
Charter (discussed in the next section) and a fourth had signed the Charter but the policy officer 
interviewed was not aware of it (Steffek et al. 2009 p. 26).   So what is the daily practice of 
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accountability, which can be verified ad hoc?  What types of CSO practice accountability using which 
measures, and when?  
Piewitt et al (2010 p.252) in their CSO study (an earlier version of which was Steffek et al’s 2009 article) 
counted the number of CSOs of their sample of 60 which claimed to have a form of self regulation.  They 
found that, “only 20% of CSOs claimed to have a written code of conduct, and in most cases this was an 
internal organizational code of conduct, such as “code of ethics” (WWF International). Four organizations 
claim to be committed to philosophical or religious values, such as the “Quakers’ testament” (QUNO) or 
“Franciscan values”.  The remainder indicated that they adhere to other documents or regulations, such 
as their organisation’s mission statement or staff manual, or to donor or national regulations for non-
profit organizations (e.g. “Belgian Law” for EuroCommerce or “European Commission” regulations for 
IHEU)”. 
 The data presented does not provide a further break down between the different types of CSOs using 
self regulation so that we are unable to provide figures in relation to business associations.  It does 
however provide information on the differing types of tools used under the heading of self regulation.  
These are codes of conduct, mission statements and staff manuals.  The choice of use of these tools can 
reveal a certain level of intention on the part of the organization to render itself accountable to the EU 
public or not.   For example, an application of the rules of the “internal codes of conduct” might indeed 
be used in a public accountability procedure when the rules affect engagement with that public.   
“Mission statements” however are normally intended to state the purpose of the organizations and what 
it hopes to achieve though this seems far from a form of self regulation.   “Staff manuals” might indeed 
address accountability in practice but are they freely consultable by the public?  Indeed, they might miss 
that vital element of transparency in order to link with the EU public.   
One of the organizations mentioned “legal compliance” as a form of self regulation.  However, legal 
compliance is not a matter of choice.  Governance structures can indeed be set up to ensure legal 
compliance, but accountability measures go beyond the minimum legal requirements and therefore act 
as deliberate demonstration of the will to render oneself accountable. Therefore, legal compliance 
cannot be equated to a choice or preference of governance structure which encompasses an 
accountability mechanism; it is a minimum level of administration from which any organization can act.             
Piewitt et al also looked at the existence of complaints procedures which are fundamental for members 
of the public to act upon any measure emanating from the organization in question.   From the 60 CSOs 
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interviewed 17 responded that they had no formal mechanisms, 13 of which stating that they deal with 
conflicts informally usually internally through discussion and debate with members concerned, but 
without a particular forum.  The 19 that have formal complaints procedures pointed to (p. 253), “a 
designated body (e.g. the Steering Committee, the Board, or the Secretary General) entrusted with 
resolving disagreements within the organization”.  But how effective would such internal bodies be (to 
the association in question) in solving  a dispute involving a third party, rival CSO or a member of the 
public ?.  An external element to the planned process would bring aspects of neutrality and transparency 
to any such procedure.  
The research undertaken by Steffek and Piewitt et al demonstrates a lack of cohesion amongst CSOs in 
understanding self regulation and overlapping roles in complaints procedures.  The research gathers 
differing accountability measures which deal mainly with aspects internal to the organizations such as 
resolving disputes between members. However, the authors do not focus on accountability measures in 
practice in business organizations, the rationale behind their adoption and the desired results of the link 
with the EU public.  Kohler Koch pointed to this gap when discussing grass roots accountability (2010b p. 
1135).  She states that, “it seems as if the positive image of civil society as a political actor, forcing 
decision makers “to put matters right” results from a methodological research bias.  Scholars have 
concentrated on the role of CSOs in extraordinary events… but have not looked in a systematic way at 
the daily business of EU accountability”.   This “daily business of accountability” evokes a way of 
operating as opposed to a willingness to render oneself accountable for a one off cause.  
Conclusion to 2.2.: 
Chapter 2.2.  has described the emergence of civil society and its expected role in the EU’s embracing of 
participatory democracy.   There are however limits to that participation on the part of CSOs, not least in 
relation to the expectations of deliberation.  I then describe the role of CSOs in the framework of 
accountability before focusing on interest specific type CSOs such as business organizations. This focus in 
turn reveals the challenge of reconciling the private commercial interests of business associations with 
those that are perceived to be in the public interest.  
This chapter 2.2., has given rise to questions which will be addressed in chapter 3 in the case studies.  
The questions arising will focus on establishing the existence or not of a link between business 
associations and the EU public.  They will first seek to qualify the unit of analysis within the CSO 
landscape of types and define the “specific interest” represented, the stakeholders and the funding 
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sources. The questions will seek evidence of deliberative practices as framed by Tanasescu and 
conditioned by Fischer, and ascertain the level – national or EU - at which these are undertaken.  I will 
then map the accountability relationships of the business organization examined and identify the tools 
or means by which the accountability is practised, as well as the regularity of the practice (although this 
is also determined by the rationale behind the practice, addressed below).   
The next sub chapter addresses the meaning of accountability, its purpose and the context in which 
accountability questions arise.    
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2.3. Providing a framework for Accountability 
Chapter 2.2.  established business associations as CSOs in the EU governance context of participatory 
democracy and the quest for legitimacy.   The legitimising potential of greater civil society 
participation in EU policy rests on the public accountability of those actors.  Yet, accountability, often 
confused with “responsibility” evokes promising notions of representation, transparency and 
legitimacy   which need to be aligned with and distinguished from the core concept itself.    
The following initial analysis discusses the concepts above drawing on literature in order to clarify 
how each one relates to accountability.  I then address the emergence of accountability as a 
governance concept in a historical context which sheds light on its current applicability and indeed 
growing importance for multilevel governance structures.   
In the second part of this section I seek to untangle the plethora of accountability definitions and 
types by distinguishing between contexts and desired outcomes of the application of an 
accountability process.  The argument is made for accountability as a governance choice or 
preference, lying beyond legal compliance.  The difference between internal and external forms of 
accountability as set out in the literature and how they relate to each other is described.   Finally, the 
case is made for a generic process to be applied to transnational actors and its potential to yield 
public accountability.  This section centres on the meaning and purpose of accountability.  
2.3.1. Distinguishing the core concept of Public Accountability; its emergence in the governance 
debate: 
The work of Bovens, a leading author on accountability in an EU context, has been decisive in shaping 
the debate in hard terms (Papadopoulos 2007, Curtin 2006, , Kohler Koch 2009, Persson 2009, and 
more).  He believes “accountability has become an icon for good governance both in the public and 
private sector” (Bovens 2006 p.7).   
Bovens defines accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgment, and the actor may face consequences”, (Bovens 2006 p.9).     
The author’s definition is prescriptive and detailed.  In the next section, I make the case for the 
generic application of a modified definition with a focus on the origin of the mandates to act and 
judge.  
The Bovens definition refers to a voluntary process applied ex post facto in a governance context, for 
a specific purpose and desired outcome.   The focus of this author on the process and not the context 
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widens the empirical application of this particular definition.  There are potentially multiple 
accountability relationships within an organization be it public or private with as many reasons for 
seeking accountability.  The analysis below distinguishes public accountability from other forms, its 
internal application for an external outcome.  It also presents an understanding of how the definition 
was derived, what is and what is not accountability, and how it fits into the governance debate.    
2.3.1.a. Accountability v. Responsibility 
In seeking to underpin the origin of the word, Bovens, (2005) identifies a shift in terminology from 
the traditional bookkeeping function of accounting in public administration to performance auditing 
and public accountability.  This shift would date back to the early 1980s when the UK’s Thatcher 
government introduced New Public Management and the US Clinton-Gore administration adopted 
the Reinventing Government Reforms.  According to Scott (2000) writing about the UK approach , 
(2000 p. 44) the shift “is, in part, a response to the recognition that “total control” models of state 
activity fail to deliver desired outcomes. The problem can be expressed in a number of ways: the 
limited capacity of central state institutions to know what is best provided by state intervention; the 
tendency of highly active states towards fiscal crisis; the risk that state actors will be diverted from 
pursuit of public interest outcomes to the exercise of public power for the pursuit of narrower 
private interests; and the limited capacity of the instruments of state activity (and notably law) to 
effect change in social and economic systems”.  
Private sector practices of outsourcing previously “public” activities led to a need for auditing the 
efficiency of newly created “public agencies” using key performance indicators and efficiency 
benchmarks.  Commenting on the US reinvented government reforms in 1998, Deleon (1998 p. 539) 
states that, “whether reinvented government implies worker empowerment, managerial discretion, 
or decentralization, it is widely thought to mean diminished accountability”. In her article she 
discusses types of accountability as applied in both the public and private sectors, to conclude that 
(p. 553), “different accountability mechanisms are appropriate in different circumstances, depending 
on an organization’s structure, which is in turn dependent (at least in part) on the type of problems it 
is designed to handle”.  
 Deleon focuses on professional accountability to single out a distinction with personal responsibility, 
and to reason as to the emergence of professional compacts (1998 p. 549), “the answer is that the 
way individual professional workers are held accountable is an internal, or organizational matter.  
But the way the profession itself is held accountable to society is an institutional matter”.  Would this 
suggest that accountability is an intrinsically “public” notion, with “external” properties and applied, 
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in a professional context, to a homogenous “group” of individuals?  The co-related features of 
responsibility would therefore be “private”, internal and applied to an individual alone? Yet, 
individuals such as senior civil servants are called to account for their carrying out of their 
responsibilities.  
Bovens (1998) sheds some light by providing a distinction based in time.  He argues that the basic 
significance of being made responsible lies in the fact of being liable to be held to account before a 
forum.  This would refer one presumes to task and role allocation within an organization, where 
hierarchical accountability might apply, and the manager has direct responsibility for the worker’s 
own acts.  The reference to a time lag is maybe more helpful when Bovens (1998 p.28-30) defines 
accountability as being a passive form of responsibility since occurring after the fact.  The post facto 
element of a calling to account is vital and undeniable since the deed needs to have occurred in 
order for the “agent” to describe the event.  
 The author identifies four criteria of, “accountability as responsibility” (1998 p. 29); i) transgression 
of a norm, ii)a causal connection iii)blameworthiness, iv)the relationship with the agent. Examining 
each of these in turn, it would appear unnecessary to require a transgression in order for an 
individual to be “accountable”.  The recounting of how a given responsibility is discharged might 
suffice.  The causal connection between the conduct of the person held to account and the 
transgression need only be tenuous in a situation for example of corporate accountability and 
therefore this criterion cannot be universally applied.  The notion of blame is sensitive and 
subjective, directly linked to responsibility as opposed to accountability.  It arises only when a norm 
has been transgressed with undesired consequences and not in the context of an account giving 
based on “how” type questions.  Finally, the relationship between the principal and the agent is a 
condition sine qua non without which there is no relationship on which to base the enquiry and 
therefore no expectations to be met.  This criterion would best be considered as a premise for the 
existence of an accountability mechanism.  One might argue however that the closer the 
relationship, the greater the responsibility incurred.                           
The UK and US managerial styles of devolved governance are more prominent in EU countries with a 
historical practice of free trade and a less intrusive and more devolved system of government.  
Bovens notes that, (2005 p.2) “countries with a strong tradition of administrative law and a strong 
“Rechtsstaat” such as France, Germany and Italy, have on average been less vigorous in adopting 
these more managerially oriented styles of governance and auditing.  Countries like The Netherlands, 
Sweden and Finland are intermediate cases (Pollitt et al. 1999 p.197)”.  The less centralised the 
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government structure, the more likely it is to delegate “public” powers to external agencies which in 
turn need to be held publicly accountable.   
In his reflections on the interplay between accountability and democracy, Papadopoulos (2010 
p.1031) describes the shift from government to governance in an EU context where policies are 
“formulated or implemented by networks involving public actors together with non public actors of 
different nature”.   He goes on to provide an example, “EU structural and regional policies exemplify 
multilevel governance”.  In brief, multi levelness (a technocratic version of which would include 
comitology) blurs the centre periphery divide and network governance blurs the state society divide.      
Papadopoulos further describes a distancing of networks from parliament by stating that “if decisions 
are prepared by policy networks the legislative function of parliament is affected; if they are 
implemented by them, it is their control function that is weakened” (p. 1034).  He then makes an 
interesting point on the chain of accountability, presuming that the longer the chain, the weaker the 
accountability, again placed in the context of democratic accountability with elected politicians.  He 
states that (p. 1035) “members of the bureaucracy are accountable to their political superiors who 
are subject to electoral sanctions; however, the length of the chain of delegation combined with the 
magnitude of administrative discretion makes their democratic accountability fictitious”.  One would 
argue that this need not  be so; again, with efficient accountability mechanisms in place, it would be 
naïve to suppose that a sanction can and will only fall at election time on the head of the 
parliamentarian and, that civil servants remain thus immune from the “consequences”.   
However, the following observation by Papadopoulos that “if multi level governance is uncoupled 
and remote from representative government, there are attribution errors in responsibility”…”the 
effectiveness of the democratic feedback loop is thus undermined” would appear pertinent.  This 
need not be so if the accountability mechanism caters to this typical state of affairs and addresses 
accountability throughout the decision making chain, as “internal accountability”.  The 
implementation of political decisions often depends on a network of actors ranging from civil 
servants to quangos which might act remotely from the “democratic” source, but this has long been 
a fact of political life in modern democracies. 
2.3.1.b. Accountability and  Representation  
This concept of distance from the delegating entity or principal is addressed by Pitkin (1967) in the 
context of the election of public officials.  She uses a nomenclature (1967 p.144) in which she 
contrasts the role of a delegate, where a representative is strictly bound by a mandate, with that of 
an agent, representing a principal.  From the perspective of accountability and the rendering of an 
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account, the delegate in the former, “closer” relationship would be “merely” required to 
demonstrate that he/she has respected the wording of the given mandate to the letter and is able to 
tick all the boxes provided.  In the latter set up, he/she would be required to demonstrate that 
he/she acted in the best interests of the represented. 
The greater the measure of freedom or distance, and, in the absence of a clearly delegated path to 
follow, the more salient the need for an accountability process becomes.  As Harlow (2008, p.177), 
writing about the need for a network concept of accountability, state, “The rapid proliferation of 
European agencies, and hiving off of policy responsibility to transnational and international network 
agencies (Gérardin, Munoz and Petit, 2005), renders a new theoretical approach the more 
necessary”.  The need for a focus on accountability also arises in the context of the EU where the 
perceived democratic deficit has led to increasing citizen participation in the decision making process 
since this greater inclusion of civil society in the policy making is said to offer, according to Persson 
(2009 p.3), a “promising complement to representative democracy (Smismans 2006; Finke 2007; 
Kohler Koch and Rittberger 2007)”.   However, civil society as such presents no “actor” quality; this 
role is taken up by civil society organizations.  
Kohler Koch (2010a p.104) argues that representation was not addressed in the governance 
approaches linking democratic participation and civil society organizations and deliberation.   
“Representation and governance do not go well together”; Kohler Koch states that this is true from 
two perspectives.  The first rests upon the fact that in the EU system, the Parliament and the Council 
are the decision makers and are therefore concerned with democratic legitimacy and representation.  
The Commission as the “executor” is more concerned with governance and hence 
representativeness. The author therefore states that, “democratic representation is not an issue for 
concern in relation to EU governance”.  She points to a particular historic-political context, to 
highlight that representation was absent from the governance debate around the White Paper on 
Governance of 2001.   The notion of the involvement of civil society was fashionable and favoured by 
Prodi, the incoming president of the Commission, due to the state of Italian politics, and easily 
encompassed, due to lack of need for Treaty reforms.  This approach also had the advantage of 
responding to popular discontent at the failures of the Santer Commission.   
The input for the Prodi position was sought from, amongst others, the Forward Studies Unit of the 
European Commission which pointed to i) doubt that experts can solve all problems and allow for 
smooth policy making; and the fact that ii) accountability applies only for formal decision making and 
parliamentary democracy is limited.  Therefore the solution was to involve more stakeholders, 
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allowing for a new mode of governance with wider involvement, and to redress inequalities of access 
and participation whilst increasing collective learning.  
With the input of internal working groups and interest groups in the consultation, the civil society 
debate moved towards a focus on better regulation and away from the need to make good the 
democratic deficit.   The result was that the final version of the White Paper pushed for greater 
involvement of civil society for more efficiency and democracy but did not address problems of wider 
democratic legitimacy for the EU and the need for a measure of accountability of these civil society 
actors.  
Papadopoulos in his observations on civil society (2010 p.1037) notes that NGOs in particular act as 
surrogates and use “self authorized” representation; “if representation is not based on any form of 
formal authorization ex ante, it requires at least some form of consent ex post on behalf of the 
represented”.   A more general point can also be applied to business associations which are usually 
specific interest organisations; the more an organization claims to represent diffuse interests – and 
thus legitimises itself by asserting that it is immune to capture by particular interests – the more its 
accountability to the population of reference becomes distant and fictitious.  However, the challenge 
for specific interest business associations whose mandate is traditionally derived from the 
membership is to legitimise its output in the wider governance context by engaging with civil society 
and rendering itself accountable through a process that links to the wider public.       
Papadopoulos focuses on another problem related to representation which goes beyond the mere 
identification of the constituent basis when he states that “empirical work (Saurugger 2008; Warleigh 
2006) shows that NGOs involved in EU policy making lack adequate internal democratic structures 
and that their supporters do not manifest a will to monitor their action” (2010 p.1037).  He states 
that “in order not to remain toothless (Schedler 1999 p.16-17), soft pressure necessitates strong 
norms.  Norms of appropriate conduct must be unchallenged by a community displaying strong 
cohesion – or, at least, persuasively defended by their advocates – so that power holders would have 
no other serious option than adhering to them.  This is not always the case.” (2010 p.1038). For 
NGOs  maybe, but not for business associations where contractual obligations and stringent internal 
accountability rules can be used as the missing “pressure” link.                  
Another aspect of decentralization of power from a national structure to that of the EU, in relation to 
representation, requires debate.  It is the correlated increase in difficulty for citizens, the electorate, 
to identify the origin of the power, the decision and hence to attribute responsibility to an actor. This 
difficulty, which is absent in the classical form of political or electoral accountability, gives rise to the 
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newer form of “stakeholder accountability”.  Lord and Pollack (2010 p.981) term this shift of the core 
of the problem as a shift from the problem of the accountability of a representative to that of the 
accountability through a representative.  They provide an example, “Thus in the case of the EU, the 
Commission is forced to compensate for its own limited ‘problem solving capacity’ (Bohman 1996 p. 
240) by accounting to groups whose active cooperation it needs to deliver its objectives.  Indeed, the 
Commission itself has been eager to present its procedures for consulting citizens and civil society 
groups as potential forms of ex ante accountability (European Commission 2001)”. Thus, the nature 
of EU decision making relies on the activities of a buoyant multiplicity of actors competing for 
executive approval in a policy making context of vying priorities.   This also indicates that the current 
EU political governance challenges call for greater clarity on the meaning of accountability for 
differing forms of social or political relationships.  
2.3.1.c. Accountability v. Transparency  
The questions surrounding the interplay between accountability, representation, representativity 
and the identification of actors, calls for a focus on transparency.   Benner et al (2004) writing about 
the accountability of actors (p. 200), assert that networks are a composite of their individual parts 
and that these parts need therefore not only be identifiable but transparent. They underline 
transparency as of key importance in particular information on internal responsibilities, voting rules, 
procedures and funding.  They claim that the greater transparency of individual actors will allow for a 
greater public scrutiny of the network actors and lead to higher standards of transparency.  However, 
transparency is a pillar of the accountability edifice, a concept inherent but not equivalent to the 
accountability relationship discussed.  The greater transparency of individual actors will allow for a 
greater public scrutiny of the network actors and lead to higher standards of governance.   
In his cross referenced breakdown, Bovens does not dwell on the all important aspect of 
transparency of the forum which Vibert (2007 p.5), in an assessment of the Accountability Charter for 
NGOs, defines as a classic dimension of accountability and as, “the importance of bodies to operate 
under well defined terms of reference so that outside observers can see that they are operating 
within their set of responsibilities”. He, however, refers to transparency later in his section on “what 
is not accountability” to state that transparency indeed, is not accountability, since it excludes the 
constitutive notion of scrutiny.  
Benner et al (2004 p.201) discuss transparency in some depth - to the extent that it appears to be 
considered as quasi synonymous with accountability - and emphasize the need for all internal 
procedures and structures to be open to scrutiny. They write that, “this applies to government 
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agencies, international organisations, corporations, foundations as well as NGOs.  Information on the 
internal division of responsibilities, voting rules and procedures and most of all on funding (sources 
and spending patterns) are crucial in this context”.       
Persson (2009) clearly positions transparency in this all encompassing web of defining components of 
accountability.  He writes (2009 p.144) that “transparency and accountability are intimately 
connected.  For citizens to be able to hold those wielding power to account, they must at the least 
have access to information on policy deliberations, decisions and the policy making process.  Hence, 
transparency can be considered a necessary but insufficient condition for accountability”.  
Papadopoulos (2007 p. 473) points to the distinguishing factor; “transparency lacks the element of 
sanction; it induces the accountability holdee to provide justifications for his or her action, but if 
these justifications are not considered satisfactory, the accountability holder has no possibility of 
imposing any sanctions”.     
The calling of actors to account therefore implies that the holder of accountability is sufficiently 
informed to have the data on which to base such a calling. The data could be gleaned from 
procedures of openness, transparency and access to information.  Esmark (2008) refers to this forum 
related aspect of accountability as “publicity”.  The process of decision or policy making itself 
requires monitoring, providing a continuous and transparent forum for observance of the process.  
Esmark (2008 p.285) speaks of the documenting of decisions echoing a contemporary challenge with 
the trend of seeking a policy footprint, and of access to these documents. 
Finally, Benner et al (2004) link transparency to legitimacy by defining internal accountability as 
related to process and external accountability as related to outcomes. They describe the 
accountability of processes as such: “networks are process oriented forms of governance” and the 
process will affect the form of accountability to be applied.    After this statement, the authors assess 
the transparency of a selection process for which they identify reputational accountability as an 
important mechanism.  Beyond this, they underline that there needs to be “clear terms of 
engagement in terms of common goals and guidelines for cooperation, clear timetables and decision 
making procedures” (p. 201), in other words, good management.  They point to the need to 
sometimes “in source” expertise and consult transparently.  Again the clarity as well as public 
information on the sources of funding is mentioned.  “Cooperation should not lead to collusion”, and 
again the authors feel the need to specifically refer to some features of good management (as 
consideration for elements of accountability mechanisms, without any clear differentiation between 
these features) in stating that, “a measure of competition and mutual checks and balances is healthy 
for accountability” (p.201). 
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The authors state that external accountability is related to the accountability of outcomes in which 
the focus becomes one of output legitimacy.  Since the work of such networks often does not 
translate into hard law, the effectiveness of networks will rely more on the persuasiveness of the 
results as judged internally and by the public. It is said at this point of the argument that “the 
accountability for outcomes in networks is important for the re-embedding of results” (p.205), i.e. 
seemingly that accountability affects the legitimacy of outcomes and hence the eventual public “buy 
in”.  The text then mentions the possibility of independent evaluations which can help to assess the 
process and outcomes of a network from an accountability viewpoint and that this is usually carried 
out ex post facto (for example, the World Commission on Dams conducted by the World Resources 
institute), but adds quixotically, that results can be monitored at different stages of the cycle.                   
All this to conclude that different networks will use different accountability systems with differing 
emphases, depending on the intended purpose of the exercise and desired outcomes.  Benner et al 
state however that transparency is the central element of any accountability system for multi- 
sectoral networks (p. 205).  Efficiency is not mentioned until the next paragraph where a lack of 
empirical evidence is deplored.  Indeed, using the right yard stick to improve legitimacy is important. 
2.3.1.d. Accountability and legitimacy  
“Accountability has come to be considered as a hallmark of democratic governance”,(Mulgan 2003), 
but it does not lend legitimacy per se.  So, in the light of the above argumentation how does 
accountability provide legitimising consequences?  
Risse asserts that (2006 p.7) “while accountability focuses on a particular relationship between 
actors, legitimacy refers to the particular quality of the social and political order. Institutions and 
rules are legitimate, not actors”.  However, Risse goes on to argue (2006 p.8), that input legitimacy 
consists of both internal and external accountability since, “if the agents involved in governance 
arrangements are both internally accountable to their “clients” – be it shareholders of firms, or 
citizens of governments – and externally to those who are affected by their decisions – the various 
“stakeholders” – input legitimacy should be assured”.  
Finally, accountability is also held by Risse (2006, p.8) to affect output legitimacy, in that if the 
governing actors have to justify their actions towards those who are affected by them, “this is likely 
to enhance the perceived problem solving capacity of governance arrangements.”    
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2.3.1.e. The emergence of accountability as a governance concept 
In exploring the etymological  roots  of accountability, Bovens refers to Dubnick (2002), according to 
whom the word originates  in Anglo Norman and dates back to 1066 and the requirement by William 
I, that all landowners render an account to him of their possessions and chattels.  These were then 
assessed by the Crown and listed in the Doomsday Books.  William’s original intention was to hold 
the population accountable to the Crown.  Our current understanding of the term however is a 
reflected image of its origin: the populace or civil society is to hold the “powers that be” accountable 
to them. 
Due to the EU context in which I am writing, it is worth noting that there is no exact equivalence for 
“accountability” in Germanic or Latin languages.  A German or Dutch term for answerability 
“Verantwortung”, touches upon and captures the hard aspects of the concept of accountability in 
evoking a process involving possible sanctions as well as a principal to agent relationship.  
Papadopoulos (2007 p.472) writes that “answerability strongly induces the rulers to anticipate the 
retrospective control by the governed. The damoclean sword of control fosters responsiveness to the 
preferences of the accountability holder: the more decision makers feel that they act in the shadow 
of possible sanctions, the more it will be rational for them to endogenise the preferences of their 
“principal””.  
The four main steps described by Bovens (2005) as constituting the historical transition from financial 
accounting to public accountability provide insight into the original purpose of accountability and its 
transformation into a governance concept.    
From compliance to performance: the classical accounting methods were set aside to make 
way for “value for money auditing” (Harlow 2002 p.19), where qualitative performance indicators 
prevail and no longer the application of quantitative criteria.  The focus has shifted from following a 
procedure to assessing the efficiency of an outcome. 
From internal to external accountability: the audience or forum for whom the exercise is 
carried out has changed from being the management hierarchy of an organization to external 
stakeholders, which, for public organizations or those that engage in quasi-governmental decision 
making as members of civil society, encompasses the public at large.  Bovens (2005 p.186) goes even 
further, describing a compulsion or obligation felt on the part actors, “agencies or individual public 
managers should feel obliged to account for their performance to the public at large or, at least, to 
civil interest groups, charities, and associations of clients”. The inclusion of this compelling need on 
the part of the individual seems superfluous.  The recognition, on the part of all citizens engaged in a 
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public activity of responsibility, that providing an account is part and parcel of the job would appear 
to suffice, foregoing the need to examine the moral inclinations of that same individual. In discussing 
the forum, Bovens refers to public reporting and the increased use of the internet as a window for 
presenting audit results, and uses the UK’s National Health Service trusts or school leagues tables as 
examples.  The internet is indeed a wonderful platform of indefinite magnitude for engaging with the 
public.  However, limited to publication, it does not of itself provide the opportunity for investigation 
which accountability promises.  
From financial to public goals: This stage describes the move from publicly reporting 
essentially on financial activities to reporting about a much wider set of public concerns.  This trend 
includes reporting on Corporate Social Responsibility on the part of private corporations.  Many such 
companies base their exercise on the Global reporting Initiative (http://www.globalreporting.com) 
although critics would state that this reporting is little more than a Public Relations stunt (Bovens 
2005 p.188).  
From vertical to horizontal accountability: Bovens describes the classic, traditional 
accountability system based on the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to Parliament as “vertical”.  
With the proliferation of public agencies, public managers have taken over operational 
responsibilities whilst ministers might only be directly involved in policy formulation or institutional 
arrangements.  The heads of agencies, who might be required to appear before legislative 
committees, national audit officers or be subject to administrative scrutiny bodies, are said to be 
practicing diagonal accountability.  The further step of horizontal accountability is therefore towards 
the media, interest groups or the public at large.  
In refining his own definition, Bovens et al point to a transatlantic divide and sets aside that 
interpretation known in American political discourse where, “accountability is used predominantly as 
a normative concept, as a set of standards for evaluation of the behaviour of public actors”, (Bovens, 
Schillemans and T’Hart, 2008 pp.226-227).  He focuses on a more narrow sociological definition 
referring to a specific social relation “following amongst others, Day &Klein (1987 p.5), Romzek and 
Dubnick (1998 p.6), Lerner and Tetlock (1999 p.255), Mc Candless (2001 p.22) Scott (2000 p.40), 
Pollit (2003 p.89) and Mulgan (2003 pp.7-14)”, (Bovens 2006 p.9).  The purpose of the system is to 
ascertain whether an agent can be held accountable after the fact, and not whether he or she has 
acted in an accountable way (Bovens et al 2008 p.227).   
The above analysis sets out what is and what is not accountability and positions each respective 
concept in relation to accountability as framed in the governance debate.  The questions raised 
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regarding representation looked at the circumstances in which the need for an accountability process 
might arise.  It is suggested that the greater the distance of the location of activity from the 
mandating body, and the wider the mandate, the greater the need for public accountability 
becomes.  However, an NGO claiming to represent diffuse interests such as animal rights will 
experience difficulty in deriving a mandate from those animals and hence identifying a key 
component of the accountability relationship.  For specific interests such as those promoted by 
business associations, the difficulty is not in identifying the mandator but in linking the cause to a 
mandate from the population at large; the public.   One of the means by which this problem has been 
addressed by the European Commission which is not directly elected by universal suffrage of the EU 
population is to seek ex ante accountability by accounting to groups whose cooperation and support 
it needs.  The case studies will demonstrate whether this scenario arises or not with EU business 
associations.  
Transparency is a pre-requisite to accountability.  It provides the principal with enough information 
to ask pertinent questions and to probe the behaviour of the actor.  Calling to or providing an 
account cannot occur without transparency. This last also allows for a greater involvement in number 
of principals or participants in a forum; it provides a window for the public.  Accountability allows the 
public to break through the glass and interact with the scene in “asking questions”.              
Legitimacy is not an interchangeable term for accountability but the latter aids in bringing about the 
former.  If a specific interest organization participates in a greater governance process such as the 
elaboration of an EU law affecting the wider public, the outcome would be more legitimate if a 
causal link can be established between the interest and that public. The aim of the case studies is 
also to ascertain the existence of that tenuous link in the internal processes adopted by the specific 
interest.  
The emergence of accountability in the narrow sense as a governance concept is linked to historical 
developments.  Accountability developed an external perspective potentially embracing the wider 
public and aims to assess performance or outcomes and no longer merely to verify if a given 
procedure was followed.  
But the literature refers to multiple kinds of accountability, the denomination being dependent on 
the given situation and the relationships involved.  The diverse typology and terminologies used are 
discussed below in 2.3.2.  with a view to refining our understanding of when and where 
accountability questions arise.  
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2.3.2. Typology and definitions: denominational drivers and functional commonalities  
In this second part of the section, I seek to identify definitions of accountability and match them to 
contexts or expected outcomes of accountability measures.  Accountability terms are often used 
interchangeably, leading to confusion on its value and weakening the possible effect.  
This part of the chapter identifies and aligns commonalities in the scenarios described in accountability 
literature.  The aim is to track the shift from democratic accountability to public accountability as a 
process applied in a transnational context to business associations. It is also to ascertain when and 
where the accountability questions arise.   A greater understanding of public accountability definitions 
and contexts allows for a more accurate assessment of accountability measures in the case studies 
below.  
 The analysis below is based on the works of six leading accountability authors. These authors were 
chosen because they directly address accountability as a governance concept taking the form of a 
process or mechanism as opposed to a possible “status”.  Their respective contributions shed light on the 
outcomes of accountability measures thereby providing a clear rationale for their application, but they 
also provide insight into the greater potential of accountability and its transferability to hitherto 
unconsidered structures.  
Accountability literature provides varying definitions according to different criteria including context, 
scenarios, aims and demands, actors and forums.  The first author, Bovens, provides the most 
prescriptive approach defining the main steps of the process and providing the basis for a possible 
generic definition requiring specific components for a procedure to qualify as that of accountability.  The 
order of literature presentation thereafter highlights accountability definitions, aspects which ascertain 
when and in which context an accountability question arises, how the concept has evolved to encompass 
more recent transnational governance models and the assessment criteria giving rise to accountability 
classifications.  The conclusions drawn and the proposed generic model set out at 2.4 will be deployed in 
sections below on the case studies to qualify the accountability process examined and verify the criteria.     
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2.3.2.a.  Bovens: towards a generic accountability process? :     
Mark Bovens, as previously referred to in 2.3.1. above, provides a prescriptive definition of 
accountability in his article; “analyzing and assessing accountability, a conceptual framework” (2007 pp 
447-468).   
Bovens sets out the premise by arguing that the development of appropriate accountability systems has 
not kept pace with that of European policy making and that the gap appears to be widening, leading to 
growing accountability deficits. He states that the concept of accountability is elusive, yet it is 
increasingly used and conveys an “image of transparency and trustworthiness” (Bovens 2007 p.448).  
Bovens claims that it is the type of forum, the nature of the obligation or the nature of the actor which 
will dictate the form of accountability sought.  These breakdowns merely point to the denomination 
referring to the context in which the question of accountability arises but do not modify the above 
Bovens definition.  
In asking to whom the account must be rendered Bovens identifies five different forums as venues for 
public organisations and officials as the chosen actors for this part of the argument (though this choice is 
not explicit).  Bovens states that the forums differ in the kind of information demanded and the criteria 
agreed as to what constitutes “responsible” conduct.  These five forums, named as “political”, “legal”, 
“administrative”, “professional” and “social” presented and analysed below.  
Political accountability: This type of accountability complies with the principal agent relationship. Voters 
delegate sovereignty to representatives, who delegate to a Cabinet of ministers, who then delegate to 
civil servants or administrative bodies. Indeed, Bovens states that “political accountability operates 
precisely in the opposite direction to that of delegation”. The author refers to the media as an informal 
forum for political accountability (2007, p. 455) which provides some degree of transparency to political 
proceedings.  But does it fulfil a deliberative role as democratic credentials would require?   
Legal accountability: This description (p. 456) concludes by stating that it is the most unambiguous type 
of accountability since the standards and process are written and available to all. The examples used 
take for granted that the actor is a public servant, but do not address an overriding constituent of the 
court system; that the public servant is first and foremost a citizen and that all are subject to the law.  
Different types of court are evoked e.g. special administrative courts set up to witness the HIV 
contaminated blood products scandal. Bovens makes no mention of the fact that the type of 
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accountability forum which will hear the account, or court in this case, is dictated by the nature of the 
act or crime.  Also, “legal accountability” would seem to carry a double emphasis in that the purpose of 
the law is intrinsically to call to account and then allocate responsibility.  I would suggest that an 
accountability process is therefore redundant when legal means, with written rules and established 
practice in dedicated structures such as courts are foreseen.   This analysis is addressed below discussing 
Ebrahim where I argue that governance choices such as the application of accountability mechanisms lie 
beyond legal compliance (which is not a “choice” itself).    
Administrative accountability: New forums have arisen in past decades; ombudsmen, audit offices and 
chartered accountants are mentioned amongst others. Bovens claims that they mainly exercise financial 
and administrative scrutiny based on written rules. This form of accountability, however, can also be said 
to be linked to the profession exercised by the actor.      
Professional accountability: Public managers who work in professional public organisations may in 
practice need to render account to professional associations or at disciplinary hearings.  The author 
states that these professional bodies promote standards of practice that are “acceptable” and “binding” 
on all members, though one might add that they also often develop “best practices”’ which are 
“recommended” to members.  Again, this type of accountability defined by Bovens is intrinsically linked 
to the nature of the work undertaken by the actor and might not be of wider public interest.      
Social accountability: This form is the least structured in the sense that it does not stem from established 
political, legal or administrative practices.  Bovens states that “agencies or individual public managers 
should feel obliged to account for their performance to the public at large, or at least, “to civil interest 
groups, charities and associations of clients” (note the term “feel obliged” discussed below which 
contradicts the true nature of an obligation where there is no place for “feelings”).  He points out a limit 
to the audience’s powers in that the possibility to sanction is sometimes lacking thereby removing this 
forum from the narrow definition of accountability.  Yet it is the element of sanction and the willing 
submission of the actor to face the consequences as a result of the process which renders the process 
“narrow”.  It is this form of accountability which is also referred to as “public accountability” by Steffek 
whereby the actor responds to the “public”.  The quality of that “public” acting as the forum, whether it 
be composed of citizens at large or representatives (mandated or not) of civil society organisations, is of 
key importance to the validity of the desired consequences. The democratic credentials of the forum are 
directly linked to the legitimising potential of the entire accountability process.             
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 This form of accountability is indeed a governance choice unlinked to the requirement of legal 
compliance.  It does not arise from a specific profession, contractual obligation, or set practice and can 
be adapted to all situations that comprise the components as presented in the Bovens definition of the 
accountability process.  
Bovens writes that the nature of the actor will also point to an accountability denomination and that 
there are four accountability strategies for overcoming the problem of many hands, supposedly 
prevalent in the hierarchies of governmental agencies.  
 Corporate accountability: The author draws several parallels between private corporations and public 
organisations which enjoy independent legal status. Corporate type liabilities are also extended to these 
last, with the exception of criminal liability (though, in more recent legal developments, environmental 
damage can lead to penal redress).    In fact, only Norway, Denmark and Ireland accept criminal liability 
for governmental bodies.   The tradition of transparency in Scandinavian countries might be related to 
this fact.  Bovens states that the organisation as a whole is to be held to account for the collective 
outcome. Practically speaking, does this mean that the highest person in the hierarchy would feature in 
the rendering of that account? Whose head might fall in retribution? These questions are not explored.  
Hierarchical accountability: This form of accountability seems more credibly applied to the situation 
described above where a collective approach just appears impractical at the least.  
In the current system, the highest official is called to publicly account although he might seek “internal” 
accountability in the lower ranks thereafter.  The middle managers are a forum for holding the lower 
ranks to account and can also be actors in turn to render account to the upper levels.   
Collective accountability: With this approach, every member of the organisation can be held accountable 
for the organisational misconduct. This is however limited in application and morally unclear since one 
would suggest that this strategy can only be fairly applied to small collegiate bodies such as the 
European Commission.  
Individual accountability: A means by which one might resolve the moral acceptability problem described 
above is to hold each person accountable for his or her actions only. This is said to be a characteristic of 
professional accountability.     
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Moving on to denominations derived from the nature of the obligation, Bovens refers to yet three more 
types of accountability. “Vertical accountability” is noted when the forum has the power to compel or 
summon the actor to provide an account. Examples are a hierarchical professional relationship or a court 
of law summoning a witness to appear.  When the forum cannot compel the actor to render an account, 
due to a lack of hierarchical relationship, the term “horizontal accountability” can be used.  This is typical 
of when a public agency feels morally obliged to account for deeds.  “Diagonal accountability” is typified 
by an audit office which is hierarchically independent but reports to a minister from whom the informal 
power is acquired.   
I would suggest that the weight of the obligation, its compelling nature, the “stick or the carrot” might 
also be explored here.   One usually speaks in terms of legal and moral obligations.  A legal obligation 
includes all processes covered by the courts of law and professional tribunals by virtue of the contractual 
relationship between employer and employee, or membership of a regulatory body for independent 
professionals.  A moral obligation would include all the above “political relationships” and the activity of 
the forums described as civil society groups.  
Having set out accountability denominations according to the nature of the forum or the actor in the 
process Bovens then seeks to assess the effects of accountability by setting out perspectives of 
assessment.  He quotes Aucoin and Heintzman (cited in Bovens 2007 p. 462) and discusses the three 
perspectives which arise from the quote; “Accountability is important to provide a democratic means to 
monitor and control government conduct, for preventing the development of concentrations of power, 
and to enhance the learning capacity and effectiveness of public administration”. The three perspectives 
are discussed below. 
 The Democratic Perspective: popular control 
Public accountability is an essential tool for a democratic process and rests upon the principal agent 
relationship whereby citizens vote for representatives who appoint ministers, who entrust them with 
tasks for public bodies populated by civil servants who will render the account.  Accountability here 
provides the citizen with information and the means to judge governmental conduct.     
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The Constitutional Perspective: prevention of corruption and abuse of power 
An accountability forum such as a Chamber of Audits or an independent body with judicial powers can 
provide the necessary checks and balances to the inappropriate use of excessive power applied by a 
government supported entity. Although the notion of good governance is touched upon here, the 
question of legitimacy is sadly absent.  
The learning perspective: enhancing government effectiveness     
The purpose of accountability mechanisms can also be inscribed in the striving for optimal efficiency of 
an organisation. This arises from being subject to public scrutiny or a public process, as well as its result, 
combined with the threat of punishment.   Bovens states that the existence of an open process in which 
governmental delegates or administrators justify their acts and in which citizens can put questions 
increases the acceptability of that government and confidence in the administration. Whether it 
inherently lends more legitimacy to that administration is not addressed. 
The Bovens approach to interpretation of accountability yields a definition, five “types” of accountability 
identified according to the nature of the forum, four types identified according to the nature of the 
actor, and three types according to the nature of the obligation.  Add to this three perspectives from 
which to assess the effects of accountability.  
 This is the most prescriptive approach examined in literature addressing accountability and appears 
somewhat overworked.  It does however provide an essence of accountability through identifying 
commonality in the given situations addressed in the types.   This essence led Bovens to draw up the 
definition applied.   
The EU context of the role of civil society organisations in multilevel governance structures is not 
addressed directly.  The Bovens examples are based on classical western national government structures 
with no reference to the transnational potential of organisations in accountability models. 
The selected authors below adopt differing governmental structures for their assessments of 
accountability. Their insights better qualify where and when accountability questions arise and justify the 
use of accountability as a process.  
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2.3.2.b. Ebrahim: the inducement theory and accountability beyond legal compliance:   
Ebrahim, writing about the practice of accountability as mechanisms for NGOs, categorises a tool or 
process against the beneficiary of the accountability process.   Interestingly she lists the “inducement” 
for each category and finally the result or response, this last mimicking the Bovens perspectives.  
Ebrahim’s study is limited to NGOs operating in an international context and addresses concerns of the 
lack of accountability of NGOs and a “series of highly publicized scandals that have eroded public 
confidence in non profit organisations”, (2003 p. 813).   
Her conclusions (2003 p. 824) address the dual perspective of internal and external accountability, not 
unlike the classical interpretation of democratic accountability.  She deals with the definitions of 
accountability which include “being held responsible” by others, thereby corresponding to the external 
dimension and “taking on responsibility”, which corresponds to the internal dimension. Ebrahim (2003 p. 
813) quotes Edwards and Hulme (1996, p.967), who define accountability as “the means by which 
individuals and organisations report to a recognised authority (or authorities) and are held responsible 
for their actions.” 
The external and internal aspects are examined respectively as “inducements”, acting as the motivation 
behind the adoption of the accountability mechanism.  For example (from table 1 “characteristics of 
accountability mechanisms” page 825), if the tool or process applied by the NGO is “disclosure”, the 
internal inducement is that this is a legal requirement in order to gain not for profit fiscal status.  The 
external inducement element is derived from the funding requirement or the “external threat of loss of 
funding or tax status”.  The accountability target, which answers the question of “accountability, to 
whom?” is defined as being “upwards” to funders and oversight agencies and “downwards” to clients or 
members who read the reports.  Finally, the element of “organisational response” is said to be either 
“functional”, or “strategic” and interpreted as addressing short term needs and long term positioning 
respectively. For the example of disclosure, the organisational response is said to be “primarily 
functional”.  
As with Bovens, above, there is little distinction in these interpretations between legal requirements 
imposed by statutes or contractual obligations and voluntary practices designed to address long term 
goals such as reputation management.  The legal requirements are indeed functional and tend towards 
addressing compliance with the law of the land.  Legal requirements posing as accountability 
mechanisms fall short of the connection with the public at large in the guise of individual citizens, and 
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not “the Public” in the guise of the State.   Indeed, the “forum” which hears the disclosure account takes 
the form of the State or the Internal Revenue Service (for the UK), or its agency.   
Ebrahim’s fourth example of an accountability tool or process in her table 1; is “self regulation”, clearly 
positioned outside statute books.  She answers the question of accountability to whom by stating that 
NGOs render themselves accountable to themselves, “as a sector” and “potentially to clients and 
donors” i.e. currently including members of the public at large.  There is no mention of “upwards or 
downwards” for this example. The inducement is said to be both internal and external, the risk being the 
“erosion of public confidence due to scandals and exaggeration of accomplishments (external loss of 
funds and internal loss of reputation)”. The organisational response for this non statute based tool is 
clearly strategic “in that it concerns long term change involving codes of conduct”.  
In summary, public accountability lies outside statute books and caters to the public as individuals and 
citizens, not the State. This might also explain why Ebrahim did not qualify the forum (“accountability to 
whom?), which should include or represent the public, as being upward or downwards.  The 
organisational response when the need for public accountability arises is clearly strategic and to take the 
form of a long term practice.  It goes beyond the functional purpose of legal compliance.  The Ebrahim 
inducement for public accountability might be closely related, as that of the tool of self regulation, to the 
core purpose and activity of the organisation in question. An NGO needs to enjoy a good reputation if it 
relies on donations from the public and a business association needs to continue to support the business 
or industry in question through its activities.     
2.3.2.c. Goodin: results based market accountability:  
 Writing in the context of not for profit organisations, Goodin discusses typology derived from 
accountability regimes. His approach of analysis is based on identification of a sector or political context.  
This contextualisation however points directly to the type of actor in the accountability exercise, thus 
reflecting the Bovens approach of first identifying the actor and then the forum in order to classify 
accountability types. 
He states that “accountability is a concept that takes a three part predicate.  Accountability is of some 
agent to some other agent for some state of affairs,” (2003 p.364).  He notes that the subject of 
accountability, what people would be held accountable for, centres on actions, results or intentions. The 
system by which people can be held accountable is also broken down into three categories which he 
then illustrates with three different sector based scenarios.  
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The first addresses the state sector and accountability of public administrations, the actors of which are 
civil servants.  State sector actors are the subject of accountability through their actions.  The system by 
which they are held accountable is hierarchical in that the actor must demonstrate that he/she has acted 
within the mandate.  Goodin sets out the internal chain of command by stating that; “subordinates are 
accountable to superiors, who are accountable to higher officials in turn, who are (after however many 
links in the chain) accountable to elected officials who are accountable to the electorate.  The electorate 
thus sits at the pinnacle of a large set of nested hierarchies that constitute “the state””, (p.369). 
Interestingly, Goodin interprets the practice of what might be termed “public administrative” 
accountability as resting on hierarchical systems applied within the public administration which might 
equally be applied to the private sector.  The Bovens reference to corporate accountability also includes 
this system of internal scrutiny.  
In the market sector, therefore where corporations are key actors, Goodin refers to the subject of 
accountability as being “results based”, or dealing with “the bottom line” measured by income and 
profit.  The internal process of accountability can be described as that of the firm’s officers facing the 
shareholders, whereas the external side can be “the way in which the market sector justifies itself both 
to society at large and to consumers in particular”, (p. 371).  The author defines the mechanism of this 
type of accountability as competition based.  Market accountability based on demands and expectations 
of consumers takes on a wider public dimension which might indeed encompass society at large when 
consumers enjoy ease of access to information about the actor and can make choices based on their 
analysis of that information.  I would suggest that this form of market accountability could equally be 
applied to non-governmental organisations, pure CSOs, seeking and competing for funding from the 
general public or from governmental or intergovernmental donors sensitive to public perception.  If the 
market encompasses the general public then, in certain circumstances, market accountability might shift 
closer to “public accountability”, the circumstances resting on the importance of transparency and 
participation to be able to hold actors to account.   
The third and last sector addressed by Goodin is named the “non-profit sector”.  He again speaks of 
sectors but refers quickly to actors, in this case “non profit managers and workers”, (p.373).  He places 
emphasis on the intentions of these actors and states that they are “responsible for – their subject of 
accountability – is, to a much greater extent than in the other two sectors, manifesting good intentions 
appropriate to the non profit’s formal goals”.  But what of the accountability mechanism applied?  
Goodin proposed that non profits hold each other accountable through network based mechanisms.  He 
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suggests that “the real solution to securing accountability in such settings is through monitoring and 
reputational sanctioning among a group of like minded others.  The key agents, here, are networks of 
people sharing a common core of norms and values, mutually internalising the views of one and other” 
(p. 375).  Goodin (p. 376) writes less of the actual steps in the process of accountability than Bovens 
(2007) and quotes Keohane and Nye (2002, p. 239-240), “professional associations create and maintain 
transnational norms to which IGOs, NGOs and government officials can be judged accountable”.   
The practice, by non-governmental organisations and the Press, of “naming and shaming” of 
transnational corporations with valuable brand names, also provides a sort of accountability.  In this 
example of a form of sanction, not of a process, Goodin focuses on an outcome arising in effect from two 
opposing international actors said to be operating in the same network.  Although I believe some form of 
peer pressure is inevitable and successful in networks for gearing actors towards best practice the 
effectiveness of this form of “soft” accountability would all but disappear in overlapping networks. 
Goodin acknowledges the other limitations of network based accountability (p. 387) when writing that 
networks “can be conspiracies against the public or cosy cabals covering one another’s incompetence as 
easily as they can be collaborations in pursuit of true public goods”.            
In summary, basing himself on a given political context Goodin, as with Ebrahim, notes the internal and 
external aspects of the accountability.  Moving away from the classical form of democratic or electoral 
accountability, Goodin introduces market accountability not identified by Bovens.  This last form 
operates equally for NGOs mindful of and vulnerable to reputational deficits which might impact donor 
generosity, as for business related entities such as associations.  Indeed, business associations composed 
of competing members are equally vulnerable in that their reputations might depend on the good 
behaviour of each and all of its members active in a highly visible consumer market.      
2.3.2.d. Bluemel: matching functions and types of NGO accountability: 
Bluemel (2005 pp. 141-206) directly addressed the role of accountability for NGOs operating in an 
international context and argues that it is the function of the NGO and not the actor which defines the 
type of accountability to be applied.  He writes that, “as NGOs perform different functions, the level of 
power they wield over an international governance system changes, and therefore the strength of 
controls based on internal accountability and external accountability to the regime itself should vary 
according to the importance of its function and level of control over outcomes” (p. 156).    
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 The author seeks to position the discussion away from concerns over the democratic accountability of 
NGOs covering questions such as representativeness, elections and the activities of the actor, towards an 
analysis of the functional roles of NGOs in a governance context and how these roles relate to 
accountability theory.  Bluemel quotes Keohane ( 2002 p.144); “accountability refers to relationships in 
which principals have the ability to demand answers from agents to questions about their proposed or 
past behaviour, to discern that behaviour, and to impose sanctions on agents in the event that they 
regard the behaviour as satisfactory”.  This definition refers to the need for answerability of the account 
holdee to the account holder.  Its construction, referring to the relationship between principal and an 
agent or actor, the ability to ask questions and the reference to a sanction, is very close to that of 
Bovens.        
Moving beyond democratic accountability, Bluemel relies on control mechanisms derived from the 
delegatory system of governance referenced by Grant, Nye and Keohane which centres on NGOs 
operating in an international context (http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/nye/ggajune.pdf).    These 
identify no less than seven types of accountability relevant to NGOs operating in an international 
context; fiscal, market, supervisory, legal, peer, reputational and hierarchical.   Bluemel matches these 
types to the function in which they might be used, divided into three categories; political activities, 
administrative duties and enforcement.  These three categories then each give rise to tasks; e.g. “agenda 
setting” is one of three political activities.  He then identifies three groups of accountability holders as 
the “internal membership”, “external beneficiaries” and “external regime” (by which he means the set of 
rules required for national legal compliance). The importance in relation to both the membership 
(internal accountability) and the beneficiaries and the regime (external accountability) is proposed per 
function as well as the type of accountability to be applied. For example, “agenda setting” is of high 
importance to members which can apply hierarchical accountability to this function but of lesser 
importance to the beneficiaries of the regime where hierarchical and peer accountability could be 
applied respectively for that same function.  
Having analysed this breakdown, which is indeed very relevant to the aim of a deeper understanding of 
when and where accountability questions arise (but may be most appropriate to international NGOs 
only) the author then advocates standardising the accountability procedures per function of the NGO, 
divided into the three above mentioned categories of political activities, administrative duties and 
enforcement.  Whilst Bluemel recognizes and describes a multiplicity of differing accountability 
situations both internal and external to the entity examined, he fails to address the overriding question 
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of the purpose of the application of a procedure or the desired outcome, such as verifying legitimacy 
claims in order to obtain more state or public funding. 
Some of the internal function examples provided by Bluemel such as “training and information” could be 
understood to be inherent to a professionally run organization whether it is an international NGO or 
business association seeking to follow best practice.  Other such functions listed by the author such as 
certification are in fact mainly founded in legal compliance with the purpose of obtaining a fiscal 
advantage and should maybe not be attributed to internal governance issues which imply optimization 
beyond mere compliance.  In fact, for this function of “certification”, and in the column defining the 
accountability holders as the “external regime”, Bluemel equates two different accountability types 
which sit strangely together; fiscal and supervisory accountability.  These would appear, in practice, to be 
intrinsically internal since dealing with mainly administrative tasks and obligations.  
In summary, the matching of functions to accountability types provides insight into the pervasive nature 
of accountability and its applicability to both internal and external scenarios alike, this aspect being also 
identified by Ebrahim and Goodin.  Bluemel creates a confused setting with overlap between both 
scenario types but points to the interplay between them and their inter-reliance.  In his section on 
harmonising domestic procedures (2005 p. 189) Bluemel notes that internal accountability controls are 
best complemented by externally imposed constraints such as advisory boards or financial conditionality.  
The author addressed the situations in which accountability questions might arise in some detail but did 
not discuss the breakdown of actions to be carried out, or guidelines to be applied per procedure limiting 
himself to reiterating why the type of accountability is important for each function.  
2.3.2.e. Deleon: professional accountability and its limits    
Deleon discusses accountability in the context of the US re invented government (1998 pp.539-558), 
where central government devolves power to external agencies which are, in effect bureaucracies.  
Holding these closely to account for all minor actions would defeat the purpose of devolution and stifle 
quality in output.  She explores different types of accountability based on Romzek and Dubnick (1991) 
and focuses her analysis on professional accountability as a means of building public trust.  
She writes that (1988 p. 546), “for the purpose of this analysis, the important point is that accountability 
for results is possible only where goals are clear, and accountability for process is possible only where 
there is general agreement as to which processes are the most (or only) appropriate ones – the “best 
practices” in management vernacular.”  This distinction seems to overlook the rationale behind the 
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existence of an accountability question, in that accountability arises when there is a doubt that desired 
results might be obtained.  The effort would therefore lie in the process followed in order to increase the 
chances of obtaining the desired results.  On the other hand, rigorous application of the process would 
whitewash any result obtained.  Accountability questions also tend to arise concerning tasks of an 
“expert” as opposed to those of an low skilled worker, amongst other reasons, because the 
administrative effort or burden required to carry out an accountability process would discourage the 
organization from applying it on a daily basis for “mundane” tasks. 
Echoing Bluemel, Deleon states that the “clearest conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that 
different accountability mechanisms are appropriate in different circumstances, depending on an 
organisation’s structure, which is in turn dependent (at least in part) on the type of problems it is 
designed to handle.” (1998 p.553).  Indeed, an organisation’s structure will usually depend on its 
purpose as will the skill set and experience of the people who work in it.  But again, accountability 
mechanisms are likely to apply in a given set of circumstances where the process applied or undergone 
by the actor needs to be verified against the expectations of the principal.  The mechanism and steps 
themselves can be generic and conform to the Bovens definition; the circumstances of the activity as 
well as the outcomes might not.   
Deleon draws a second conclusion from her analysis (1998 p. 554); “overlapping accountability 
mechanisms….may be the result of differences in the way problems are perceived at different times or 
by different groups”.  Certainly, accountability mechanisms can centre on a particular aspect of the 
mandate or activity.  But this could be the focus of the type of questions asked in a forum and not really 
impact the steps themselves in the application of a mechanism.  Different groups might hold different 
perceptions but the purpose of the exercise should be a matter that all involved agree upon.  The 
expected or desired outcomes can denote an emphasis just as Bovens evokes in his description of 
perspectives; learning, constitutional or democratic. 
Deleon addresses the matter of internal or external accountability for professional organizations very 
succinctly; “the way individual professional workers are held accountable is an internal, or 
organizational, matter.  But the way the profession itself is held accountable to society is an institutional 
matter”.  She neatly draws a line between the individual accountability of a professional and the public 
accountability of a profession. One might draw this argument further by stipulating that each 
professional conducts himself in a professionally accountable way by adhering to internal rules.  The 
adherence of each professional to these rules will provide a sum equivalent to external or public 
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accountability of the profession.  This would underpin the proposal, in this context of a “professional 
society” type organisation at least, that public accountability cannot exist without internal 
accountability.  
But what of the adherence to a prescribed set of rules? Deleon writes of an “organizational philosophy” 
or a “basic set of principles of operation”, (p. 550) for professionals who can justify their actions by 
proving that they acted in compliance with those same principles. She points out that Codes of Conduct 
have been used in the professions for many years but it is their enforcement, or the credibility of their 
enforcement which poses problems.  “Codes are only a small step, however.  A much more important 
second step is to enforce them, and most experience with professional review panels is discouraging, 
since professions tend towards lenience when clients or citizens allege wrongdoing against a 
practitioner”.  Might this lack of credibility which undermines the rationale of the application of an 
accountability mechanism be overcome by looking at the composition of the said review panel and 
ensuring a “public” representative as well as transparency of the process and results?           
In summary, Deleon’s focus on professional accountability refers to codes of conduct as the tool for 
measuring compliance during an accountability process.  This self same tool in an internal context can 
take the form of a service level agreement annexed to a contract of employment.  Adherence to this 
agreement however would merely result in legal compliance.  It is when an external assessment is 
required to have an effect on the public at large that an accountability mechanism might be applied.  
However, that external exercise would be not practicable without the prior existence of the internal one.                  
 
2.3.2.f. Koenig –Archibugi: public accountability for transnational actors : 
The above cited authors have written about accountability concepts in the context of national 
governments (Goodin and Bovens) or international relations (Bluemel and Ebrahim) mainly from the 
view point of NGOs (pure CSOs in the examples provided) or government agencies.  Commonalities in 
relation to typology and drivers which point to an accountability type and its application have been 
identified.  The form of accountability process, leading to use of certain terminology, is dependent on a 
trigger such as the nature of the actor, the forum, the inducement or the outcome.  Despite this, 
differences in vocabulary between different types do not change to a great degree the steps of an 
accountability procedure, as set out by Bovens.  The literature on the actual process itself, as opposed to 
its nature and hence type, is sparse.   
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The inter reliance, overlap and co existence of varying mechanisms is indeed taken up by the authors 
and the internal (professional accountability) and external types (social, market or public accountability) 
are defined as such in relation to the respective drivers (actor, forum, outcome).  The internal types of 
accountability for NGOs, for example, which might lead to classification of non-profit status for fiscal 
reasons, are sometimes based in legal compliance with national laws and hence outside the context of 
governance structure preferences; a particularity which is not addressed.  
 Deleon alone, discussing professional accountability, points to an accountability “format” as being a 
code of conduct.  She underlines that it is the enforceability of that code and the credibility of the 
outcome which underpins its viability. The enforceability of a system depends intrinsically on the 
“consequence” or sanction component of the process.  Ebrahim writes of inducements which bring 
about a positive “consequence” for NGOs, for example, seeking that not for profit fiscal status.  There is 
little reference however in the above analysis to sanctions or negative consequences of accountability 
procedures which in effect would justify their application.  It might be argued that the voluntary nature 
of NGOs would mean that the threat of a sanction for any given actor would risk discouraging all activity 
and taking on of responsibility.  Does the sanction element become more prevalent for public actors that 
do not qualify as “pure” CSOs or NGOs in view of a lack of need for the voluntary nature of activity?         
What of the public accountability of non NGO transnational actors? Do the Bovens definition and its 
prescriptive steps apply to such scenarios?   
Koenig Archibugi (2010) tries to ascertain whether there is something inherently distinctive about 
accountability in transnational spaces as compared to domestic contexts.  He argues that accountability 
can be used as a means to better elucidate relationships of communication and power and clarify core 
features, dynamics and implications. This is certainly true for complex governance models inherent to 
the relationship between business associations and the EU.   
Koenig Archibugi examines conceptualization of accountability and concludes that there are no great 
differences between the public administration (Bovens), democratization studies (Schedler 1999) and 
international relations (Grant and Keohane 2005) definitions of accountability.  He notes that the 
substantial overlap in typologies identified is a “further indication of significant similarities across the 
domains” (2010 p. 1144).  I would assert that it also supports the proposal for a generic definition of 
accountability as set out by Bovens.  There are however two types of accountability presented by this 
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author which are of direct relevance to the role of business associations in the EU policy process; market 
and surrogate accountability. 
The first, “market accountability”, was discussed in the context of NGOs by Goodin.  Interestingly, the 
Bovens definition does not include the market as a mechanism for accountability. Koenig Archibugi 
remarks (2010 p. 1144) that “market based power relationships are important in a political domain that 
lacks overarching stateness”, which is true to the activities of business associations in an EU policy 
context.  He points out that International Relations authors Grant and Keohane (2005) go even so far as 
to exclude electoral accountability from their list of accountability mechanisms due to its lack of 
relevance to global institutions. Koenig Archibugi adds that (2010 p. 1144), “This exclusion rests on the 
argument that there is no global public that could function as a forum for global democratic 
accountability”. There is also no EU demo, identified as a public.   
Keonig Archibugi refers to a second distinction of greater interest to how business associations work in 
practice, drawn up by Rubenstein (2007) between standard and surrogate accountability.  In standard 
accountability, “the accountability holders endorse standards, receive information about the power 
wielder’s compliance with those standards and help to sanction power-wielders. In surrogate 
accountability each of these actions…can be performed by a third party on behalf of the accountability 
holder”.  Here, accountability holders cannot sanction the surrogate and surrogates are not links in 
chains of accountability.  This distinction as applied to the role of an accountability forum assessing the 
activities of an association executive raises interesting questions not least in relation to the level of 
surrogacy an actor can carry, and whether the forum is a power wielder able to sanction or not.  Koenig 
Archibugi points out that the distinction is usually difficult to apply in practice “because of the difficult of 
determining empirically when an actor genuinely acts on behalf of another, less powerful actor, instead 
of simply promoting its own interests and values”.    
 The ability to impose sanctions is crucial for the performance of an accountability mechanism. Koenig 
Archibugi states that the threat of sanction is the essence of surrogate accountability but points to a 
major obstacle for the transnational context. Indeed, the greater physical and social distance between 
surrogate sanctioners and the intended beneficiaries “reduces the ability of the former to understand 
the preferences and situations of the latter” (2010 p. 1157). 
 The author notes that surrogate versions of accountability are particularly common in transnational 
relations, as opposed to a national domestic context, for three reasons (p. 1150): “1)structural 
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inequalities in the global system mean that the power differentials between accountability holders and 
power wielders are usually greater than domestically; 2) at the transnational level there is a lack of 
formal institutions that would allow the operation of standard accountability; and 3) the larger social and 
physical distance between accountability holders and power wielders reduces the breadth and depth of 
common life world experiences as well as the intensity and velocity of communication, which hinders 
standard accountability”.                
But what of the aim of accountability in a transnational context? The above cited authors write in terms 
of typology, triggers and desired outcomes specific to a process.  The granting of a fiscal not for profit 
status however is particular to legal compliance with national fiscal requirements, the compliance with 
which will bring about the desired outcome in a clear causal link.  But what of transnational actors, 
legally compliant in their country of main activity, and which use due process in their existing governance 
structures? What is the incentive to render oneself accountable in an international context, by adopting 
structural governance preferences?   Koenig Archibugi directly addresses the purpose of the application 
of an accountability process by arguing that accountability is aimed at enhancing legitimacy. 
“Accountability is demanded, supplied and studied mainly because of the expectation that it will 
contribute to establishing, maintaining or enhancing legitimacy.  Arguably, accountability is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for legitimacy… But there are reasons to believe that 
accountability is likely to enhance the legitimacy of power in the eyes of those who have 
delegated it and of those who are affected by it – as well as being normatively desirable from a 
more impartial point of view”.(2010 p.1146).  
In contrasting the domestic and transnational relations context, the author argues in line with Steffek 
(2003) that states are subject to special demands of legitimacy “as the relationships of domination they 
embody are largely involuntary” whilst, since transnational governance arrangements do not possess 
that characteristic and “thus the demands on their legitimacy are different and generally weaker” (2010 
p. 1153).   I would take this last conclusion with great caution as applied to the EU governance context 
which operates under close scrutiny and less obscurity for the EU population than maybe an 
international organization. Indeed, the higher the level of authority – in particular for the EU’s 
supranational infrastructure – the higher the demand for legitimacy.    
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Koenig Archibugi (p. 1158) writes that, NGOs have been, “hailed as agents able to stimulate and sustain 
democratic accountability”, and that civil society organizations may promote transnational democratic 
accountability by contributing to the establishment of governance arrangements that operate 
independently from state power”. 
 What form would these rules take? The author notes, (p. 1153), that accountability mechanisms can be 
built into the constitutions of the governance of an organization or added on after as reporting 
requirements.  Another invective for accountability regimes to be added to the voice of the principals or 
the supporters is that of competition between agencies for funding, policy input credibility or simply 
popularity, applicable to all CSOs EU business associations and pure CSOs alike. 
Conclusion to 2.3.:   
This chapter 2.3., has set out the core concept of accountability and initially identified how the notion 
sits with overlapping and included concepts such as Representation or Transparency.  The multiple 
definitions of accountability tend to refer to a context based on the role of the Actor or a Forum but do 
not denote the desired outcome of the application of an accountability mechanism.  It has also tracked 
the historical development of accountability as a governance concept and its growth from democratic 
accountability to the multiple forms of accountability addressed.  
Despite the literature based discussion on various triggers which will lead to a specific typology, I found 
that the actual process steps as set out by Bovens can be applied, with inclusion of the emphasis on 
mandates, in a generic way, whatever the intended result.  The application of the mechanism would 
certainly require internal activity such as monitoring of actions or recordings of decisions taken.  The goal 
of the exercise, however, is to engage externally in a public way, beyond transparency.   
Transnational actors, legally compliant with national law in a given state, but operating in a multi level 
governance context, can seek to enhance the perception of their credentials through accountability 
mechanisms.  This is of particular importance in competing network structures.  The means of 
enhancement is accountability based governance preferences which can take the form of codes of 
conduct coupled with disciplinary or compliance measures.   
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In order to complete this in depth examination of accountability, its types, roles and purpose, the 
constitutive components of an accountability process and the questions they raise are the subject of the 
next section below.        
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2.4. Constitutive components of a public accountability process and the role of CSOs  
This last part to Chapter 2 on the context and focus of accountability will address and question the 
constitutive components of an accountability mechanism.   The components are derived from the 
Bovens definition though the corresponding elements identified by other leading accountability 
authors are discussed at some length.  
The analysis is undertaken with the purpose of applying the modified definition to the transnational 
context of business associations in an EU policy process.  Maybe the greater challenge is to derive a 
“public” element from the accountability process itself, in particular when the unit of analysis is a 
private commercial, interest specific organization.  My contention is that this element can be 
potentially found in the nature of the relationship, in particular related to the nature of the mandate, 
or in the composition or mandate of the forum.  I also focus on the “consequences” or sanction 
element to point out the lack of enforcement of the consequences.  Another related aspect is the 
unease with which authors address sanctions in the not for profit sector.  The questions derived from 
this final part on the steps of an accountability procedure are set alongside those from chapters 2.2., 
and 2.3.        
The Bovens definition gives rise to a number of questions to be addressed herein under four sub 
headings (Harlow and Rawlings, 2008, break the Bovens definition down into the last three sections, 
only. I believed it important to also provide a focus on the “relationship” at hand);  
 The relationship (e.g. between the principal and agent, where the latter is a minister 
mandated by Parliament):  
How does one qualify the central relationship? How does it lead to external account giving? 
How does one identify the actor in a complex organisation? How does one deal with the 
problem of “many hands” ? Who are the accountability holders and holdees – who responds 
to whom?  How can one address accountability issues and where do they arise in a 
relationship based on representation?   
 The forum:  
The mention of a forum, which might act on behalf of the “EU public”,  to which an account 
will be given raises questions as to its legitimising role, its composition (whether they are 
members of the EU public or professionals acting on their behalf)   and purpose. Does it act 
sui generis as the “public” factor in the account giving, assuming that the process is 
“transparent” and in the public domain? Or, should it act as a conduit to the EU citizen, a 
form of administrative verification process?   Is the need for a “public” account giving 
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satisfied by mere transparency of the process? What is the role of the EU media – if there is 
one - in acting as a platform for rendering public? In the EU context, might it be hampered 
by the underdevelopment of a European Public Sphere?        
 The account giving and the obligation to provide it:  
 The obligation on the actor to justify his conduct is said to be “formal” or “informal”.. An 
informal obligation seems to be a contradiction in terms.  Just as for the actor, should the 
forum not respond to an obligation to ask questions, and not enjoy a mere “possibility” to 
do so? This possibility could imply that the account rendering is equated to an 
administrative process without active participation, which stands in contrast to the level of 
“obligation” placed on the actor and might not serve the “public” element of the process.  
Does the information which the actor is obliged to provide in the explanation or justification 
lie in the respect of a set procedure to be followed by a civil servant? Is this part of a 
contractual obligation in which case would this undermine the compelling nature of the 
process?  
 The passing of judgment and meting out of possible sanctions:  
How is the forum invested with the power to “pass judgment” and bring about 
“consequences” or impose a sanction? From where does it derive this public mandate and 
how does it justify its own legitimacy and independence? Who is scrutinising the scrutinizers 
(Persson 2009)? The weight of the suggested public mandate will bear directly on the 
forum’s option to pass judgment. In the absence of a law setting out the answers to the 
above questions, we remain within the realm of soft law, such as codes of conduct, which, 
due to their nature and although they might carry a form of sanction, usually lack a means 
of effective enforcement of  that sanction.  More importantly, can the forum ensure that 
the actor accepts this sanction and acts in a more accountable way, without which the 
whole exercise would appear to be futile?    
In the next section I will examine each phrase of the definition with a view to complementing 
and underpinning its meaning.  
2.4.1. The relationship giving rise to accountability:  
The relationship described by Bovens above, between the forum and actor, is that of a principal to 
agent, the forum being the principal, e.g. parliament delegating powers to a minister, the agent, who 
must be held to account about his performance in office.   It is social in nature.   
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Bovens (2006 p.14), describes the relationships as being possibly occasional or contingent.  He 
distinguishes this form from accountability arrangements which involve rules, standing practices and 
processes which might present an institutional character, whereas, an accountability regime would 
be linked, for example, to the members of a Cabinet in a parliamentary democracy where a system of 
standardised rules is followed.     
The relationship under scrutiny is categorized by Mulgan who speaks in terms of “core 
accountability” (2000) identifying key components of the term, which “carries with it most of the 
major burdens of “governance””.  He states that the first meaning of accountability is “associated 
with the process of being called to account to some authority for one’s actions” (Jones 1992 p. 73).     
Mulgan (2000 p.555) places his interpretation on this definition of accountability to note that it;  
 is external,  “in that the account is given to some other person or body outside the person or 
body being held accountable;  
 involves social interaction and exchange , “in that .. the side calling for an account seeks 
answers and rectification while the other side .. responds and accepts sanctions”;  
 implies the rights of authority, “in that those calling for an account are asserting their rights 
of superior authority over those who are held accountable, including the right to impose 
sanctions and demand answers”.  
Mulgan’s responsiveness element at the second bullet point appears to be of key importance to 
identifying the relationship which gives rise to issues of accountability. He focuses further on the 
relationship between the actor and the forum to underline two particular aspects.   The first is where 
public agencies are expected to be responsive to elected politicians. The second is where these 
agencies are expected to be responsive to their “clients” or the public. In this last case, the 
responsiveness of public officials is directly to the public, yet the latter cannot hold the former 
accountable without charters and complaints procedures etc.  
Responsiveness can also be defined in this context as a form of control since, “accountability implies 
that accountability holders have some level of control over the actions of accountability holders,” 
(Esmark, 2008 p.290). Esmark writes,  .. “the real touchstone of any system of accountability is the 
level of responsiveness of the accountability holdees to the accountability holders”. He states that 
the first challenge in identifying an accountability relationship is to identify these holders and 
holdees, in particular in the context of network governance where the nature of the structure itself 
will fudge the clearly defined roles (2008 p.290, this problem is referred to as that of “many hands”, 
discussed below).  He rejoins Mulgan on the notion of “rights of authority” and clarifies that (2008 
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p.283), “the accountability holder is in a superior position – based on popular sovereignty – to the 
holdee and stands in judgment over the holdee”. This element is of key importance to the author’s 
study of accountability in networks which, he states,” ought to first and foremost be considered 
representative forums of accountability holdees”.          
Indeed, accountability is inherent to democratic representation.  Discussing Pitkin in the context of 
her study on civil society and EU democracy “Astroturf representation,” Kohler Koch (2010a p.107) 
notes that “authorisation and accountability are the well tried mechanisms with which to enforce 
democratic representation, and the core criteria with which to measure it are representativeness and 
responsiveness”.  Pitkin herself (1967 p.113), whilst describing the institutional arrangements that 
precede and initiate formalistic representation,  directly links accountability to the “ability of 
constituents to punish their representative for failing to act in accordance with their wishes (e.g. 
voting an elected official out of office) or the responsiveness of the representative to the 
constituents”.  To close on the concept of representation at this stage it is worth commenting on the 
mandate versus independence controversy highlighted by Pitkin to clarify further where the 
accountability issues arise in this social relationship.  
Pitkin states (1967 p.146), “that a mandate theorist will see the representative as a “mere” 
agent...with the constituents’ purpose in mind and not his own”.   Independence theorists see the 
representative “as a free agent, a trustee, an expert who is best left alone to do his work”.  In 
providing an account, the mandate theorist’s agent would be required to demonstrate that he/she 
has closely followed the detailed mandate.  His obligation is to implement the means provided. The 
forum would therefore merely need to be satisfied that all appropriate steps were followed, reducing 
the account giving to a possible box ticking exercise.  The independence theorist’s expert, who will 
have acted more as a free agent, will need to justify the choice of course adopted as well as all 
decisions taken in order to reach the required outcome, which is where his obligation lies.  The more 
independent the representative, the more fundamental accountability questions arise and the more 
complex the account giving is rendered.   
Having identified the nature of the relationship and causal connections in which accountability issues 
arise, we need to finally focus on the identity of the actor, which gives rise of itself to the “problem of 
many hands” (Thompson 1980 p. 905, in Bovens, 2006).  As we scrutinize governmental or policy 
decisions it is becoming increasingly pertinent to trace a policy’s developmental footprint.  Who 
really pulled the strings? And, at which stage? Who is ultimately responsible for the resulting policy? 
The naturally long drawn out process of adoption of EU legislation, now mainly evolved under the 
new Lisbon procedure will usually take between two to four years.  The stakeholders, multiple 
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levelled decision makers, influencers, movers and shakers in the course of the foetal developments 
of the policy will change quite drastically.  The consensus and committee based nature of EU 
legislation renders the picture even more complex, let alone the 28 Member States’ input.   
2.4.2. The forum: 
The role of the forum is central to the understanding and assessment of accountability. It is 
suggested that it is the nature of the forum, or the entity to which the account is rendered, which 
acts as a key legitimising component via its “public” aspects.  But who is that “public” and can the 
media act as a forum in this context? What is the role of civil society organizations? The transparency 
of the process would equally depend upon and hence be derived from the forum.           
Bovens (2006 pp. 16-17) allocates elected representatives, political parties, voters and the media as 
the forum for political accountability; the courts for legal accountability; auditors, inspectors and 
controllers for administrative accountability; professional peers for professional accountability; and 
interest groups, charities, and other stakeholders for social accountability.  But what of public 
accountability?  
The traditional definition of public accountability is “democratic” based on the political relationship 
of the elected, the actor or agent, to the electorate, the public and is recognised by “the giving and 
demanding of reasons for conduct” (Roberts and Scapens 1985 p. 447). 
This type of public or democratic accountability focused on how the elected use the authority 
granted to them by the public and possible abuses of that authority can be contrasted with the 
newer type of accountability; managerial or corporate focused on performance and output.  There is 
common ground shared by both concepts in that, other than responsiveness to the electorate, the 
elected are expected to conduct themselves “properly” and this conduct is assessed using managerial 
techniques such as financial auditing, judicial review and hierarchical control in public administration. 
As Steffek (2008 p. 3) notes, this assessment can only be carried out retrospectively; “with the 
emphasis on retrospect and assessment of performance, the term accountability also in the public-
democratic context shifts the focus of analysis from the input dimension, which is the main concern 
of much of democratic theory, to the output dimension and ex post control of office holders. This 
emphasis on ex post performance assessment circumscribes the common ground with managerial 
types of accountability”.    
Managerial accountability centres on performance and results, as do new modes of governance 
which Steffek describes as “functional arrangements of collective problem solving, whose regulatory 
scope is quite narrowly circumscribed” (2008 p. 4).  He cites Grant and Keohane (2005 p. 37) who 
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argue that traditional notions of democratic accountability should be set aside here because they 
would not make us see that “multilateral institutions are, indeed, highly constrained by 
accountability mechanisms”.  Steffek's point is essentially that the “public” in public accountability is 
being redefined in the new context of international governance.    
  On this same point, the role of a potential public sphere, according to Esmark (2008 p.276) is to 
bring about a deliberative process which sustains communication; “a proper public sphere not only 
implies procedures of making decisions public, but also a particular way of justifying these decisions, 
which in some way or another makes reference to universal rationality or morality in the process of 
deliberation”.  We turn to Habermas (1998 p.160) to qualify this reference to a public sphere; “The 
core of a European communicative context is formed by a political public sphere which enables 
citizens to take positions at the same time on the same topics of the same relevance”.  Does the EU 
currently boast a public sphere as defined?  This does not seem self evident and leads to the 
question as to how the link between CSOs and the “public” of public accountability might be better 
described.  
Public accountability has so far been equated to democratic or political accountability.  Steffek (2008 
p.7) seeks to reconcile this traditional interpretation with post Westphalian new governance 
structures and makes a case for another, more purist form of public accountability “as a specific type 
of accountability relationship that functions through critical debate in the public sphere and that 
contributes to the broader task of democratic accountability”.   This form of public accountability 
would be more directly linked to the public in that it seeks citizen input to an ongoing discussion but 
is also less formal than democratic or electoral accountability. 
 How does this newer form of public accountability relate to democratic or electoral accountability?  
Accountability through elections presumes that citizens have had access to and absorbed enough 
information with which to create an impression on which to base their electoral choice. As Steffek 
(2008 p. 8) puts it, “for electoral accountability to function, there needs to be an intermediate sphere 
of public communication that enables citizens to review what is happening in government.  In turn, 
public debate enables office holders to observe and react to changing expectations of their 
constituency. This is why public accountability taking place through public discourse is central for the 
functioning of a democratic polity.”  
To further illustrate the point, we turn to the Habermas et al (1974 p.51) definition of a public 
sphere, “as a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed”.  
Habermas distinguishes between the centre of democratic decision making and judicial review which 
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includes the courts, parliament, governments, and the periphery consisting of processes of public 
communication that surround and besiege the formal institutions.   
How does this description of the periphery relate to the EU disparate structure of decision making? 
Steffek (2008 p.10) sets the scene by quoting Fraser (2007 p.19) at length; 'Public spheres are 
increasingly transnational or postnational with respect to the elements of public opinion.  The “who” 
of communication is no longer Westphalia national citizenry...” but dispersed interlocutors, who do 
not constitute a demos.  The “what” of communication” is no longer Westphalian national interest 
but “now stretches across the globe in a transnational community of risk”....”The “where” of 
communication...is now deterritorialised cyberspace.  The “how”, once Westphalian national print 
media, “now encompasses a vast translinguistic nexus of disjointed and overlapping visual cultures.”   
Steffek (2008 p.12) refers in particular to CSO activities prevalent in interest representation, a role 
often taken up by business associations.  He refers to “1)monitoring of public governance, 
2)translating highly technical discourse and flagging of issues, 3)framing issues and formulating 
alternatives.”   
Purposely disconnected from the nation state and focused on often widely defined issues, CSOs do 
not constitute per se the “public” as understood in Steffek's definition of public accountability but 
contribute to a European Public Sphere as active components generating debate and discussion 
within the sphere which then transmits topics to the wider public via media and news outlets. 
Another means of putting the public back into Public Accountability might be derived from the 
nature and composition of the forum. Any civil society organisation fulfilling a role as a forum in the 
application of an accountability procedure would not only require bringing a “public” element to the 
process but also demonstrating its aptitude to following and understanding the context and activities 
involved.  Just as for courts of law the composition of such forums can present different remit 
allocations according to the priorities to be derived from the process, with a representative for the 
“public” element, correctly mandated to act as such and  with internal  accountability checks and 
balances in place that ensure the necessary consultation   of an informed public. The discussion and 
deliberation centring on the allocation of the mandate from the public to their forum representative, 
short of being all encompassing of all “public” issues might be construed as also constituting a certain 
element of the European Public Sphere (EPS).  
To conform to identified features of an EPS and therefore seek to emulate the “public” in public 
accountability, CSOs would require transparent internal governance structures and modus operandi 
and internal accountability mechanisms. Their output and information on internal activities and 
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monitoring of governance structures must be accessible in order for a calling to account to take 
place.  Maybe more contentiously the representativeness of these actors – often doubted – should 
be linked directly to the EU 'public”.  When the advocacy of these CSOs is undertaken “on behalf” of 
voiceless causes, such as the protection of nature or animals, the desired link becomes more 
tenuous, relying on the “interests of” the EU public.       
In the Habermas deliberative approach, CSOs are seen as the institutional core of civil society 
(Habermas 1996 p.367). CSO generated debate and activity might constitute a public sphere.  CSOs 
deliberate and relate experiences from the private sphere to formal political decision making 
processes but can they “represent” the public? This question brings us back to the issue of mandate 
and the use of clear internal accountability procedures to ensure that wide and deep consultation of 
informed EU citizens is carried out on given issues and on a regular basis. 
In order for this forum to function, conditions of transparency and access to information need to be 
met.  It is also of note that the role might require specialist knowledge whilst still aspiring to 
represent the public at large.  Differing actors and accountability situations will dictate the 
appropriate mandate and composition of the forum.  Civil society organisations, taken in the context 
of the definition of public accountability discussed can actively contribute as a section of the 
European Public Sphere.     
In conclusion, CSOs cannot per se constitute the “public” in public accountability. They do however 
take up issues arising from their respective topic focuses and then generate information and debate 
which can reach national media and hence be aired to the wider EU public.  
CSOs might develop this role further and, under the application of clear internal accountability 
guidelines focusing on consultation of EU citizens, request a mandate of their members to more 
formally act as conduits of public EU opinion and thus contribute to the desired informed debate 
which of itself can develop viable media platforms for general consumption.    
The above analysis of the interplay with the European Public Sphere has brought us a step closer to 
putting the “public” back into public accountability.   
2.4.3. The obligation to provide an account and the account giving itself:   
In his definition of accountability, Bovens (2006) underlines the fact that “the actor has an obligation 
to explain and justify his or her conduct”.   He goes on to widen the scope of the definition of the key 
term “obligation” by stating that it can be “formal” or “informal”. .  The demise of Edith Cresson 
which brought down the Santer Commission is presented as an example of a “formal” obligation to 
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render account to a Belgian penal court and the European Court of Justice.  A given example of an 
“informal” obligation might be a press conference or a voluntary audit.  From a purist view point, one 
might question whether an “informal obligation” is not a contradiction in terms.  A strictly legal 
interpretation of the term “obligation” is highly likely to refer to its compelling nature, the absence of 
the possibility to escape from that action required; and hence its “formal” nature.  Bovens’s 
approach would likely include what is commonly referred to as a “moral” obligation, yet one might 
question whether this last type of “informal obligation” is weighty enough to give rise to 
accountability issues which carry with them the possibility of retribution.        
 According to the Bovens narrow definition of accountability, the actor is obliged to provide a 
justification for his conduct. The type of justification will often depend on the forum e.g. an audit by 
the Chamber of Audits. The weight of the obligation to provide an account, its compelling nature, the 
“stick or the carrot”, might be better framed.  Indeed, a moral obligation would include all the above 
“political relationships” and the activity of the forums described as civil society groups.  Is there room 
for such a term in the context of social accountability?  
For Keohane (2005), the weight of the responsibility does not lie with the actor to respond to his 
inner compulsion but with the “holder” of the accountability who “makes demands”. According to 
Keohane “accountability refers to a principal-agent relationship in which an individual, group or 
other entity makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to 
impose costs on the agent”.  Keohane further distinguishes between internal and external 
accountability, where external accountability refers to people or groups outside the acting entity 
who are nevertheless affected by its activities.  It is suggested that the Keohane definition, which 
avoids the fuzzy notion of personal feelings and the need to define a compulsion in this context, 
would duly encompass the set of elements of social accountability and hence the “relationship” as 
presented by Bovens.     
Mulgan equally discusses the external nature of the account-giving at this juncture but points to an 
internal moral sense, based on one’s own judgement, which would lead the individual to the external 
act.  Admittedly though, he chooses a hybrid example to illustrate this by referring to accountability 
as the sense of individual responsibility and concern for the public interest expected from civil 
servants.  A clear chain of command and task allocation with hierarchical accountability prevailing 
might be more effective. Mulgan also singles out an unusual aspect of the theory which is related to 
the “ability” of the actor to provide an account, and arises around the question of the “problem of 
many hands”.   Is the actor indeed, “able” to provide the relevant account?  
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Ebrahim prefers to use “inducement” over “an obligation” to provide an account.   In practice, 
Ebrahim (p.825) states that the legal requirement, or the inducement, to justify an NGO’s tax status 
leads to the use of fiscal disclosure or tax reports as an accountability tool.  The accountability forum 
is made up of the funders and oversight agencies, acting “upward” to the NGO, and the clients or 
members who read the report, acting “downwards”.  In this last example, the inducement is legal 
and entrenched in law.  Another example from Ebrahim of a non legal inducement would be the 
erosion of public confidence due to scandals and exaggeration of accomplishments which could be 
dealt with by using process based self-regulation as an accountability mechanism, providing an 
account to the NGOs themselves as a sector or potentially to clients and donors. 
One may note, moreover, that where there is a legal requirement as the inducement, it will dictate 
the mechanism to be applied which is of itself, directly linked to the forum.  The forum in turn, boasts 
a very wide constituency, potentially encompassing the wider public. The sanction of the loss of the 
not for profit tax status is tangible and flows directly from the accountability process.  Where no legal 
“inducement” (though this should be better termed “requirement”) is observed, the mechanism will 
be based in soft law, such as for codes of conduct and the forum members appear to be more limited 
and focused on other NGOs, in other words, the competitors for funding.  The sanction of possible 
loss of funds or reputation, whilst potentially fatal, appears less measurable and less intrinsically 
linked to the accountability process.                 
2.4.4. The questioning and passing of judgment with possible consequences:  
This last section regroups both the possibility of passing a judgment with that of bringing about 
consequences since it would seem futile, in this context, for a decision to be taken as a judgment 
without consequences ensuing. The possibility to ask questions, granted to the forum is inherent to 
the exercise of participation and scrutiny, which goes beyond the mere “reporting” process which 
lacks the active nature to qualify it as an accountability process under the Bovens definition. Clearly, 
accountability theorists are uncomfortable with the notion of a sanction and its legal overtones. This 
might also explain the lack of discussion on a mandate granted to the forum to pass such a judgment 
leading to consequences.  Note that there is only a mere “possibility” for the forum to question the 
adequacy and legitimacy of the conduct and no “obligation”- whether formal or not – on the part of 
the forum to question and scrutinize.  The all important elements of enforcement without which the 
effectiveness of the accountability process is undermined are not addressed in literature either, yet it 
is intrinsically linked to the fundamental issue of the mandate of the forum. 
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Bovens (2009 p.10) mentions that the inclusion of a sanction as a constitutive element of 
accountability has been questioned.  He settles therefore for the “possibility” of sanctions stating 
that this mere possibility “distinguishes the non committed provision of information and being held 
to account”.  Again, though, it is more difficult to distinguish the “informal” obligation to account, 
included in the author’s definition, from “being held to account” which might imply the voluntary 
nature of the forum to seek that account or not.              
The opting for the  expression that the actor “may face consequences” as opposed to using the word 
“sanction” in the  definition is explained by Bovens who argues that the latter  would exclude the role 
of an ombudsman who merely seeks “redress” or “reparation”. It is also conceivable however that 
whoever has to carry out that redress or pay that reparation would define it as a “sanction”. In that 
sense it might have been more constructive to argue for a wider definition of “sanction”.  This 
tentative approach contrasts starkly with the definition put forth by Pitkin of the institutional 
arrangements for formalistic representation; authorization and accountability, where accountability 
is described as the ability on the part of constituents to punish their representative.   
Harlow and Rawlings (2008 p.313), also interpret the term “facing consequences”, as the possibility 
for sanctions to be imposed.  The inclusion of this last element renders the accountability “thick”, 
whereas any mechanism which does not include this last element would be deemed “thin”.  The 
authors discuss a case study of the European Ombudsman      placed within the concept of “thin” 
accountability because he lacks the power to sanction administrations. On the one hand, whilst the 
office itself carries essential elements of independence and public investigation it appears to act 
more as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism than that of accountability.   On the other 
hand, these techniques applied by the ombudsman of hearing from an independent and public status 
and then passing judgment display the elements of a non judicial accountability machinery.  The 
authors however deplore the lack of “teeth” in the post, and point to “non contribution by the 
ombudsman in the major crisis of accountability – extending to issues of corruption – under the 
Santer Commission”. 
Translating these characteristics into civil society discourse, Kohler Koch (2008 p.15) writes that,  
“European civil society organisations, for their part have to give account to their members or 
constituencies and have to face severe consequences, either through the mechanism of elections or 
through donations.  This I call “material accountability””.  Later, Altides and Kohler Koch (2009  p.3) 
further states that, “Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) can pose questions and pass judgment, but it 
cannot be taken for granted that CSOs can impose consequences on the responsible actor “to turn 
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matters right”. Furthermore, even if CSOs had the capacity to exert sanctions, it would constitute a 
case of accountability, but not necessarily of democratic accountability”.                
In his description of accountability as responsiveness, Esmark (2008 p.290) provides yet more food 
for thought.  He qualifies the relationship in question, and nature of the sanction; “Sanctions can 
generally be understood as the means of punishment. Or in other words, the relationship between 
the accountability holder and holdee, is also a relationship between punisher and punishee. 
Legitimately administering punishment requires a negative outcome of a comparison between a 
mandate already given and decisions made by the accountability holder.” He goes on to ask two vital 
questions; what is the legitimate mandate through which the accountability holder can specify the 
desired course of action to the accountability holdee? And, which sanction – or form of punishment – 
may legitimately be employed according to the accountability if the mandate is not followed? He 
says that for political accountability, sanctions means being voted out of office. Administrative 
accountability is (p. 291), “associated with mandates in the form of job descriptions and sanctions, 
such as warnings, being demoted, fired and the reorganisation of public administration units”.        
In his review of the International NGO Accountability Charter, a code of conduct signed by 11 
international NGOs in June 2006, Vibert (2007) opens with a reference to the general nature of 
sanctions which can be defined as promoters of good behaviour and deterrents from bad behaviour.  
He mentions the requirement to disclose information as a form of discipline and the need to evaluate 
and monitor activities as another. He then argues that since the NGO world is voluntary in nature, a 
penalty based system should be avoided. He repeats that the Charter itself is voluntary.  This raises 
the question as to what the purpose of the Charter itself is and to rationale.  What was the real 
impetus for its existence and adoption?  Similar to business standards, will the Charter give rise to a 
register of complying NGOs which will then be favoured by governments and individuals alike? Which 
independent body will audit compliance with the Charter’s provisions?  If there is a gain, should 
there not be a correlated sanction? It is suggested for example, if the purpose is indeed to draw up a 
register of “respectable” and accountable NGOs, that any infraction of the rules be sanctioned by 
removal from the register.                
In the absence of a sanction mechanism Vibert focuses on softer, more administrative means of 
redress such as disclosure (note that Ebrahim referred to disclosure as an accountability mechanism, 
tool or process and not as a sanction), monitoring or evaluation.  On this last, Vibert states that a 
system of evaluation that is penalty based is “more likely to cover up what really happened rather 
than to reveal the lessons that need to be learnt”.  One would submit that a penalty based system 
would not only ensure that the infringing behaviour does not happen again, it is also more likely to 
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lead to the necessary procedural changes to make that behaviour a thing of the past.  An isolated 
lesson learning focus will not be effective in the NGO competitive environment of the future.  The 
virtues of self assessment do not win the argument over the merits of independent external review, 
and sanctions for that matter.   
It would appear that the weight of a sanction might vary according to the type of organization and 
relationship examined.  In their study of multisectoral networks, that is, including both NGOs and 
multinational corporations, Benner et al focus on reputational accountability and point to “naming 
and shaming” as a key strategy in this context. They believe that (2004 p. 200), the “loss of credibility 
is one of the more effective negative sanctioning mechanisms, to further accountability in and of 
networks”.   One might conclude that it is the impact and consequences of the sanction on the 
particular organisation at hand that should be a determining factor in the choice of sanction type.  
The importance of the role of civil society organisations and their fulfilling of their potential for 
lending greater legitimacy to EU decision making are conditional upon this assessment of the hard 
components of accountability. Internal accountability to the constituency duly represented might be 
addressed through strict internal procedures of consultation, representativeness, transparency and 
mandate giving. However, the prized external accountability to the public at large, the process of 
which is developed and examined herein calls for more direct linkage to the legitimisation theory, 
justifying the relationship to both input and output legitimacy.       
Conclusion to 2.4:  
The above discussion has identified the existing definitions of accountability, what role it carries out 
and in which context.  This gave rise to setting out the constitutive components as well as 
complementing the gaps noted from the analysis.  Qualifying the nature of the relationship giving 
rise to accountability sheds light on the related social aspects but also points to a means of control or 
responsiveness and a right of authority of the holder of accountability over the holdee. The variety of 
definitions is discussed in how they construed the impetus leading to an account giving, ranging from 
a near compulsion on the part of the account giver, resting in personal responsibility, to a calling for 
an account practised by the holder.  Indeed, the provision of an account itself, in the form of 
disclosure has even been equated to a sanction.  The public nature of accountability is reflected in 
the choice of forum which in turn is often ascribed by the nature of the social relationship. Finally, 
the legal conundrum of the lack of mandate on the part of the forum to impose a sanction, or at the 
least to bring about the desired effects of redress is focused upon.   
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The careful approach of cited authors to this last vital component and the noted differentiation 
between civil society actors according to their voluntary status or not, points to the need for further 
empirical research in particular in relation to the use of codes of conduct as a soft law means for 
bringing about accountability.    
 
Having examined and underpinned each component of accountability, I highlighted the missing 
considerations of the definitions.  This led to a focus on the question of the origin of the mandates to 
act and to judge in particular.   I have also questioned the inclusion of the term “obligation” on the 
part of the Actor to provide an account.   The commonality between definitions used, coupled with 
above considerations lead to the proposed generic process as set out below, at Figure 2.  
Figure 2. The proposed Generic Accountability Model:  
 
 
 
 
This model, derived from the analysis of the authors’ conclusions and process components will be 
applied to the case studies at Chapter 3.       
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2.5. Conclusion to Chapter 2:  
This chapter has addressed and discussed the literature on accountability, and the related role of 
business associations as civil society participants in the EU policy process.   
Chapter 2.2 first described the emergence of civil society and its role in the EU’s practice of participatory 
democracy. It found limits to that practice not least in the limited evidence of deliberation and 
consultation on the part of organized civil society.  As specific interest organizations, business 
associations promote a private commercial interest and can be seen as “distant” from matters that lie in 
the public interest.  Ascertaining whether a business association might render itself publicly accountable 
will therefore first lead to defining the specific interest at stake, the stakeholders and contributors.  
Questions then arising from this section to be applied to the case studies will include whether the unit of 
analysis engages in deliberative practices with members of the public, pure civil society organisations or 
not.   Also, to what extent the practice if there is one contributes to the efficiency and legitimising of the 
output and corresponds to the design characteristics set out by Tanasescu and the key conditions of 
Fischer.   
Chapter 2.3.1. dealt with distinguishing the core concept of accountability and mapping its relationship 
to other related governance concepts.   This analysis gives rise to several questions on representation 
and the quality of the mandate derived for action that is then subject to accountability.  Does the lack of 
a clear public mandate indeed heighten the need for an accountability process?  Organisations that claim 
representation of wider interests and hence more freedom from capture by particular interests also 
struggle to link directly with that wider public and derive a mandate from it.  Similarly, struggling to link 
with that wider public, business organizations however represent a specific narrow interest though their 
activities are usually clearly mandated by an identified set of members.  Representative but de facto 
weak on public accountability, business associations might rely on accountability processes to establish 
that link with the organizations more representative of the public in the civil society spectrum.  The 
“public” credentials of organizations are in part reliant on transparency; a necessary quality for 
accountability to proceed.  However, transparency lacks the essential element of scrutiny and therefore 
does not allow us to draw reliable conclusions based on observed practices.          
Transparency allows however for public involvement and this potential establishment of a causal link 
with the public will enhance legitimacy.  In effect, input legitimacy can be achieved according to Risse 
(2006), when the actors are held accountable by their internal constituents.  But accountability 
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developed as a governance concept with an external effect of potential legitimization, based on internal 
accountability processes that engage at some stage with a “public” representative. 
Chapter 2.3.2. examines the differing types of accountability as described by leading accountability 
authors and seeks to align definitions and nomenclature where viable.  Where possible, this exercise 
ascertains commonality in drivers, circumstances and expected outcomes.  There is some overlap in 
contexts studied by the authors which tend to focus on international NGOs.  I justify the particular choice 
of business associations again in this argumentation by pointing to their own need of reputation 
management, as per INGOs, their transnational activity, and their role in policy making.  Accountability 
processes can be common to both organisational types.   Bovens offers a definition of an accountability 
process in several steps which I have questioned and sought to re-balance with differing emphases (see 
Figure 2.). The combination of the defining of accountability as a governance concept and its mapping 
into a process as applied to a business association allowed me to draw further key conclusions from 
leading authors.   
The first is that the application of an accountability process is a governance choice.  It is strategic and 
political, and lies beyond legal compliance.  Its application therefore is deliberate and should yield an 
outcome or satisfy an expectation.  On a practical level this also entails adoption of this process or 
mechanism as a deliberate choice on the part of the actors and also wider stakeholders.  The setting out 
of the process would be found in internal documents that take the form of “operational rules” or “codes 
of conduct”. The key question lies in the existence and quality of the “public involvement; where and 
when does this occur and in what form? Does deliberation takes place?   
The second conclusion relates to the context in which accountability questions arise.  Goodin identifies 
“market accountability” as linked to the management of reputational deficits which I assert is a concern 
common to most civil society organizations, business associations included.  The need for reputation 
management arises in circumstances related to obtaining funding from the public directly or from public 
authorities.  Business entities engage with the public as consumers and also rely on a market reputation 
management.  But what is the quality of that relationship and how is it measured? Is this the motivation 
behind the use of accountability mechanisms?                              
The third conclusion lies in agreement with Bluemel’s (2005) reference to the interplay between the 
internal and external aspects of accountability mechanisms.  Bluemel relates accountability types to the 
function that the organisation was carrying out which then gives rise to a denomination.   Although I 
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believe that the classifications arrived at do not point to any greater emphasis of a procedural stage or of 
a particular actor, thereby allowing us to further refine a definition of accountability, Bluemel points to a 
clear advantage in complementing internal controls with externally imposed constraints such as advisory 
boards.  But how “external” must that constraint be and is this a formal basis for public involvement, 
interaction or consultation?        
Deleon also emphasizes the interdependence of internal and external aspects of accountability by stating 
that the “professional” is individually accountable whilst the profession is publicly accountable. I carry 
this thinking further by claiming that the adherence of all professionals to internal rules of accountable 
will realize the sum total of public accountability of that profession.  Is there any evidence of tracking of 
individual behaviour in business associations, professional societies in particular?   She refers to codes of 
conduct as the tool for individual accountability but points to the problem of leniency of experts towards 
their own kind.  I ask whether this might not be overcome by that public element in the process, such as 
participation in the review panel and note that the question arises only in the context of external 
assessments and reputation management.  
The last conclusion to this part of the chapter is that the notion of a sanction and its enforceability are 
dealt with by accountability authors in a tentative way.  This is partly explained by the voluntary nature 
of the not for profit sector actors and the risk of bringing about inaction through fear of retribution.  I 
therefore ask whether the sanction element becomes more prevalent for public actors that are not 
volunteers.  I also agree with Koenig Archibugi’s claim that accountability is likely to enhance legitimacy 
and is “normatively desirable from a more impartial point of view” (2010, p. 1146).  These conclusions, 
however, need to be tried against the case study findings.             
Chapter 2.4 has focused on the steps and components, as described by Bovens, of an accountability 
process for analysis and to identify the outstanding questions to be applied to the observed practice of 
accountability.  Concerning the relationship, the responsiveness of the account holdee to the holder is 
identified as of importance as well as the measure of independence of the mandatee in the fulfilment of 
the task.  Key questions on the forum centre on its mandate to hear the account and to pass judgment as 
well as its composition.  Is the public element derived from the presence of a “public” representative on 
a forum panel?  This in turn raises the questions related to the public quality of CSOs and their ability to 
represent the public interest or not, as well as satisfying the correlated expectation of deliberation to 
emulate a public sphere.  
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The obligation to provide an account is questioned to the extent that the weight of an obligation sits 
uncomfortably with the voluntary nature of the not for profit sector.   Also, there is no mention in 
literature of the co-related obligation to call to and hear the account on the part of the forum.  The 
frequency, content and format of the account giving itself are referred to, to the extent that it would be 
either the nature of the act or of the forum which would point to the rules to be followed.  Does the 
account giving follow a prescribed set of rules? Are these generic or specific to the act or the forum, or to 
another component or actor in the process?  What are the consequences of the application of the rules 
in relation to the expected outcome? 
Finally for this section, the important element of sanction or the passing of judgment is discussed.   
Several vital questions are raised here, not least the origin of the mandate to pass such a judgment on 
the part of the forum and the potential for a link with the “public interest”.  However, the tool used for 
application of the process such as a code of conduct can also constitute a form of de facto mandate from 
stakeholders.   The nature of the sanction and its severity tend to vary in the literature although I 
contend that loss of reputation can be a “consequence” across all CSO types.  The enforcement of the 
sanction is absent from the constitutive components and this would appear to weaken the choice of 
application of an accountability process.  Further research on the existence and forms that judgments 
might take is required in order to ascertain their severity and impact on the actor and or organization 
concerned.  The origin of the mandate and its scope needs to be identified as well as a means of 
enforcement.     This section closes with the proposed Generic Accountability Model, at Figure 2. that I 
have derived from the above analyses focusing on the origin of the missing mandates to act and to judge 
and setting out each step as a separate component in the process.      
The next chapter is empirical and deals with three case studies involving four business organizations 
engaged in the EU policy process in diverse ways.  The questions as derived from the above analysis of 
literature and the generic model will be applied to the units of analysis in order to better qualify 
accountability contexts and the detail of the application of an accountability procedure.  The data will 
allow for us to better ascertain the role of accountability and its legitimizing potential when practised by 
transnational actors in the specific circumstances of the EU political and legal structure.   
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Chapter 3: ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE UNDER CONDITIONS OF EU POLICY PARTICIPATION 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the three case studies of this thesis.  They are complex in structure due to the 
mapping of the relationships inherent to the respective activities of the associations examined.   As 
stated in the chapter on methodology, the choice of these units of analysis is deliberate in that they yield 
greater insight into the rationale of use and consequences of an accountability process.  The search for 
these units also demonstrated that these questions arise in perceived circumstances of public concern 
and in relation to the activities of business sectors that strive to enjoy public support.     
The first unit to be presented is UNESDA, the EU soft drinks association, which has a hybrid membership 
encompassing national associations as well as direct company membership.  Its participation in a 
European Commission led and managed Platform is the focus of the study.   
The second organisation is the European Public Affairs Consultancy Association (EPACA) which deals with 
representing professional lobbying companies.  The employees of these companies represent interests 
and input into the EU policy process as professionals.  The study focuses on the application of a 
complaints procedure against a member company and the ensuing consequences such as amendments 
to the EPACA Code of Conduct.  
The third and last association is the World Federation of Advertisers (WFA) which represents some of the 
most well known brands in the world today.  WFA are members of the European Commission’s European 
Alcohol and Health Forum and as such commit to the maintaining and development of high advertising 
standards in particular to identified sensitive audiences such as young adults.  Their interaction with pure 
civil society organisations and the polarising effect of the Forum’s topic are addressed in the analysis.        
The accountability aspects as presented and identified in the literature are referred to throughout the 
respective studies.   The aim is to evaluate these aspects of accountability such as to what extent they 
measure up to the definitions.    The analysis at the end of each case study addresses the main key case 
study questions resting on the existence or not of a mechanism of public accountability under conditions 
of EU policy participation.  Finally, the conclusion of each study deals with the mapping of the 
constitutive components of the generic accountability process.       
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3.2. Union of European Soft Drinks Associations and the EU platform for Action on Diet, Physical 
Activity and Health 
3.2.1. Introduction:  
This case study generates and analyses core data on the Union of European Soft Drinks Associations 
(UNESDA) practices undertaken as part of an identified EU policy process.  The methodology, based on a 
case study and empirical enquiry and described in detail at Chapter 1.2., leads to ascertaining the 
existence and practice of accountability arrangements.   
The choice of unit and practice followed highlights the conditions under which accountability practices 
might be identified.  As the business association participates in the “Platform” based EU policy process, it 
seeks to further a reputation based goal, to enhance the image of its members and to be seen to rub 
shoulders with civil society organizations that might have been vocal in their condemnation of the effects 
on health of the association members’ products.  In this context, participation would serve as a means to 
an end of reputation management.   
 This accountability justification mechanism, where information and transparency alone do not suffice, 
firstly raises questions addressed in the case study as to the public mandate of the principal which is 
intended as the forum, since this is the central relationship.  The public credentials of the Civil Society 
Organisations present in the forum raise questions of representativity, although it is understood that 
UNESDA acts “in the public interest”.  The identity of the Actor might be in doubt in situations of “many 
hands” and his /her “obligation” to “justify and explain” the conduct sits uncomfortably with the 
voluntary nature of such Commitments as addressed here. The accountability authors cited in chapter 2 
do not dwell on the type of account to be given although this would be crucial to the fulfilling of the 
mandate or the judgment of the forum.  Light will be shed on the composition and mandate to ask 
questions and judge of this last and the needs for a deliberative process to constitute that same forum 
will be discussed.  Finally, the nature of the consequences and their use as an incentive or threat to 
participants in the Platform are described through interview results and evaluations of the Platform.      
The accountability mechanism applied binds a group of private actors to elicit an essentially public 
outcome.  This can only be brought about by the bringing together in the Platform - which takes the form 
of a very wide issue based stakeholder coalition - of all public and private actors concerned, “committed” 
to a common cause.  This “bringing together” was initiated and is administered by a public regulatory 
body on a topic that escapes a classical regulatory approach, in that one cannot regulate against obesity.  
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The European Commission therefore stands to gain from being notably active on this sensitive agenda 
through responding to calls from health related CSOs and avoiding the development of costly legislation 
which would be less than welcomed by producers operating in a free market.  
Therefore, this self regulatory approach, applicable to private commercial actors and civil society players 
representing varying facets of the public interest alike, is administered by a regulatory public body using 
soft law means.  The accountability process identified is that causal link between the commitment of 
activity made and the actual carrying out of it.  The accountability elements are not limited to the 
monitoring process but include the debate and discussion generated by the reporting in the Platform 
meetings.  It does not suffice for participants to commit but an account has to be made in some detail 
through the monitoring mechanism, under the threat of removal from the register.  The account is then 
reiterated and renders itself subject to immediate scrutiny in the Platform presentations.  It does not 
suffice to undertake “general” activities but actors must tailor and refine the content of their pledges to 
match them to the overall goals of the Platform, under the potential threat of poor publicity generated 
by civil society participants or a public naming and shaming in meeting reports kept online on the Europa 
institutional site.   
The case study questions first ascertain the context in which an accountability mechanism might 
operate.  Is the process applied in an EU policy context? Is it prescribed by inclusion in a system?  
They then map out the process by asking what and who are the components of the accountability 
mechanism? To whom is the accountability to be owed? They seek to indentify the quality of the 
“public” element and the origin of the mandate to hear the account, to question and pass judgment 
based on the account and generated discussion.   
How can one qualify the public nature of the account giving; what means are used and is the process 
transparent? What is the composition of the forum and its role and how is it mandated to receive the 
account?  
The questions finally focus on the sanction.  Does the process include the necessary sanction element 
and if so, how is it meted out and which body enjoys the mandate to sanction? How is the forum 
invested with the power to pass judgment? Finally, what is the added value of participation in the 
process and is there a competitive advantage derived from participation?    
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 The study’s key empirical questions are addressed through an analysis of documents related to the 
association as well as to the European Commission’s DG SANCO and relevant website for the EU 
Platform.  An in depth discussion addressing all questions arising at Chapter 1 part 2 on Methodology is 
presented at the end of this case study.   
The two points of particular interest in this study centre on seeking to provide a link between the mainly 
private commercial considerations of a business organization active in the EU context and an overriding 
public interest, and the existence or not of a sanction mechanism as an integral part of this process 
based on soft law.  Indeed, the involvement of the “public” can be identified at several levels both in the 
form of civil society organizations participating as members of the Platform and engagement with 
members of the public albeit in their professional roles as head teachers of schools which house large 
vending machines which in turn present UNESDA member products.  The UNESDA commitments related 
to schools also seek to engage parents in the choice of products to be placed in vending machines. 
Varying forms of sanction mechanisms can be noted at different stages in particular the policing of the 
database by the European Commission for inactive commitments and the negative publicity, or potential 
for it, generated by the Platform actors.   
The format of the analysis below is adapted to a presentation of the data to firstly set the unique context 
in which this organisation operates with a focus on detail of the UNESDA Constitution and the process of 
participation in the Platform with particular attention to the all important monitoring process and its 
evaluation. The relationship between the association and the Platform itself is described since this period 
covers some six years with a focus on the 2010 commitment to not advertise in schools and limit 
advertising in secondary schools. The final part of this Chapter deals with outstanding questions and 
mapping this process to the identified components of the generic accountability mechanism.                     
 3.2.2. Union of Soft Drinks Associations:  an accountability actor:  
UNESDA was founded in 1958 and represents the European non-alcoholic beverages association. Its 
members are soft drinks companies who conduct their business in at least five EU Member States, as 
well as national associations from across the EU27. Their declared mission statement is to “support the 
growth, development and understanding of non-alcoholic beverages at a European level”.  The 
association claims to provide technical expertise and input to legislators and influencers in Brussels and, 
when requested, expertise to international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
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and the Codex Alimentarius of the World Health Organization (WHO) (all UNESDA related documents are 
at http://www.unesda.org/about-unesda - accessed 16 June 2014).   
Although active since 1958, the association was incorporated as an “AISBL” (“Association internationale 
sans but lucratif” or “international not for profit association”) under Belgian law by Royal Decree 
awarded on 29th June 1993.  The statutes were last amended in November 2007.  The association’s 
declared purpose at article 3.2 of the UNESDA Constitution is to “engage and dialogue with each of the 
institutions of the European Community and the broader stakeholder community, on all matters 
scientific, regulatory, economic, environmental, commercial, technical and corporate social responsibility 
relating to the non alcoholic beverages industry”.  
Of relevance to the analysis of the EU process hereunder is the declaration in the UNESDA Constitution 
article 3.2. that, the association, “ shall in particular carry out the following activities:  
a) gather and represent its national member associations and corporate members, enabling them to 
work together in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity; b) coordinate the policy positions of individual 
association and corporate member; c) advocate in the interests of the non alcoholic beverages industry 
and to promote its actions and initiatives; d) work together with other stakeholders on issues of common 
interest.” 
UNESDA has a federative structure regrouping the national associations of the EU and beyond for the 
non alcoholic beverages industry.  It also presents a hybrid nature in that companies can benefit from 
direct corporate membership as well as being members of the diverse national associations.  This 
practice is not unusual for a large consumer brand facing reputation management issues on a global 
scale and identifying a need to enhance their opportunities for influencing policy and regulatory 
outcomes.    
Interestingly for questions concerning internal accountability, the Constitution sets out the principle of 
rule compliance in this membership clause, stating at article 4.4, “No-one shall be admitted as a member 
who does not agree to abide by the Constitution, the rules and the policies of the association.”  This 
implies equally that a current member who does not comply with the rules can no longer be admitted as 
a member.  Indeed, at article 4.5, the constitution provides that membership of the association can be 
terminated by resignation or expulsion. 
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 The administration of the association befalls the Board of directors composed of 10 directors, each 
respectively appointed by an ordinary member.  The Board sets guidelines for the Secretary General and 
will “instruct him/her in the actions to be taken in conformity with the purposes of the association”, 
(article 7.2 of the UNESDA Constitution).  The amount of administration required to implement and 
monitor the voluntary commitment undertaken by UNESDA requires a quasi daily check with oversight 
which can only be carried out by an empowered delegate such as the Secretary General.   
3.2.3. Presentation of EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health: an accountability 
forum 
 Consumer protection and health are included in the competences of the EU thereby conferring on the 
European Commission (henceforth, the Commission) a public health mandate.   In 2003, to address the 
rise of obesity in the EU, the Commission recognised the need for a coordinated action in this sector and 
sought expert input through a network composed of Member State experts, the World Health 
Organisation, and nongovernmental organizations dealing with health to develop a strategy to deal with 
the growing public health concern, obesity.  The debate generated conclusions to which the Commission 
responded by setting up in 2005 the EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health 
(henceforth, the Platform).  The aim was to, “develop best practices and encourage voluntary action on 
consumer information, labelling, advertising, marketing and food composition, and on education and 
promotion of physical activity…”(European Commission, DG SANCO, 2011).    
The Platform’s Founding Charter of March 15th 2005 convened food manufacturers, retailers, the 
catering industry, advertisers, consumer and health NGOs, health professionals and public authorities.  
The main objective was to discuss informally and openly ways of achieving binding commitments to 
tackle obesity and other diet related diseases. The Platform thereby provides a forum for all interested 
actors at European level where, Charter point 2, page 2: “a) they can explain their plans to contribute 
concretely to the pursuit of healthy, nutrition, physical activity and the fight against obesity, and where 
those plans can be discussed; (b) outcomes and experience from actors’ performance can be reported 
and reviewed, so that over time better evidence is assembled of what works, and Best Practice more 
clearly defined”. 
The creation of such a forum where discussion (at point a.) is encouraged, thereby allowing for 
questioning and the need to provide answers and justifications on future plans, opens up corporate 
decisions to civil society input.    
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The Platform members, described as actors, would unilaterally commit on an annual basis to address in 
as concrete a manner as possible to further the fields of action identified in article 3 of the Charter.  The 
means by which this “furtherance” could be assessed and measured is through a monitoring process.  
The crucial monitoring of actions was addressed in 2005 in the Charter at point 5; “actors will monitor 
their own performance in a transparent, participative and accountable way, so that there is a degree of 
stakeholder involvement in reviewing progress and outcomes that creates trust in data….there is a 
general desire amongst participants to develop not only participative self monitoring, but also some 
more ambitious best practice on monitoring, including aspects such as self evaluation” (European 
Commission DG SANCO,  Platform’s Founding Charter of March 15th 2005).   
The Platform principle was that each member annually proposes and commits to specific activities 
designed to halt or reverse the obesity trend.  These commitments must be recorded, and outcomes are 
monitored in such as way that they might be fed back to the Platform.  This all important monitoring 
process and how the results are now shared and acted upon will be addressed later at the end of this 
section on the process.   
The platform was evaluated and assessed in a thorough exercise carried out by independent consultants, 
The Evaluation Partnership, in July 2010 (European Commission, DG SANCO, The Evaluation Partnership 
2010) which gave rise to other important developments regarding communication and advocacy and 
highlighted the need for deeper public as opposed to civil society organization buy - in to the activities 
and their benefits.    
Measures of public accountability require involvement of that self same public which should be defined 
in as wide a sense as possible.  Transparency is necessary for communication to the public but does not 
bring about accountability per se.  Persson (2009 p.144) writes that “transparency and accountability are 
intimately connected.  For citizens to be able to hold those wielding power to account, they must at the 
least have access to information on policy deliberations, decisions and the policy making process.  
Hence, transparency can be considered a necessary but insufficient condition for accountability”.  
If actors are called upon to provide an account, the holder of the accountability must benefit at the least 
from the minimum of data required to decide to hold the actor, the holdee, to account or not. This data 
can be gleaned from procedures of openness and transparency and access to information.  Esmark (2008 
p.285) defines these procedures as “publicity” when he refers to the documenting of decisions.  Indeed 
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the process of decision or policy making in itself requires monitoring, providing a continuous and 
transparent forum for observance of the process.  
There are four levels at which the public can be identified in the prescribed Platform process. Firstly, as 
each member of the Platform commits to the cause of reducing obesity, the activities are undertaken in 
the “public interest”.  The Evaluation assessed that, p 63, “the majority of commitments target groups 
such as Children and Adolescents, however more than one third of commitments target the general 
public”.  Secondly, the Platform reporting is carried out in such a way as to render all results accessible to 
Platform members, themselves including civil society organizations.  The solidity of the public mandate 
which these organizations might enjoy can be tested through scrutiny of their respective internal 
structures and their own use of transparency or public consultation practices.     
The commitments and reports are themselves reported on annually and updated quarterly in the 
database of the Commission’s Platform web site. Thirdly, the monitoring process carried out by a given 
member might entail gathering data and evidence from members of the public and / or local civil society 
organizations. Finally, the Platform members themselves can act as conduits for the public by 
commenting on and publicizing Platform activity and results. If the civil society organizations cannot 
constitute per se the “public” in public accountability, they might however take up issues arising from 
their respective topic focuses and then generate information and debate which can then reach national 
media and hence be aired to the public.       
3.2.4. The 2010 evaluation of the Platform:  
This evaluation focused on questions of collective effectiveness; to what extent had the Platform 
collectively met its goal; had Platform members’ commitments been proportionate to the Platform’s 
initial goals; what was the impact generated in policy at national and European levels; the role and 
function of the Platform as a place for dialogue between different stakeholders and the level of 
satisfaction of different stakeholders.  The conclusions of the evaluation were structured around four key 
themes; dialogue, action, impact and the future.    
In order to retain the focus on the elements of the Platform’s work which reflect components of an 
accountability process, the analysis of the 2010 Evaluation Report (henceforth, the Evaluation) will 
centre on the quest for the “public” nature of the activities undertaken and therefore look at 
communication and dialogue based aspects first and then at the monitoring process.  
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In “Key conclusions” at page 2 of the Evaluation the authors point to the fact that multi-stakeholder 
groups are still “very rare, and this evaluation has brought to light that industry and NGOs have very 
different perceptions on a number of issues”. The report differentiates between industry members and 
NGOs through classification based on the for-profit or not for profit status (p.16). The report did indeed 
reflect many divergences of opinion on fundamental issues such as the rationale and purpose of the 
Platform itself (p.3).  On assessing the relevance and proportionality of the commitments, the report 
argues that the monitoring system “succeeded in placing the issue of monitoring high on the agenda of 
Platform members and has forced members to be accountable in some way, it could be argued that it 
has developed more into an end in itself, rather than supporting the implementation of commitments.”   
The members also disagreed on the appropriateness and relevance of some commitments bringing 
about difficulties in achieving general agreement on which messages might be placed in the public 
domain as part of a communication exercise.   However, communication is desirable since (p.3 of the 
Evaluation) it is “likely to sustain and or increase the top level buy in of the members”.  
One of the key recommendations highlighted on p. 5 of the Evaluation underlines that a “clear reward 
(such as the communication of the Platform’s achievements and key actions) needs to be provided to 
members in order to avoid platform fatigue.”  On the other hand, not for profit members perceived 
some for profit members as “not putting enough effort and resources into their commitments, and 
choosing easy to implement commitments instead, using the Platform as a “public relations exercise” 
more than a real vehicle for change”(p. 47).  This last would imply that industry committers are regularly 
undertaking these PR exercises with the wider public, yet the report notes a clear lack of public 
communication.  This assessment might imply that the intended recipients of the PR exercises are the 
civil society organizations who are members of the Platform themselves and not the wider public.  This in 
turn might mean that the entire Platform process is self defeating unless the civil society representatives 
can display real “public credentials”.  The question brings us back to the issue of a mandate and the use 
of clear internal accountability procedures to ensure wide and deep consultation of informed EU citizens 
is carried out on these issues on a regular basis. 
When assessing the impact on national or EU policy of the Platform’s activities and findings, the report  
(p.4) states that “part of the reason for this limited impact on policy may be that little is known about the 
Platform outside the Platform itself and its members’ inner circles.  In fact, communication of the 
knowledge of the Platform externally has been limited and communication at the Member State and 
local level was considered to be particularly lacking”.  
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When asked in a survey for the Evaluation, to what extent has knowledge generated by the Platform 
been communicated to the right people, in the right way at the right time, Platform members replied 
that they only “occasionally” communicated internally (p. 94) and that the external communication 
should be improved (p. 96).  Indeed, the fact that more external communication needs to be carried out 
was a point of near consensus among Platform members, observers and interviewed national platforms 
and national authorities.  All in all, the internal communication of knowledge and results among 
members of the Platform and their respective member organizations was not frequent.  The for-profit 
sector tended to communicate more frequently internally than the not-for-profit sector (p. 98).  
One particular aspect of communication was highlighted by industry respondents in that all stated that 
contact and communication with the European Commission was either “very important” or “quite 
important”.  A number of members viewed “knowing what the European Commission’s future plans are” 
as a benefit.  The Evaluation states at p. 120 that, “being able to show “what individual sectors are 
achieving in the fight against obesity”, “being involved in the European dialogue on obesity” and a 
“unique opportunity for exchanging experiences and information” were also mentioned in the interviews 
as benefits. One member also referred to the issue of accountability in relation to the platform: “it 
creates a unique level of publicity, accountability and pressure to deliver”.   This last mention of pressure 
brings to mind the “obligation” to explain and justify the conduct on the part of the actor, discussed 
above in the Bovens version of the definition of accountability.          
The result of the assessment on Communication above was the setting up of a working group which 
decided to add a sixth field of action “Advocacy and Information Exchange” to the five fields existing so 
far (Consumer information and labelling, education, physical activity promotion, marketing and 
advertising, and composition of foods) (2011 Annual report p. 3).  
Another working group focused on amendments to the monitoring process which the Commission rolled 
out in 2013.  The current applicable monitoring system (for the year 2012) is described in full in a 
diagram below at Figure. 3.  It is considered the tool through which accountability of members is 
demonstrated; “monitoring of commitment plays a vital role in developing engagement, accountability 
and trust, in mapping progress and confirming the commitments undertaken”, p. 1 of “Monitoring 
Framework”.  The focus of the exercise is on measuring progress and learning from outcomes as 
opposed to a means for holding members to account.  This might be due to the need for greater and 
more explicit communication as identified above as well as a demonstration of a lack of more tangible 
results in relation to obesity.  
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An interesting comment derived from the survey of for profit members was that the system “only 
monitors in how far the commitments have reached their objectives rather than the overall effect of the 
commitments which might include results and outputs that were not anticipated”.  This would seem to 
indicate that the monitoring system per se falls short of an accountability mechanism because it focuses 
on the measurement of achievement in relation to a declared finite goal as opposed to the delivery of an 
account of what happened whilst trying to achieve that goal.  Also of interest to the question of the 
nature of the actor is the comment made by not for profit members at this section on effectiveness of 
the monitoring system that, “different levels of monitoring could be required from profit and not for 
profit members, with not for profit members having to spend fewer resources on monitoring” (p. 73).     
When asked whether the Platform had met their expectations, two thirds of not for profit members felt 
that the Platform had only somewhat met their expectations. Half of the industry representatives felt 
that the Platform had met their initial expectations.  Both groups tended to agree that “the expectation 
that was fulfilled to the greatest extent was that the Platform produced a better understanding of each 
other’s positions in the debate on how to tackle obesity”, (Evaluation p. 113). 
3.2.5. The Monitoring Process and Platform Rules: evidence of activities undertaken by actor:    
The Commission produced the Monitoring Framework for guidance to Platform members (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION DG SANCO, Monitoring Framework 2007) to update an earlier version of 2005.  It does not 
currently reflect any changes to the monitoring system brought about as a result of the Evaluation of 
2010.  Its purpose is to guide Platform members to take forward the monitoring of their commitments in 
the context of this specific process.  It states at page 1 that;  
“Platform members agreed to monitor their own performance in a transparent, participative and 
accountable way, so that there is a degree of multi stakeholder involvement in reviewing progress and 
outcomes that creates trust in data…. Monitoring of commitments plays a vital role in developing 
engagement, accountability and trust, in, mapping progress and confirming the commitments 
undertaken”, (European Commission, DG SANCO, Monitoring Framework, page 1).  On page 3, at Users 
Guide, the document urges participants to assess the progress on initiated activities in order to “identify 
the constraints for early corrective action”.   The guide then sets out steps to indicate the minimum 
agreed requirements to monitor a commitment.   
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Administration, deadlines and milestones:  
The process of making a commitment to this platform is owned by the European Commission’s DG 
SANCO.  The Platform meets in plenary 4 times per year.  The 2012 dates for meeting of the Platform 
members were; 9th February, 24th May, 20th September and 14th November.  The Platform members 
meet with the High level Group once per year.   The minutes of these meetings and the annual reports 
are available on the Europa web site at (European Commission, DG SANCO, 2014).  
The participation in the Platform of the current circa 300 members follows a fixed timetable on an 
annual/ calendar basis. The Commission is the guardian of this procedure and in the best interests of all 
parties, developed in 2008 the first visibly sanction based system related to the functioning of platform.  
A bottleneck type problem had developed in that organizations enthusiastic about participation in the 
platform had signed up and entered their names as participants without either specifying the detail of 
the commitment undertaken as required above or undertaking the monitoring process correctly and 
reporting in a timely way to the Commission in full respect of the procedure.   
At the plenary meeting of the Platform on 23rd April, 2008 (European Commission, DG SANCO, 2009) it 
was reported at page 8”, that the “Commission provided a briefing note on membership including as 
requested by the Platform, a proposal for dealing with delinquent members.  The outcome is that those 
organizations who had not yet fulfilled their 2008 membership requirements (in terms of submitting 
commitments for the year) were to be formally reminded, with a deadline of 15 June 2008 by which to 
complete them, failing which, their membership could be terminated or suspended.  It was agreed that 
suspended memberships might be reactivated in future upon the submission of appropriate new 
commitments and after consultation of the Platform membership”.    
The suspension from the register, although not broadcast by the Commission, would have been visible to 
the other platform members who access the Platform’s database on the Europa website.   More 
importantly, the non inclusion of the commitment in the Annual Report signals a real missed opportunity 
for the participating business associations who would need to wait another 12 months for participation 
and publicity of that commitment.  Finally, the threat of the removal from the register acts as a co-
relation to the “obligation” to provide an account.  The reporting is more than a discharging of one’s 
responsibility and becomes an obligation, or a condition to remain in the process.     
The result of this updating of the rules of participation in the Platform is clearly marked at Figure 3. 
“UNESDA Obesity Forum Monitoring Process”.  Indeed, participants in the Platform can submit and 
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amend commitments from 1st April - here 2008 but it also applies to any given year – until 30th 
November.  The entry in the chart  reads; “30th November 2008: final date to submit commitments for 
2008, members who fail to have an active commitment by this date will be suspended as of 1st 
December”.    From 1st December the commitment owners are to complete the monitoring section of the 
form for each commitment.       
 
Figure 3. UNESDA Obesity Forum Monitoring Process 
 
 
 
 
April 1 - 30 
November 
•New commitments added 
•updating and amending of monitoring reports  
By 30 
November 
latest  
•Submit commtiments by deadline  
•Members who do not have an active commitment by this date will be suspended from the 
register as of December 1 and will not be included in the annual report  
December 1 
to January 31 
•Members to complete the monitoring section of the form for each commitment 
 
Until  January 
31 
•Final date for submitting annual updates for monitoring activities  
February  1 - 
March 31 
•Annual report prepared  
•No new commitments can be added or amendments made  
 
April 1 - 
November 30 
•New commitments added 
•updating and amending of monitoring reports   
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3.2.6. How UNESDA deals with fulfilling the commitments and the obligation to provide an account:  
UNESDA is a proud “founding member” of the Platform and appears as a signatory to the Charter.    
When asked how this came about, Alain Beaumont, Secretary General of UNESDA and a recognized 
association management professional in Brussels, stated that his motivation was based on a need to 
counter attacks that were made on the soft drinks industry “in a very unusual way” (interviews of 
9/10/12, 25/10/12 .   The organisation had previously worked on a “regulatory basis” but in the early 
2000s “was attacked in the Press without the existence of any medial report or scientific basis”.  The 
method of UNESDA dealing with such sporadic attacks was “traditional” according to Beaumont who 
would have recourse to no doubt other scientific evidence that counters the original argument. The basis 
of the “attacks” was the rise in obesity.  The Press awareness raising led to an invitation to liaise with the 
World Health Organization’s Brussels office.  Beaumont “sent a scientist” who would cooperate with the 
WHO on matters that impacted UNESDA members.  However, as he states, “the articles in the Press 
continued”. A brief search of Foodnavigator.com which covers all food related press publications does 
not yield any such negative publicity although this might have taken place predominantly in the US 
where leading UNESDA members are headquartered and where obesity is more widespread than in 
Europe.      
According to Beaumont, he then “went to DG SANCO to meet with Mr Madelin then Director General for 
Health and Consumer Affairs at the European Commission, to inform him that UNESDA wanted to be 
proactive and were willing to take on their own responsibility”.  He had The Amsterdam Group 
(association representing alcoholic beverages) in mind as an example in which industry had proactively 
responded to negative publicity generated by drink driving campaigns.  Beaumont told Madelin that 
UNESDA “should develop a Commission Programme for part of the obesity debate.  Beaumont claims he 
initiated this approach despite the fact that he “understood this would eventually provide limitations to 
our industry”. He therefore sat round the table, “with major players who had suffered from bad press to 
see what limitations were acceptable”.  The principle of the freedom to join and pull out of the 
commitment offered to all UNESDA members was according to Beaumont, central to the incentive to 
sign up to this self regulated initiative.   Beaumont stated that he spoke to members to warn; “you can 
accept this if you want but you accept that this is a UNESDA commitment even if the entire membership 
had not joined…the reality is that they all followed later.” In fact he added, “the platform grew at the 
same time as the number of commitments”.    
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When asked about his perception of the sanction mechanism of the process, the co-relation to the 
motivation to join the Platform, Beaumont explained the overriding need for an independent monitoring 
system with key performance indicators (KPIs).  He stated that it was the publicizing of the audit report 
which is perceived as the “sanction”.  All Platform members are presented with the report and can 
decide to publicize it should they wish to do so.    
Beaumont felt that the “NGOs were originally impressed by UNESDA due to our insistence on KPI and 
independent auditing, but there was also some skepticism …soft drinks are an easy target…the critical 
articles and bad press continued”.   A search of the foodnavigator site; 
http://www.foodnavigator.com/for 2006 {accessed on 14 November 2012}, the first year the 
commitment came into force produced the following articles:  
- “EC ‘names and praises’ committed food firms”, 14th November 2006; 
- “Europe’s soft drinks firms ban adverts to  children”, 26th January 2006; 
- “Junk food marketers target kids with dirty tricks”, 30th January 2006. 
 
When quizzed about the UNESDA system for dealing with press reports, Beaumont informed that 
UNESDA now monitors its press centrally as opposed to per national association per Member State.   This 
system was put in place only in January 2012 and is subcontracted to consultants Fleishman Hillard.  The 
relevant press of 20 Member States is monitored on a daily basis for mention of the industry, 
association, members etc.    The organization has put in place a rebuttal system whereby they, upon 
receiving an press article which they deem requires a reaction, contact the national association which 
will deal proactively with the press involved.   
 
This raised a question as to the visibility of UNESDA in the platform and the impact of its claim to be 
“leading by example”.  Indeed, according to Beaumont, UNESDA struggled to retain the leadership 
position for their own commitment.   This came about as a result of DG SANCO’s approach to the main 
European food association, now FoodDrink Europe, then known as CIAA.  FoodDrink Europe “tried to 
take control” of the relationship but finally agreed that although the umbrella organization was the main 
representative for its sector of food and drink, UNESDA would always have a seat at the Platform table.  
FoodDrink Europe pledged to market “healthy foods” mirroring UNESDA.  The pledge limits advertising 
to children to certain products whereas one of the UNESDA key pledges is to not advertise to children at 
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all in schools.  Beaumont sees the pledge as “more ethical in philosophy; there is no good or bad food”. 
Whereas UNESDA’s philosophy was that children under the age of 12 cannot make “proper” choices.     
According to the Implementation Manual for the Commitments to the EU Platform for Action on Diet, 
Physical Activity and Health, 21st December 2006, UNESDA represents a substantial part of the European 
non alcoholic beverages industry, uniting all major producers of non alcoholic beverages (carbonated 
and non carbonated drinks, juice drinks, ready to drink teas and coffees, bottled water, sports and 
energy drinks) as well as its national member associations in 25 countries.  In January 2006  it made six 
commitments, which  were implemented by the following member companies, later joined during the 
course of 2006 by a further 104 beverage companies throughout Europe:  
 
- C&C Ireland 
- The Coca-Cola Company 
- Coca-Cola Enterprises  
- The Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company  
- Gerber Foods Holding Ltd 
- GlaxoSmithKline 
- The Orangina Company (formerly: Cadbury Schweppes European Beverages) 
- Pepsi Beverages Europe  
- Unilever 
 
The “original” six commitments made in 2006 covered five topic areas;   
- Public education; healthy lifestyles and physical activity programmes 
- Consumer Information  
- Advertising and commercial communication  
- Responsible marketing aimed at not targeting directly to children under the age of 12  
- Commitment on Digital Marketing Communications:  
- Promotions and choice  
- Research    
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Concerning the third commitment, the definition of “audiences of children” related to an audience 
where more than 50% was age 12 or under.  This definition was unilaterally changed by UNESDA to 
increase child protection, to a limit of 35% of the audience being 12 or under in 2011.   
Having positioned themselves as founders of the Charter, UNESDA then progressed yearly, adding to 
their original list.  In spring of 2010 UNESDA committed to extend its commitment to act responsibly to 
the digisphere:   
 “UNESDA recognizes the growing use of internet and digital communications amongst children.  
While we believe the digital space can be a wonderful way to communicate, share and learn, 
UNESDA members commit not to market products targeting children through the internet and 
other forms of digital marketing communications”.     
 UNESDA responsible marketing policy abides by the International Chamber of Commerce 
Consolidated Code on Advertising and Marketing Communication Practice, which is the global 
benchmark for widely supported self regulatory codes of conduct promoting ethical standards in 
marketing communications of all forms and across all channels.”   
 UNESDA commitment on digital communications cannot substitute for parental guidance.”  
 
The latest commitment undertaken by November 2012 is the UNESDA Code for Labeling and Marketing 
of Energy Drinks, revised by the UNESDA Board on 25th May 2012 and providing guidelines that go 
beyond Reg. 1169/2011. 
 The monitoring of the commitment is of utmost importance to underpin the engagement of the 
members to the Platform’s cause, to produce credible data to enter into the Commission’s database and 
leverage the value of the commitment to gain legitimacy in relation to the other Platform members, in 
particular Health related CSOs such as the European Public Health Alliance,  EuroHealthNet and EUFIC 
(EU Food Information Council).  
The Implementation Manual addressed monitoring based on a methodology derived from the “table of 
practices developed by the UNESDA self regulation working group; 15 interviews with in-house and 
agency experts on marketing, product development, packaging, digital marketing etc and other self 
regulatory initiatives”.  
 103 
 
The Manual also provides incisive information of particular relevance to the credibility of the self 
regulatory approach (page 7 of the Manual) and the sense of responsibility to be borne by signatory 
companies;  
“There are a number of basic thoughts and premises that are essential for the effective implementation 
of the commitments. They include: 
- All practices need to be in full compliance with EU, national, regional, local laws and any other 
regulations that may apply. 
- Self-regulation is as much about the letter – or the actual wording as it is about the spirit or the 
intention of the commitments. This therefore needs to be borne in mind when judging whether a 
particular practice is in compliance with a (the) commitment(s). 
- Using common sense and reasonable thinking is also important. 
- It is generally well accepted that all practices and commercial communications initiatives should always 
be prepared with a substantial sense of responsibility. All communications are interrelated.” 
The manner in which this responsibility is shouldered, the self regulatory approach, is justified at page 2 
as follows;  
“One aspect of the debate on some of the health issues facing our societies today, in particular 
regarding obesity, is how to best regulate these concerns: through regulation at EU / national 
levels or through self-regulatory measures. UNESDA believes that, in many instances, self-
regulation is the most appropriate, efficient and effective way, as it offers the right combination 
of standard setting rigour and flexibility demanded by the fluctuating and creative nature of 
brand and product positioning. It is in the interest of our industry to ensure that the self-
regulatory systems function effectively. All practices and commercial communications need to 
be in compliance with both the letter and the spirit of legislation and these commitments”. 
The veiled reference to reputation of the industry in the before last sentence reflects the initial incentive 
behind the commitments to the Platform.  The motivation for rendering oneself voluntarily accountable 
through a burdensome, complex and costly monitoring system for UNESDA lies in “public concerns”.  The 
threat of removal from the database for non compliance with the deadline imposed in the Commission’s 
timetable adds weight and renders the reporting obligatory as per the original Bovens definition.    
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“Background” at page 2 of the Manual refers to responsibility and the co-related link to the wider public.  
The unstated consequences of “concerns” already described by Mr Beaumont above, were impacting the 
industry’s reputation; “UNESDA and its members recognize public concerns about today’s health issues, 
particularly the rising levels of obesity and chronic diseases related to poor diets and lack of physical 
activity. The non-alcoholic beverages industry recognizes its responsibility to play a positive role in 
tackling these problems, together with other relevant actors. It has been developing and implementing 
initiatives to address these issues”.  
A first monitoring report was undertaken in April 2007 by UNESDA.  Beyond responsibility, the report 
clearly refers to “accountability” at page 2 (UNESDA, 2007).  It covered five broad categories of 
commitment each set against a set of Key Performance Indicators.  Independent auditors were 
appointed “to monitor compliance across key commitments and ensure transparency and 
accountability”. The aim is to “build trust among stakeholders in UNESDA’s ability to self regulate”.    This 
sentence crucially encompasses the link between increased trust being derived from accountability and 
the need for a monitoring system in a self regulatory approach.   
 On a practical level, the commitment in relation to schools was monitored in 2007 for UNESDA by 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers (henceforth PWC).  It covered: i) no vending in primary schools, ii) offering a 
full variety of beverages in unbranded vending machines in secondary schools, and iii) parents and 
educators to be involved in the selection of drinks offered in secondary schools.   The commitment in 
relation to advertising and commercial communications was monitored by Xtreme Information.  It 
covered no targeting of marketing communications to children under 12 (where children make up more 
than 50% of audience – later reduced to 35% to provide more stringent guidelines).  Finally, the 
commitment in relation to provision of products, choice and portion size in the market was monitored by 
Canadean.  It covered; on i) commitment to increase the number of new beverages with no or low 
calorie content, ii) calorie value analysis.   
A most recent comprehensive report was undertaken by PWC and Xtreme Information for UNESDA in 
2011 using data from last quarter of 2010.  It covered the commitment in relation to schools and 
advertising (now broken down into 4 elements, the unbranded nature of vending machines now being 
“stand alone” and also the newer 2010 commitment to “behave responsibly in the digisphere”.   The 
next assessment would cover the new elements adopted in June 2012, where the threshold for 
audiences under 12 is lowered to 35% of child audience to provide more stringent targets.   
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Mr Beaumont estimates the costs of monitoring the commitments made by UNESDA at circa 1 million 
Euros every three years.  This figure only covers the consultancy fees to external service providers such 
as PWC and does not include costs incurred by the members of the organization nor the press 
monitoring fees.   
 
3.2.7. The monitoring of the 2010 commitment of non advertising to children in schools: 
This case study focus looks at how UNESDA undertook its monitoring duties and its reporting obligations 
for the above commitment, in the year 2010/2011.  The project was developed in October 2010 and 
launched in November 2010.  
The data is gathered and audited by PWC using a monitoring form of 26 questions sent directly to 
schools in the monitored sample.  The responses are elicited, recorded and compiled into data to assess 
compliance which is expressed in the form of a percentage. The findings are inputted into the 
Commission database and maybe more importantly from an accountability viewpoint, presented in a 
powerpoint created by PWC to underline the independence of third party monitoring at the plenary of 
the Platform members.  The UNESDA secretariat summarised the data into a document, “Upholding our 
commitments five years on”, which also covers the results of the study on compliance with the 
commitment on non advertising to children through commercial communications and not targeting 
children in the digisphere (UNESDA, 2012).  
The wording of the Commitment was first broken down into Key Performance Indicators.  The 
monitoring approach selected centred on direct contact of the independent auditors with the schools 
involved; the member companies of UNESDA were not involved directly in the data gathering, their role 
being to have undertaken the activities they had committed to do within the set time frame.  
Three different types of European countries were selected:  
- Germany : a large northwestern European country 
- Spain: a large southwestern European country, and  
- Czech Republic: an eastern European country       
The targets in all three of these countries received the monitoring questionnaire from PWC in their own 
respective languages.  The recipients of the survey questionnaire were school headteachers who were 
invited to participate in an online multiple choice questionnaire with closed questions.  
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On 12th November 2010, a sample of 900 invitations to participate in the survey was sent to both primary 
and secondary schools respectively in the Czech Republic. This country has 3961 Primary schools and 
1143 Secondary schools. On the same day, 988 out of 13 520 Spanish Primary schools, and 955 out of 
7842 Spanish Secondary schools received the invitation to participate in the survey. These were sent out 
by email with reminder email invitations following on 19th November 2010.  
Over 900 German primary (out of 16 392) and 900 German secondary schools (out of 13 542) received 
the same invitation by letter on 26th November.  A reminder letter to fill in the survey was sent on 3rd 
December 2010.   
A reminder letter this time was sent to the Spanish sample on 3rd December followed by a reminder 
telephone call on 10th December which also acted as a telephone interview if the respondent did not 
wish to complete the form him/herself.     
The response rate was expressed in percentage form by PWC as follows:  
German primary schools: 15, 33% or 138 responses;  
German secondary schools: 15% or 135 responses;  
Czech primary schools: 25,78% or 232 responses; 
Czech secondary schools: 17, 78% or 160 responses;  
Spanish primary schools: 8, 68% or 84 responses;  
Spanish secondary schools: 8, 27% or 79 responses.  
The results were analysed by Key Performance Indicators and summarized in the UNESDA secretariat 
documents; “Upholding our commitments five years on”.  The authors provide interesting information 
missing from the formal PWC report, due to their knowledge of the wider European market.  It includes 
two comments at page 2 of the document;  
“It should be noted that some countries, including France and the UK, have in place legislation 
that is in line with our commitment, and does not allow for the sale of soft drinks products in 
primary schools”. And later on the same page, “We experienced a number of challenges in 
monitoring schools in the Czech Republic due to the specific education system with many schools 
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actually being mixed primary and secondary. Many secondary schools for pupils of ages 15 to 19 
are regarded as further education establishments, and so are more liberal in their choices”.       
  
On KP1 – that is; “no direct sales of soft drinks products in primary schools”, an overall rate for 2010 of 
95% compared to the 2006 rate of 93.9% was noted.    
On KP2 – that is; “A full range of drinks is offered in secondary schools”, an overall rate for 2010 of 84% 
compared to the 2006 rate of 66.9% was achieved.  
On KP3 – that is; “Ensuring that parents and teachers are involved in the decision as to what beverages 
to sell in schools”.  This made for an overall rate for 2010 of 83% compared to the 2006 rate of 53.5 %. 
UNESDA rather coyly states where this information is presented, “We have to raise our hands here and 
admit that this is a difficult commitment for this industry to uphold, as clearly, we have no influence over 
how schools consult on the food and drink they sell.  However, we have been pleased that having raised 
the issue of consultation there has been a significant uplift compared with 2006 in the percentage of 
schools choosing to consult more widely and involve parents and teachers in the important decisions 
about what pupils should be offered to drink in schools.  As a stakeholder in the debate we believe it is 
really important that these decisions are taken after due consideration. ”    
On KP4 – that is; “vending machines must be unbranded, or display neutral health messages’, UNESDA 
underlines the amount of work changing the display panels on vending machines across all school outlets 
in the EU.  “UNESDA members have changed literally thousands of panels on the fronts and sides of 
vending machines to ensure that they carry no commercial branding other than neutral, lifestyle 
pictures”.    In order to gather the correct type of information from the head teachers of the schools, the 
survey includes 6 answer choices with photographs of types of images that can be found on vending 
machines. For this KPI, 90% of German schools, 93% of Spanish schools and 36% of Czech schools were 
compliant.  The Czech data is asterisked with a repeat of the earlier comment, “Note that the vast 
majority of non compliance instances have been found in schools that cater for 15-19 year olds and are 
regarded as further education establishments, with a more liberal approach to the choice they provide 
pupils.  Corrective action will be taken. “ 
UNESDA then reiterates its wish to continue driving a multi stakeholder approach to promote healthy 
and balanced lifestyles.   
 108 
 
3.2.8. Outstanding questions and mapping the process  
This final part of the section will discuss whether participation of UNESDA in the Platform on Obesity 
qualifies as a mechanism in which a business association renders itself publicly accountability.  Is the 
mechanism applied for the public benefit?  Does it feature the necessary components of public 
accountability as set out in Figure 2. ?    
One of the key attributes of public accountability is its close relationship with transparency.  Persson 
(2009 p. 144) writes that, “transparency and accountability are intimately connected.  For citizens to be 
able to hold those wielding power to account, they must at the least have access to information on 
policy deliberations, decisions and the policy making process.  Hence, transparency can be considered a 
necessary but insufficient condition for accountability”.  The open nature of the Platform commitment 
process with the use of a database accessed by the public, and the presentation in plenary of the 
information gathered to evidence completion of the monitoring process amount to a high level of 
administrative transparency.   
Vibert points to the use of a common set of standards, such as those set by the monitoring process of 
which the Commission is an “independent” guardian, as a classic dimension of accountability.  In an 
assessment of the Accountability Charter for NGOs, Vibert (2007 p. 5) points to the “importance of 
bodies that operate under well defined terms of reference so that outside observers  can see that they 
are operating within their set of responsibilities”.  And he underlines that transparency excludes the all 
important notion of scrutiny, thus agreeing with the Bovens “possibility to ask questions” which is 
indeed present in the Platform’s system.        
The presence of the monitoring process and the independent auditing requirements undertaken by PWC 
for UNESDA correspond to the call by Benner et al (2004 p. 201) for “all internal procedures and 
structures to be open to scrutiny” and reflects their assertion (2004 p. 200) that networks are “a 
composite of their individual parts and that these need therefore not only be identifiable but 
transparent”.  
Another important attribute of public accountability observed by Brenner et al lies in its links to 
legitimacy (p. 201).  The authors describe the process oriented form of governance favoured by networks 
as an accountability of processes or internal accountability.  External accountability is referred to as the 
accountability of outcomes.  Internal process based accountability will affect the legitimacy of the 
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outcome, or the public buy-in.  Hence, the efficiency of the monitoring process and the co-related 
providing of an account, impact directly on the accountability of the outcomes.  The authors then claim 
that this last is important in networks for the “re-embedding of results” (p. 205), a notion which lies close 
to Bovens’ “learning and constitutional perspectives.   
 This highlights a notable weakness in the outcomes of the Platform exercise in that, as the Evaluation of 
2010 reveals, the Platform process contains no means for directly measuring its impact on the rise or fall 
of obesity in the EU.  It is limited to an ex post facto examination of the activities that the actor stated he 
would undertake in committing to the Platform.  In this aspect in particular, the Platform system 
matches the Bovens definition and his assertion that the purpose of a system is to ascertain whether an 
agent can be held accountable after the fact, and not whether he or she has acted in an accountable way 
(Bovens et al 2008 p. 227).  Another reference to a time lag is made when Bovens (1998 p. 28-30) defines 
accountability as being a passive form of responsibility since occurring after the fact.  The post facto 
element of a calling to account is vital and undeniable since the deed needs to have occurred in order for 
the “agent” to describe the event.  
 The multi-stakeholder nature of EU policy making and the cost of legislation are both key factors behind 
the success in the number of participants of this voluntary approach adopted by DG SANCO. As related 
above, the incentive for UNESDA to join the platform as a founding member lies in its need for 
reputation management for its business sector and the existence of poor press coverage linking the 
members’ products with obesity and an unhealthy lifestyle. 
UNESDA, “the actor”, claims to act ‘in the public interest”.  Its members mass produce branded and 
recognisable products for the public at large on a global scale.  The market is highly concentrated and 
direct competitors are active within the association notably Coca Cola and Pepsi. The nine signatory 
companies of UNESDA represent 80% of that beverage market.  The question of representativity might 
be addressed through that market portion but that of “representation” arises here in relation to the 
mandate handed the actor by the principal.   
From an internal accountability perspective, the member companies have clearly mandated and 
empowered the secretariat to monitor and report and participate in the Platform.  Whilst not all 
members of the organisation participate, and there is no internal governance document other than the 
Constitution, the web site of UNESDA is mostly devoted to the Commitments.  The wording of all 
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statements refers to the organisation and its nine participating companies and the relationship is 
transparent with no apparent ambiguity.   
From the viewpoint of public accountability, the principal, according to UNESDA is the “public”.  UNESDA 
claims to act in the public interest for the cause of the “public health”. The arm’s length system of a 
unilateral voluntary commitment by which a governmental body, through its executive institution, deals 
with promoting public health is also a consequence of the lack of legal personality of the European 
Commission and DG SANCO.  Hence,  a “commitment” as opposed to an agreement.  The other instance 
of involvement of the association with the public lies in its contacts via PWC with the greater public in 
the monitoring process.  This can be identified at two levels; firstly with the head teachers of the over 
5000 schools contacted and secondly with the parents of the children concerned when flagging their 
need for involvement in choice of soft drinks for secondary schools.  
Therefore, although a direct and clear mandate from the public appears to be lacking, the consumer and 
branded nature of most of the products concerned places any consequences of their being marketed in 
the public domain.  This conclusion might differ for a more obscure product aimed at a small component 
of wider society. One might argue however that as the commitment continues over the years, an 
expectation is developed by the consulted public who tacitly mandate the association to deal with the 
problem within the Commitment process.  
The minutes of the Platform meetings analysed are not verbatim and show no record of the civil society 
organisations on public health granting a verbal mandate at the close of the reporting for UNESDA to go 
away and do more to reach the goals of the Platform and, “come back next year for more 
encouragement”.  However, as per above, a continued participation creates expectations from which a 
mandate might be gleaned.          
This particular case study identifies a clear forum, in that the Platform process carries several discursive 
and public characteristics.  The initial step of seeking to propose a commitment and inputting this into a 
database to which the public have access, points to the existence of a forum.  The nature of the Platform 
plenary meetings at which the civil society members attend, the publication of the data and minutes on 
the web site and the fact that the purpose of the whole initiative is in the public interest, confirm the 
“public” nature of the accountability process but also of the forum itself.   
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If we consider the Platform meetings to constitute the “live” forum component of the process, does it 
satisfy the conditions of being able to “ask questions” and “pass judgment”?  The interactive elements of 
accountability aimed at differentiating mere transparency from accountability seem satisfied by “public” 
dialogue over several levels.  Chronologically in the process, the participants input their commitment at 
the beginning of the calendar year and, if they have been inactive, their commitment will be withdrawn 
from the database but not without due warning on the part of the European Commission.  Also, the 
presence of a given business association’s commitment in the database and its possible subsequent 
withdrawal are all in the public domain.  The consequent participation in the Platform plenary meetings 
offers an opportunity for the Commission and the civil society organisations to ask questions and expect 
replies.  UNESDA reports annually but, like all other participants, presents its data in plenary only every 2 
and a half years. To underpin their role as a founding member and pre-empt any negative comments, 
UNESDA sends its annual report proactively to all its peers and presents the results in person to each 
leading pure CSO concerned with their subject matter i.e.  the European Public Health Alliance, 
EuroHealthnet, and the Bureau for European Consumers (BEUC) amongst others.   
On the “obligation to explain and justify his/her conduct”, the Platform process includes certain points of 
interest.  Whilst most soft law based systems do not “oblige” an account to be given, the process by 
which the Commission checks activity on the Commitments and deletes the inactive ones from the 
database, creates a co-related obligation to provide that account via the monitoring process.  The 
relationship between the actor and the forum, or principal and agent in an accountability process is, 
according to Jones (1992 p. 73, in Mulgan 2000), as, “associated with the process of being called to 
account to some authority for one’s actions”.  Mulgan provides detail on his definition of accountability 
in that it is external; “the account is given to some other person or body outside the person or body 
being held accountable”.  This does not reflect the Platform system whereby the Actors are also 
members of the Platform. The nature of the types of participants, “for profit and not for profit” creates a 
clear divide in an already very heterogeneous group.  However, the entity calling to account might also 
point to the Commission as the Platform administrators, policing the database and obliging committers 
to report on their promised activities, under threat of removal.  Mulgan adds that the relationship 
involves social interaction and exchange “in that the side calling for an account seeks answers and 
rectification while the other side responds and accepts sanctions”.  These “sides” might be constituted 
by the for profits sector and the CSOs purportedly acting on behalf of the EU public. This same 
interpretation of a divide would fit with Mulgan’s final qualification in that accountability implies rights 
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of authority since “those calling for an account are asserting their rights of superior authority over those 
held accountable, including the right to impose sanctions and demand answers”.   
The element of responsiveness described by Mulgan at the second defining aspect above can also be 
interpreted in terms of control.  Esmark (2008 p. 290) finds that “accountability implies that 
accountability holders have some level of control over the actions of accountability holders”.  He  adds 
that, “the real touchstone of any system of accountability is the level of responsiveness of the 
accountability holdees to the accountability holders”.  He goes on to qualify (Esmark 2008 p. 283) that 
“the accountability holder is in a superior position – based on popular sovereignty – to the holdee and 
stands in judgment over the holdee”.  UNESDA as an actor in the Platform system is held to provide an 
account or be removed from the register through mere compliance with the system prescribed.  They 
render themselves administratively accountable through marking their willingness to commit through a 
database entry.  There is no ad hoc deliberation on the need to call for account carried out by the public 
or representatives of the public at this stage.  The element of responsiveness of the actor to the principal 
would be witnessed however at question time in the plenary meetings or in individual meetings between 
UNESDA and CSO members of the Platform.   The deliberative nature of the meetings, or the possibility 
to ask questions, fits with generic definition of an accountability process where mere reporting would 
lack the requisite active nature.        
 Interestingly the monitoring process should not be confused with the accountability mechanism per se.  
The monitoring is the means by which the actor is held to account but does not completely, alone, fulfil 
the conditions for an accountability process.  The cost in man hours, fees and expenses incurred for the 
monitoring itself is probably the factor responsible for that interpretation.  The “account” itself is the 
means by which the organisation sought to make good its commitments.  This is presented in the 
monitoring system, which constitutes the account given by the business association in plenary and kept 
on their website annually whether presented or not.   
Although the forum might be empowered to ask questions through the nature of the system itself, it is 
not mandated to “pass judgement” based on the account provided. The reporting of the meetings 
reflects just that and does not qualify the forum / Platform for a mandate to pass judgment.  This might 
be taken up by the CSO type members themselves through their own public communication.  A scan of 
the web sites of ten of the food related organisations that are not for profit reveals that, at the most, 
participation in the Platform is mentioned in the annual report of the organisation. This might merely be 
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for the purposes of justifying time and expenses spent towards the CSO type members’ funders, such as 
the European Commission itself.    
One interpretation of the public mandate to sanction might be based on the hypothesis that CSOs enjoy 
a public mandate and act as bodies promoting and defending the public interest, as opposed to the 
forum per se emulating the EU public in this accountability process,  But Altides and Kohler Koch 
considered this interpretation and sheds doubt, stating that (2009 p. 3),  “Civil society organisations can 
pose questions and pass judgment, but it cannot be taken for granted that CSOs can impose 
consequences on the responsible actor “to turn matters right”.  Furthermore, even if CSOs had the 
capacity to exert sanctions, it would constitute a case of accountability, but not necessarily of democratic 
accountability”.  This, one would argue, would need to be derived from a greater public involvement 
brought about by increased publicity and media engagement to be undertaken by the CSOs.  This 
increased publicity would create a framework in which the question of the public nature of the forum via 
CSOs activity in the public interest would be answered and also solve the matter of the mandate to pass 
judgment and to sanction.                             
The ensuing consequences of the case study analysed on soft drink sales in schools, described by Mr 
Beaumont as poor press on the business sector, has not materialised.  This might be partly explained by 
how the pure CSOs view their own role and partly because of the generally uneventful nature of the 
business examined.  
Jo Wills executive Director at EUFIC supports essentially the need for a scientific basis to information 
about food.  She advocated the greater and wider use of communication tools such as podcasts to 
“name and shame” when Robert Madelin (former Director General of DG SANCO) chaired the meetings.  
She pointed out that there has never been a communications strategy linked to the Platform.  The 
current Chair, Despina Spanou requested that she draw one up but did not respond when this work was 
finalised and sent to DG SANCO.   The following are extracts from Ariane Moret, Communications officer 
for EuroHealthnet;  
“EuroHealthNet commitment relates to the improved information exchange about the Platform. 
Through its Policy Action Group, EuroHealthNet fits into the EU Non Communicable Diseases agenda and 
explores the linkages with other EU political initiatives. Concrete examples of the connections between 
public health and other fields at EU level include the School Fruit and Milk Schemes as well as the Most 
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Deprived Persons Scheme which give real social and equitable value to Public Health promotion efforts 
at EU level. 
Our aim is promote and inform about such initiatives (i.e: School Fruit and Milk Schemes – our Slovenian 
member is very active about this). We also attend the platform and communicate about the exchanges 
held in this frame to our members via our communication tools (internal and external newsletters). 
Promoting healthy nutrition and physical activity, we promote our position via our participation in the EC 
work and via the diffusion of our research outcomes (publications / participation in high level 
conferences).  
We took position towards the industry once - one year ago - when (as I told you on the phone) some of 
the industry representatives argued that the “sin tax” could harm vulnerable people.  It’s true that we 
communicate about our projects and their outcomes and do not really position ourselves vis-à-vis of the 
industry. However, I guess we would certainly take position if we see a strong communication we’d 
consider as harmful for citizens’ health (i.e.: pizza seen as a vegetable in the US. This is something that 
has not come to Europe..-)” 
So, the possible imposition of a sanction does not draw its mandate from the process itself but from pure 
CSO organisations drawing on their individual mandates to “act in the public interest”. This mandate 
would become clearer and more direct through enhanced external communication and greater 
engagement of the CSOs with the wider public, be it to highlight positive or negative examples of a 
business association engaging in the process.  The Platform, European Commission and DG SANCO do 
not enjoy a punitive mandate either save for the administrative based obligation to “activate” the 
commitment and report via the proscribed monitoring system.  This should not detract from the real 
“damage” that a bad press report might generate for this beverages business sector.  All pure CSOs have 
their own press relations and the ability to engage with the media. The cost of monitoring for the 
Brussels based association alone is prohibitive at over 1 million Euros every two and a half years. This 
cost would not be incurred without the consequences of non participation in the Platform having been 
monetised.  And, in that, UNESDA is held to account.           
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3.3. European Public Affairs’ Consultancy Association  : accountability in the lobbying profession 
3.3.1. Introduction 
This case study presents internal insights into accountability in practice arising in particular from the 
nature of the profession examined.  Public affairs activities encompass both internal and external facets 
in that standards set by the profession can be viewed as internal to that profession but the effects of the 
activities undertaken can have a public impact.  It is inherent to lobbyists to deal with public 
representatives who take decisions impacting the Public, based on the messages conveyed in the 
lobbying process.  The conduct under scrutiny is individual whilst the association represents the 
profession via consultancy firms.  The overlap between professional and public accountability is part of 
the analysis below.  
Another aspect to highlight is the use of the learning perspective from which to assess the accountability 
arrangements.   In March 2013 EPACA adopted wide ranging amendments to its Code of Conduct and 
Guidelines as a result of the recommendations made by its Professional Practices Panel.  These changes 
bring the association closer to consideration of the Public as key “principal” but would require further 
changes to the composition of the Panel and closed nature of its proceedings.  This, as yet, is not the 
intention of the organisation which focuses,  it seems with genuine good faith, on high professional 
standards in public affairs.    
3.3.2. EPACA, an accountability actor:  
EPACA is the European Public Affairs’ Consultancies Association, based in Brussels.  According to the 
FAQs of the web site (EPACA 2013a), EPACA was launched in January 2005 and it was the “first time 
Brussels Public Affairs consultancies agreed to a formal self regulatory structure, with a professional 
practices panel and procedures for dealing with complaints”.  The panel and complaints procedure are 
inherent to the organization from the outset.  
The FAQs refer to a Code of Conduct Group, “an informal long-standing association of Public Affairs 
Practitioners” as the ascendant of EPACA.  The timing of the creation of EPACA is said to be due to the 
need for updating the long standing informal association coupled with the start of a new Commission 
and Parliament and another enlargement (taken to refer to that of 2004).  
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In answer to the question, “what is the background to this Code group?” the statement provided covers 
procedural matters related to the EU institutions taking note of the content of the Code and its adoption 
as the basis of the original European Parliament code of conduct.  There is no reference in the answer to 
the rationale behind the creation and then adoption of this professional code of conduct; just to its 
serendipitous timing in relation to the evolution of the European Union.  The adoption of the Code is not 
described as a response to a particular set of circumstances that might have arisen in the public affairs 
community or to a demand made by the EU Institutions or the wider public for that matter.  The FAQs 
further refer to the possibility of improving on the code and also to SEAP, the Society of European Affairs 
Professionals and the difference between this last and EPACA.    
The EPACA web site also provides a narrative on “Lobbying - The Concept”, with a historic description of 
the activity as well as the term “lobbyist”.  The paragraphs entitled, “from “lobbying” to “public and 
government affairs” are of note. The explanation of the transition in vocabulary is based on the 
unpopularity of the “lobbying” label as witnessed in an “American survey of US non-profit organizations” 
(EPACA 2012a.), “Lobbying - The Concept”; “organizations were asked what activities they undertook to 
influence policy: 29% said they never lobbied, 15% never advocated and 12% never educated.  
Simultaneously, 86% answered that they did participate in the public policy process”. The explanation 
goes on to state that in order to avoid the negative connotations linked to lobbying – in this case 
involving participation in the EU policy process - , most lobbyists in Europe now use the term “public 
affairs”.  The statement then refers directly to the European Commission’s recognition of the profession 
and its evolution in terminology, thus setting out the role of the activity in the EU policy process. 
Even the European Commission has dropped the term “lobbying” used in its 2006 Green Paper, to 
become “interest representation” in its Communication establishing a voluntary Register in 2008 and in 
the current Transparency Register set up in 2011, it is being referred to as “European Institutions’ 
interaction with citizen’s associations, NGO’s, business, trade and professional organizations, trade 
unions, think tanks etc”, now referred to as “interested parties”.  Indeed, the nature of the activity of the 
members of this professional society is to participate in the EU policy process or act under conditions of 
EU policy participation.     
An interview on 7th February 2014 with Tom Spencer, who chaired the decision making panel, provides 
insight into how EPACA dealt with their only complaints case.   
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“Is the practice of public affairs a profession? It implies legitimacy and status; public affairs 
professional practitioner sounds safer than “lobbyist”.  These professionals aspire to the status 
of lawyers and doctors.  EPACA bought into the concept of profession. The bad side of a 
profession is a closed shop.  Stanley Crossick had wanted to create a golden profession, like a 
guild.  
When there is the changeover of institutions, it is a great opportunity. The drift towards 
professionalization was intensified in the public debate on the Transparency Register. This was 
my entry point into EPACA. At the time I was leading ECPA (European Centre for Public Affairs) 
and it only had academics and corporate representatives as members.  I brought in the 
associations and consultancies and we held our first meeting on ensuring access to the 
profession.  The EP had always been in favour of the profession thanks to their ability to amend 
proposals and therefore it depended on its ability to get new information with which to 
challenge the Commission and to be lobbied by Member States that are not in line with the 
Commission proposal.  I am in favour of any measure that strengthens integrity.  
The Kallas proposal was based on the US model, i.e. finance focused.  Public access to the 
legislator is legitimate and goes to the heart of parliaments in northern Europe”.  
Thus, Spencer sets the scene of awareness of the lobbying actors in Brussels of the need for improving 
the reputation of the sector.  The initiative of the Transparency Register placed the lobbying firms, 
members of EPACA, under a spotlight.   
3.3.3. EPACA and its Code of Conduct:  
EPACA is a not for profit organization registered in Belgium.  The Articles of Association are 
complemented by Internal Procedures and Guidelines adopted by the General Assembly in 2006 and 
amended in 2007, 2010, 2011 and 2013.  These guidelines set out rules on the membership criteria for 
joining procedure, the EPACA Code of Conduct and guidelines to its application and the disciplinary rules 
and complaints procedure.  All official documents pertaining to the organisation as well as the report of 
the disciplinary hearing discussed below are on the EPACA web site:  http://www.epaca.org.  
The Guidelines were updated and amended in March 2013 for several reasons explained below but in 
particular to reflect a change in the Code of Conduct arising from the case of the Smoke Free Partnership 
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v. Interel, the focus of this case study exposed later in this section.  The Code of Conduct amendments 
gave rise to related changes to the Professional Practices Panel and the Disciplinary Procedures.   
The Code of Conduct is at the core of EPACA.  It is the rationale for the existence of the organization and 
its main tool and deliverable.    The membership criteria refer to the “signature of the Code and credible 
agreement to adhere to it in both letter and spirit and accept EPACA disciplinary rules and procedures;” 
as the first condition of membership (EPACA 2013b).   
The joining procedure of the organization refers explicitly to the signing of the Code at point a. of the 
Internal Rules whilst, point c. states that one of the requirements is a, “Meeting with a representative of 
the Management Committee …to ensure full understanding of the Code of Conduct and principles 
underlying the Code by the enquiring in firm, in particular: I. presentation by applying firm of 
membership criteria being met; II. Issues arising from the Code of Conduct; III.  Process of staff signing of 
Code of Conduct; IV.  Process for implementation of internal training on the Code of Conduct”.           
The Internal Rules then deal in part II with the Code and the guidelines on its application which can be 
used as interpretation and implementation guidance.  The Preamble of the “Guidelines”, at point 10., 
states that, “it is the duty of the Association to promote awareness of the obligations arising from 
signature of the Code, and observance of its requirements by all members”.  The rules are applicable to 
all employees, part or full time, and trainees of the signatory companies.   
The Guidelines then refer to the six chapters of the Code; Transparency; Conflict of Interest; Financial 
Inducement; Illegal Actions, Political Activities and, lastly  Sanctions.  The first of these is “transparency” 
where a particular accountability aspect is worthy of comment.  The code requires that a consultant 
identifies himself correctly, meaning being clear about the interests represented. This touches upon the 
“many hands” problem identified by Bovens but from an inverted perspective.  Identifying the actor 
would appear straight forward but identifying the principal for this form of agent-principal relations 
might prove more difficult. A typical situation of a public affairs consultant or consultant from an 
association management company representing an association is directly addressed at point 17: 
“Consultants acting as the secretariat and /or carrying the cards from interest groups should be 
transparent about their dual role in contacts with EU Institutions.  Websites of such groups should also 
be transparent about such roles and secretariat support”.           
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“Illegal actions” at pt 23 clearly sets the context of the application of these rules as being beyond legal 
compliance, “we take it as a given that public affairs consultants must obey the law of the country where 
they operate,” and, “our code concentrates on defining what is regarded as ethical behaviour”.  The 
code and these guidelines provides the process by which to hold the signatories to account.  The use of 
the process is optional, and qualifies as a governance structural preference.          
The Sanctions chapter at Part II of the Guidelines states that the “signatories agree to be subject to the 
disciplinary rules of EPACA in case of alleged breach of the Code”.  And, later, that, “they also agree to 
enforce the code within their companies”.   Adherence to the code is therefore linked directly to 
application of the disciplinary rules and the possibility of a sanction.  
3.3.4. The disciplinary rules and complaints procedure of the Code of Conduct:       
Five pages of the Guidelines are devoted to the rules and complaints procedure dealing with great detail 
on the process, delays, actors and outcomes of the application of such a procedure.  
Each of the titles will be dealt with below.  
- “Causes of Complaints”: refers to any alleged breach of the Code or its related rules by any staff 
of signatory companies.  The alleged breach must not be more than six months’ old for EPACA to 
consider it.     
- “Complainants”: refers to any legal or physical entity.  
-  “Complaints procedure”: refers to the quorum of 50% + 1 of members of the management 
committee for its dealings related to the disciplinary procedures and a fast track process to be 
used for a decision to be reached within 24 hours.     
- “Filing a complaint”: the complaint is to be filed with the secretariat which would notify the 
management committee that is the Board of EPACA, the complainant and the accused 
consultancy within 7 days.  “All those in receipt of this information will be reminded that the 
process is strictly confidential until a final determination is made.  Should any information be 
leaked, EPACA will not comment on the complainant until the procedure has been completed”.    
The actual registering of the complaint is therefore not in the public domain and this rule in 
effect closes the door to any public comment or input to the process while it is ongoing. 
Importantly also at this pt 35. is the acceptance of the complainant that “he will accept the final 
decisions and appeals provided for in the EPACA rules.  He also agrees, by his participation in the 
complaints procedure, that he will not have any other rights or remedies of whatsoever nature 
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against EPACA”.   This last addition emphasizes the optional nature of adherence to the code and 
indeed its consequences.   The rules deal with ethical behaviour beyond compliance with the law 
of the land.  There is therefore no hierarchical structure of appeal against the decisions made by 
the Professional Practices Panel.  This underlines that the discussion lies clearly in the realm of 
governance preferences.     
- “Acceptance of a Complaint”:  once a complaint has been received, the Management Committee 
has up to 30 working days to decide by a 2/3 majority whether the complaint falls within the 
EPACA scope or not. If it does, the Management Committee will refer the case directly to the 
Professional Practices Panel. Again, as per a legal process, the complaint must not be discussed 
between the parties or members of the Management Committee. Furthermore, 
“Communications between the Association and the member concerned by a complaint, once the 
complaint has been received shall be confined to practical exchanges with the Chair/acting Chair 
and Secretariat on organization of hearings, acceptances of formal responses / evidence etc”, 
(point 39).  This last requirement seeks to ensure the outcome of a fair hearing in that the 
member company would not be able to exercise influence over the dealings and process.  The 
simultaneous notification of all parties concerned and transparency of the procedure as well as 
its prescriptive setting out in the guidelines all point to a willingness of the organization to treat 
these matters in a fair and balanced way.     
    
The professional practices panel (PPP):  
The PPP is a core feature of the complaints procedure. The Guidelines provide for the appointment of 3 
members ‘from outside the profession, appointed on the basis of their experience of the EU institutions 
and public affairs”. Point 46 states that the Management Committee “shall look for professionals of high 
reputation among, for instance, former MEPs, former Commission officials, professionals from the 
corporate, legal or service sectors, representatives of NGOs, or members of Brussels think-tanks”.  The 
section dealing with the PPP in the Guidelines then sets out provisions to ensure the independence of 
the panellists.   The PPP enjoys an ad hoc advisory role as well as one of hearing a complaint.  This allows 
for improvement to EPACA rules outside the context of a complaint. However, the advice provided in this 
manner will not necessarily be made public.  An agreement between the Management Committee and 
the PPP reached by consensus is required.  
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The Process of the Complaint and Sanction System:  
This step by step process is very detailed both in relation to the appointment of decision makers, how 
they arrive at decisions and the all important communication aspects. For example, point 52 prescribes 
how, once the Management Committee has referred a complaint to the PPP, the Chair of the Committee 
then contacts the members of the PPP to determine their availability.   The three PPP members will 
appoint their own Chair who is therefore not appointed by the Management Committee.  This arm’s 
length distance to avoid influence on how the PPP organizes itself internally is clearly important from 
both a process and perception viewpoint.                       
The PPP then has 30 working days from the referral from the Management Committee to “conduct its 
investigation and reach its conclusions”, with the possibility to request more time if necessary (point 54). 
The PPP determines whether a clause of the Code has been breached or not and will then make a 
recommendation back to the Management Committee.  
The conduct of the work of the PPP and the format of the hearing to be held is set out below (point 52 of 
the Guidelines); 
“ I. Review the facts of the complaint;  
II. hold a ‘hearing’ with all parties present. The format of the hearing would be as follows:  
i. The complainant explains its case  
ii. The defendant responds  
iii. Time is given during both parties’ pleadings to allow questioning by the Panel  
iv. The Panel then meets without the parties to discuss the case and to reach a decision  
III. Undertake any further research or investigation deemed necessary  
IV. In the process of its work the Panel may seek to resolve the complaint without recourse to the 
disciplinary mechanisms and sanctions set out herein”. 
 
Of note in this process is the holding of a hearing of a complaint and of an account.  This account is 
provided by the defendant company.  The Panel members can then put questions to both parties and 
then deliberates in private.  The reference in, “IV.” to the possibility that no sanction be meted out or 
that there be no need to use the disciplinary mechanisms leaves open the possibility for consequences, 
that might not necessarily have a punitive goal. 
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Should the Panel decide that the Code has been breached, it will recommend, only, to the Management 
Committee one of four sanctions which range from providing guidance on best practice to expelling the 
member consultancy from EPACA. This last however requires an Extraordinary General Meeting of the 
Members. The recommendation is communicated simultaneously to all parties and is kept confidential 
until “a final determination is made”, (Point 57).  
 
It is the Management Committee of the association that takes the final responsibility for decision making 
on the application or not of the sanctions.  Should they to wish to depart from the recommendations of 
the PPP, a two thirds majority of those present is required, with an explanation made to the Panel of the 
reasoning and an attempt to meet with the Panel representative to explain the intended decision.  This 
re-referral of the PPP recommendations might appear odd.  However, the Management Committee is an 
official body of the Association whilst the General Assembly is the demos of the organization and hence 
its “supreme” decision making group in this not for profit organization under Belgian law.  The PPP is a 
body created by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Management Committee.      
 
Point 61 of the Guidelines provides factors that must be taken into account should the sanctions be 
applied.  These factors are considerations based on the nature of the alleged breach such as was this an 
isolated case or a practice? Did it involve a junior or senior member of staff? What internal disciplinary 
measures are taken by the company?  Most salient for the association is the consideration of the impact 
of the case on the “reputation of the profession”.  These factors seem to demonstrate the will of EPACA 
“to get to the bottom” of the problem and to ensure to the extent that it is possible, that the same 
problems will not be encountered in the future.  It is only once the case has been closed that the 
decisions of the Management Committee, recommendation of the Panel and if an expulsion is agreed, 
decision of the Extraordinary General Meeting, are published on the EPACA web site. 
 
3.3.5. The Complaint of the Smoke Free Partnership and how it was processed: 
 The EPACA complaints system and process has been put to the test (EPACA 2012b). The PPP has met 
and decided on a case, referred their recommendation to the Management Committee and the case was 
closed and published on the EPACA web site.  The follow up to the case and its ramifications are 
particularly interesting from an accountability viewpoint and the Bovens leaning perspective.   However, 
I will first summarise the procedure undertaken in relation to this case involving Interel European Affairs.  
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 The case is based on a complaint made by the Smoke Free Partnership (SFP) against the member 
company Interel, concerning the conduct of an intern who was seeking information from Ms Kemp and 
Ms Brassard of the SFP via Facebook.  It was reported in the case summary that the intern “did not 
communicate clearly who he was working for or the purpose of his research, namely an enquiry for his 
employer Interel in the framework of a pitch for a potential client in the packaging industry”.    
The complainant, Ms Berteleti-Kemp described in an interview on 18th April 2014, how she decided to 
submit a complaint.  The intern in question had previously worked at the SFP led by Ms Berteleti-Kemp 
before being taken on by Interel. He was working on a pitch, which is an oral presentation of a proposal 
for services, for an entity related to the tobacco industry though focusing solely on the packaging aspects 
of the product and had asked SFP for confidential information.   Ms Berteleti-Kemp said that she;  
“..knew of the EPACA rules through a consultancy member of the association.  I was furious 
about the case and wanted to complain.  I wrote the complaint alone and submitted it to EPACA 
which took it very seriously and I was asked to come to a hearing.  We were heard separately. 
The Panel listened first to the Interel team who had brought their own lawyers and were clearly 
worried.”  
The EPACA Management Committee referred the complaint of the SFP against Interel to the PPP on 7th 
December 2011.  As per the process, the PPP members, Messrs Spencer and Perroy and Prof. Coen were 
contacted and indicated their availability to examine the complaint. They agreed between each other 
that Mr Spencer would chair the proceedings. The actual hearing took place at the EPACA offices on 10th 
January 2012 and took the form of a disciplinary committee with 2 EPACA members (the Chair and Vice 
Chair) observing.  Mr Spencer stressed that this was the first time that there had been a referral to the 
PPP and the need for close adherence to the Guidelines.   The Management Committee members also 
made a statement at the outset of the procedure recognizing the responsibility of the Committee, “to 
both protect and enhance the professional reputation of public affairs practice and to reassure EPACA 
members concerning the transparent and rigorous nature of the complaints procedure”.    
 
 
 
 
 124 
 
Tom Spencer recalls the context of the setting up of the Panel;  
“I was perceived by EPACA as an independent figure giving legitimacy to the issue and seen as an 
academic (I was teaching at Brunel).  I was out of the control of any obvious lobby, not on a 
Board and not a public official.                  
EPACA approached me to set up the PPP for this complaint from the Smoke Free Partnership.  I 
did not enquire as to if there had been any cases discussed or complaints submitted prior.  Other 
panelists were appointed.  I received a briefing from the Chair of EPACA and told that I need to 
do justice to the complainant and defendant.  I was aware at the time that there would be wider 
ramifications.  Also, the threshold for submitting a complaint had been lowered 12 months 
earlier. I knew that changes might be needed to the Code of Conduct, there were expectations 
that we would learn things that would lead to amendments of the existing code.  I also 
suspected that the greater use of interns (as quasi consultants) due to the economic downturn 
might lead to a risky practice.  The interns were very competitive amongst each other because of 
the limited number of jobs going.”  
Spencer then chaired the Panel and was instrumental in guiding the results towards a revision of the 
Code.  Following the prescribed procedure, the Committee had to first rule on whether there had been a 
breach of the Code or not, and so heard both parties.   The defendant consultancy were accompanied by 
a lawyer who provided a rebuttal to the complaint and the Interel team also claimed that the Code did 
not apply since the exchanges did not involve a member of the EU Institutions and did not count as 
lobbying because the request for information on behalf of the intern was for preparation of a pitch.   
The Panel Chair then launched into “an extensive process of questioning” which sought to establish in 
particular the extent to which the intern was being supervised or not.  Questions were therefore put on 
the basis of the argumentation heard and answers were duly provided.  The Committee also then heard 
the SFP who also answered questions on the calls subsequent to the complaint.  
Ms Berteleti-Kemp recalls;  
“There were separate hearings; I waited. I was not vengeful but nervous. When my turn came it 
lasted a long time.  After about an hour, they understood my point of view.”    
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EPACA’s PPP then decided on the facts that the intern had been ambiguous about the purpose of his 
request; that he was indeed acting on behalf of Interel and that this was not a private matter and that 
the use of Facebook was not innately improper for a business matter.  
On the matter of the breach of the Code, the Committee decided that there had been none and 
accepted Interel’s contention to the extent that the matter did not involve “dealings with the EU 
institutions” as set out in the preamble of the Code.  The PPP however made some noteworthy 
recommendations that were taken up by the Committee and gave rise to the amendments to the Code 
and the Guidelines as adopted by the General Assembly of EPACA in March 2013.          
Again Tom Spencer provides insight into the case at that time;  
“I made a distinct attempt to understand the details of the events of the case.  I followed the 
existing procedure. I heard both parties.  The PPP focused on how the presentations were made.  
There was a conflict on evidence.  The NGO presentation rested on the fact that EPACA should 
not give a positive account to the consultancy.   
The PPP decided unanimously that the complaint was legitimate but that changes were needed 
to the code to make for credibility…even though the consultancy got off the hook.   
I had no input as to how EPACA should change the rules but I anticipated a strengthening of 
rules.  We upheld the complaint but were not able to sanction since the complainant did not 
qualify.   
Here, the need for public credibility for a professional code overrode the legal reasoning i.e. that 
the Smoke Free Partnership did not have locus standi.  There should also be a proper use of 
interns and related training for them.”                   
Ms Berteleti-Kemp comments on the outcome of the hearing and her assessment of the application of 
the rules, as the complainant.  
“I lost the case but I also won the case; concerning the inclusion of stakeholders. They 
recognised there had been an injustice.  Both parties were treated equally. My case had been so 
clear.  The panel wanted to look at the case from every single angle.  During the hearing, the 
Chair of EPACA gave a long lecture on how the case might ruin the reputation of the consultancy.  
I kept to their own rules and guidelines in my answers to the questions.  The panel was very fair 
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and really wanted to find out what was right and wrong.  After, I felt legitimised because the 
rules were changed.  I want to see a case that wins.”     
This statement is interesting in that the sense of justice felt by the complainant is derived from the fair 
application of the existing procedure and not its result.  This might support the application of 
accountability procedures as instruments of legitimization.    
The recommendations arising from the decisions of the Panel as referred to the committee  were 
threefold and, combined, led to a substantial widening of the scope of application of the Code of 
Conduct both in terms of people involved as and the activities covered.  
The first recommendation would in effect remove the basis for the decision that the Code was not 
breached.  It calls for an extension of the Code to include “all relationships with other stakeholders” and 
not just be limited to contact with officials of EU Institutions.       
The second greatly widens the scope of application of the Code and hence the disciplinary process to the 
activities.  The PPP members noted that the scope was intended to be limited to lobbying activities 
defined as, “actions in pursuit of particular objectives in relation to specific policies or legislation for a 
client or group of clients”.  They however decided that preparatory work for a pitch could fall within this 
definition, though this had not been the original intention of the drafter.  They therefore recommended 
an explicit inclusion of this type of activity in any redraft of the Code and Guidelines.  
Finally, the third recommendation focused on the person who initiates the above described activities 
and their intentional inclusion in the definition of employees.  The PPP recommended that further 
training on the Code be given to member company employees and that a clarification in relation to the 
status of interns was required.  
3.3.6. Outcome of the Complaint and Professional Practices Panel recommendations: 
 Upon receiving the recommendations of the PPP, the Management Committee decided to revise both 
the Code of Conduct and the Guidelines, not only to reflect the recommendations but also to update the 
Code to current business practices such as social media used in the Smoke Free Partnership case (but not 
taken up in the recommendations). 
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The press release (also on the EPACA.org site)  announcing the adoption of the new Code only refers to 
the scope of activities and not directly to the co-related widening of the potential complainants pool, the 
inclusion of social media as a consideration and clarifications on the respective roles of the Management 
Committee and Professional Practices Panel as regards the disciplinary process.  
There are 6 main amendments to the Code, adopted by the EPACA members at their General Assembly 
of March 2013.  These are examined hereunder after an analytical textual comparison. 
Code of Conduct amendments  
 Amendment 1 to first line of Code:  
 Old text:     
 “This code of conduct applies to public affairs practitioners dealing with EU institutions”.  
New text:  
“The code of conduct applies to all activities undertaken by EPACA members in the context of their EU 
Public Affairs work”. 
This widening of the scope was motivated by the recognition that there could be a negative impact on 
the profession emanating from activities that fell out of the scope but nonetheless were carried out by 
EPACA members in their daily work.  It is a courageous move with very wide implications. Indeed, public 
affairs practitioners undertake many activities other than lobbying of the EU Institutions including: 
lobbying of other decision making bodies such as the UN or national member government 
representatives on the part of their EU clients, engaging with stakeholders on behalf of their clients in 
particular in relation to setting up alliance partnerships, undertaking research in any form to draw up 
positions or to identify recipients of these through to preparation of pitches etc. The widening of the 
scope of activities de facto brings with it the widening of the scope of potential complainants, that is 
“any physical or legal person”, now, having cause for complaint on a much wider array of activities than 
prior to the above commented case.   
Amendment 2 to paragraph 2:  
 Old text :  
“In their dealings with the EU institutions public affairs practitioners shall:”  
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New text :  
“When carrying out the activities described above, public affairs practitioners shall:”          
 Amendment 3:   
Old text (point c):  
“Neither intentionally misrepresent their status nor the nature of their inquiries to officials of the EU 
institutions nor create any false impression in relation thereto;”  
New text (point c):  
“Neither intentionally mis-represent their status nor the nature of their inquiries nor create any false 
impression in relation thereto;”  
This merely reflects the change enacted above at Amendment 1. This last Amendment 3, which is a 
deletion of the limiting of the scope, demonstrates, through the absence of a mention of a specific group 
of interlocutors, the potential breadth of the basis for complaint and the complainant.  
 Amendment 4:  
Old text (point j):  
“neither directly nor indirectly offer nor give any financial inducement to:  
-any EU official, nor  
- Member of the European Parliament, nor  
- their staff”;  
New text (point j):  
“neither directly nor indirectly offer or give any financial inducement to any elected or appointed public 
official, or staff of their institutions and political groups;”  
This text extends the ban on offering/giving any financial inducement (i.e. to persuade him/her to act in 
a certain way) to any elected or appointed official, whether at local, regional, national or EU level. It 
again reflects the scope widening to any person legal or physical which has dealings of any professional 
nature with public affairs consultants.   
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 Amendment 5  
Old text (point m):  
“avoid actions likely to bring discredit upon the profession or the Association”.  
New text:  
Deleted 
In view of the scope widening of the activities, line (m) would appear redundant and in fact slightly 
loosely worded.  The deletion would appear wise in the circumstances.  
 Amendment 6  
Old text (Para 4):  
“All signatories agree that they and all their employees of their company will adhere to the above 
code...”  
New text (Para 4):  
“All signatories agree that they and all individuals acting on their behalf of their companies will adhere to 
this code and will avoid actions likely to bring discredit upon the profession or the Association”.  
This extension of the scope of potential actors beyond employees only reflects the recommendation of 
the PPP to include the intern situation encountered in the commented case.  The criterion for inclusion is 
the link with a member company.  Other than inclusion of interns this would also extend to service 
providers specifically mandated by the company, undertaking activities within the new scope.  It also 
clearly places responsibility for training and awareness-raising in the hands of the member companies 
and EPACA.  The phrase committing members and all their co-workers “to avoid conduct likely to bring 
discredit upon the profession or the Association” was replaced here from point (m) to also emphasise 
the joint responsibility to avoid “discreditable behaviour”. 
3.3.7. EPACA Internal guidelines and procedures amendments: 
The Guidelines of the Association were also amended to reflect the changes in the Code and to address 
other developments including:  
- to allow for future considerations and technical adaptation such as use of social media, internet etc, as 
 130 
 
Facebook was used by the Interel intern.  
- to clarify the respective roles of the Management Committee and the PPP in relation to legal limitations 
in that the PPP is not legally responsible for the actions of the association, by the Board of Directors as 
mandated by the General Assembly is, and  
- to ensure that all language is coherent and in line with the thrust of the decisions taken at the 
Management Committee.  
 There are four areas in which the Guidelines were modified subsequent to the Smoke Free Partnership.  
They are examined below.  
Membership Criteria and joining procedure:  
The earlier requirement of two years of business prior to joining was removed just as that of joining 
national associations where they exist.  The main change at this section of the rules is the requirement 
that members agree to abide by the Code of conduct “in letter and spirit”.   This evokes notions of 
accountability in the sense that signatories would be willing to adhere to the rules and the disciplinary 
process through this “abidance”.  Also, to address the need for depth of understanding of the rules and 
adherence to them in all professional activity for all employees, including interns, and service providers, 
applicant member companies are now required to meet with a member of the Management Committee 
to explain the appertaining procedures.  
Membership fees: 
A clarification for companies that do not have offices in Belgium was added to the effect that fees will be 
calculated on total turnover of EU work.   
Code of Conduct Guidelines:  
The changes in this section were the most detailed.  They clarify the roles of the Management 
Committee and the Professional Practices Panel and also provide for when information related to a 
disciplinary process is placed on the EPACA web site.  Other changes reflect the recommendations of the 
PPP with regards to the breadth of inclusion of employees of signatory companies and the depth to 
which the code must be taken into account in their daily activities of EU public affairs.  
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This is evidenced in the first change at point 27 of the guidelines which note that disciplinary procedures 
can be launched for a breach of the Code of Conduct or the Statutes (or a regulation implementing the 
statutes), or for a conduct which gives cause for complaint, having regard to the letter and spirit of the 
Code.  Point 28 marks the greater inclusion of service providers to member companies, referred to as 
“contractors” in the scope of the Code and hence as potential subjects of a complaint.  
The changes clarify that EPACA will not comment publicly on a complaint until the procedure is 
completed.  Furthermore, if there is a referral to the PPP, the parties are informed that a complaint has 
been referred, but without naming the parties to the case. The final decision of the Management 
Committee and if deemed appropriate, the recommendations of the PPP, will be published on the EPACA 
web site once the case is closed.  
Finally, the changes clarified the nature of the members of the Panel to the effect that each of the three 
members must come from outside the profession and are appointed on the basis of their experience of 
EU Institutions and public affairs (point 45).   The next point stated that “the Management Committee 
shall look for professionals of high reputation among, for instance, former MEPs, former Commission 
officials, professionals from the corporate, legal or service sectors, representatives of NGOs, or members 
of Brussels think tanks”.                      
3.3.8. Analysis of accountability context and identification of components:  
The EPACA code of conduct and linked disciplinary panel process constitute an accountability mechanism 
as part of a preferred governance structure.  The set of rules are applied above and beyond legal 
compliance and are not a practical requirement for regulating or having access to a market or profession: 
they are a choice.  
EPACA, though its members are consulting firms or agencies, seeks to act as a professional society 
setting standards and regulating the professional conduct of its members.  Although, this is not 
mentioned in public documents, the impetus for its existence is likely to lie in the need for reputation 
management of the profession.   
The professionals operating in “public affairs” and inputting to the EU policy process play an interesting 
role in relation to the accountability questions at hand.  It is inherent to the job of a public affairs 
consultant to input into the decision making procedure, the outcome of which will result in legislation or 
a policy decision impacting all or a section of the EU public.  The consultant will not own the message, 
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the client of the consultancy firm does.  However, the choice of listener, the format it will be presented 
in, the policy and legislative context, the place, timing and packaging of the lobby position will be part of 
the professional’s expertise paid for in fees to the consultancy by the client.  The exercise of the 
profession is inherently linked to a public outcome. This can be contrasted with other professions that 
hold disciplinary panels such as the medical profession where an identified patient / consumer or at 
most stakeholder group will benefit or suffer from the performance of the professional.  This last impact 
is likely to be smaller and more homogenous than the EU wide population. 
The causal link and position in the professional process is different however.  A lobbyist might only 
constitute a one thousandth of the parties involved in the EU legislative process.  The distance of that 
input from the final outcome can be great, both in impact and time.  This would not be the case for a 
medical surgeon.  In brief, the practice of public affairs can lead to a public outcome, though the link 
might be indirect.  Public participation entails public accountability, so how does the Code of Conduct 
and Disciplinary panel measure up to a matching of public accountability components? Or, does the 
qualification stop at professional accountability?     
EPACA adopts the use of a Code of Conduct, the adherence to which is regulated by a disciplinary panel 
as an organ of the association, as an internal accountability mechanism.  The public nature of the process 
is only evident at the close of the process when the result of a hearing and decision making is posted on 
the EPACA web site.  These codes and disciplinary measures were adopted, in my view, with the aim of 
managing the reputation of the profession but also to stave off any EU legislation that renders 
mandatory any reporting or rules of access to the profession.  There are many practical and legal barriers 
for such EU level legislation however, which render it unlikely. 
The application of the measures and hence the timing and regularity of account giving at a hearing is 
triggered by a complaint.   The account is rendered to the PPP but by whom? There are two levels of 
actors in this context, the consultancy itself but also the profession.  This duality might be the 
consequence of the profession based rules, for a profession with an inherent public impact.    Deleon 
(1998 p. 549) draws a line between internal and external accountability for professional organizations in 
that she notes that the way individuals are held accountable is internal but the way the profession is held 
accountable is public.  What is clear in this case study is that there would be no public accountability of 
EPACA, however tenuous the link with the “public” elements might be, without the internal 
accountability system practised by EPACA members.   
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The consequences of the application of the process are clearly set out in the rules, for the “positive” 
consequences in that the PPP can make recommendations which in effect will enhance perception of the 
profession as with the Smoke Free Partnership case, or, for the “sanctions” as set out at points 59 to 62 
of the Guidelines.              
I will map out the constitutive components of the Bovens accountability definition against the process as 
presented and discuss the presence and relative strength of the “public” elements.  The members of 
EPACA, in drawing up the disciplinary process, are responding to both member and public driven 
expectations.  Member awareness is very high, that of the public is not. When a process is applied, it can 
be understood to be part of the profession’s reputation management activities.   
Moreover, the process itself is triggered by a complainant acting in his/her or the public’s interest to the 
extent that good professional practice is in the public’s interest.  Whilst the actor for the profession is 
the association itself, it is not so clear that the public is the principal.  However, if one combines the 
public’s interest in good professional practice with the fact that there is a distant link between the 
activities of the lobbyists and the wider public, the combination brings us closer to the qualifiers for 
“public accountability”.  In the case of “professional accountability”, the association would be defined as 
the principal and the lobbying firm in question as the actor.  There is of course another level of 
“hierarchical accountability” where the employee or service provider of the member firm might be held 
to account internally.  The account is therefore to be owed in turn to the public, the association and the 
line manager.      
The obligation to provide the account is derived from adherence to the Code of Conduct and is therefore 
directly linked to the membership of the organization.  This explicit obligation has been made clearer 
through the application of the PPP’s recommendations, the reference to the letter and spirit of the code, 
the internal Code training requirements, the requirement of annual re-adherence, and the all-important 
widening of the scope to encompass all types of member firm “employees” and service providers.   
The body that hears the account is the PPP, composed of “professionals of high reputation”.  The 
reference to professionals tends to diminish the “public” nature of the intention of the hearing and 
outcome.  They are however, not members of the association and have to comply with rules of 
independence as set out at point 48-50.  The academic and former MEP who chaired the Smoke Free 
Partnership hearing was not placed there because he enjoys a pseudo public mandate.  He would 
nonetheless be concerned with the conduct of the profession and its impact on the democratic public 
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process of law and policy making.  The Guidelines are also quite detailed with regard to which and when 
parties are informed of the launch of a procedure.  They are equally prescriptive about what and when 
any information is disclosed on the web site; namely “once the case is closed”.  This does not 
demonstrate a will for public involvement or awareness during the application of the accountability 
process.  Finally, the small number of participants, kept to one Chair, two Management Committee 
observers, the complainants and the complainee member firm make for a more private than public 
account giving to the forum.  The nature of the account giving itself will depend on the nature of the 
complaint but it will certainly cover questions related to adherence to the letter of the code with respect 
to training requirements and the scope of public affairs activities.  
The possibility to ask questions and to make deeper inquiries is clearly provided for in the disciplinary 
process which goes much deeper than transparency and, in fact, investigates.  The forum can then pass 
judgment “with consequences”.         
The nature of the sanctions, their availability and procedures of application are also provided for in some 
detail in the Guidelines without removing the power of choice from the PPP.  It is also important to 
remember that the PPP can only make recommendations to the Management Committee which can still 
disagree with it.  This provision allows for the retaining of control of outcomes within the profession and 
association.  The source of the power to pass judgment also remains within the profession and 
association.  The enforceability of the sanctions flows from adherence to the rules and the source of 
control is the same as above.  Concerning the most severe sanction, EPACA has never had to expel a 
member and the Guidelines clearly refer to national Belgian law for not for profit organizations by 
requiring that an extraordinary general assembly be convened for such a measure to be applied.      
The overall analysis of the above criteria would lead to the conclusion that this case study lies at the cusp 
of professional and public accountability. A determining factor for this assessment can be found in the 
nature of the activity of the profession which seeks to communicate to public organizations on matters 
that will ultimately impact the Public.  The composition of the PPP is founded on expertise and 
individuals recognised thanks to their high professional standards and relevant knowledge; not because 
they are representatives of the Public.  The closed nature of the proceedings also presents a lack of 
willingness to interact with the Public.   
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Despite this assessment, EPACA, in widening the remit of activities to “public affairs” work and the scope 
of the definition of employees have moved one step closer to that consideration of the Public at large.  
Indeed, stakeholders qualifying as complainants might also be a group of representatives of the Public.  
The learning outcome of the Smoke Free Partnership case and the related amendments adopted by the 
membership indicate genuine willingness to practice at a high professional level and to render oneself 
accountable in that regard.   The learning perspective of the accountability exercise is certainly effective 
and adequate in bringing about the desired outcome.  
I had initially wished to assess and examine EPACA at the same time as, SEAP, the Society of European 
Affairs Professionals.  But this last have never received a complaint to be examined under their current 
complaints process. There are however some insightful comparisons to be drawn, summarized below. 
SEAP, the membership of which are individuals as opposed to companies as in EPACA, also owns a Code 
and Complaints procedure both of which are very similar to those of EPACA.  However, the SEAP 
procedure relies on the Board of the organisation to hear the case after investigation on receivability 
(locus standi) and the facts, and is applied by the SEAP Policy and Codes Committee.   Philip Sheppard, 
the chair of this last mentioned committee points to the difference in the composition of the hearing 
panels of the two organisations as reflecting the nature of the respective memberships.  EPACA 
members compete for business and therefore need a neutral third party to decide on any dispute that 
might arise.  The SEAP process is more based on mediation between members leading to the result of 
“happy members”.  Once could also state however that SEAP members compete for business.  The 
European Commission recently launched a review of the Transparency Register with a view, amongst 
other points, to increase yet further the number of signatories which they see as a measure of success.  
SEAP would consider revising its Code and procedure to fall in line with any requirement arising from the 
review process; not otherwise.     
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3.4. The World Federation of Advertisers and the Alcohol Forum: cultural accountability? 
This case study deals with a global level organization, the World Federation of Advertisers, participating 
in an EU level platform chaired by the European Commission’s DG SANCO.  As a global direct company 
membership association the WFA interacts frequently and collaborates with its EU level counterpart 
organizations that are federations representing the advertising industry sector regrouping agencies and 
media outlets.   The topic dealt with in the EU policy process of this case study and the reason for 
interaction between these diverse organizations is the advertising of alcohol in particular towards 
younger adults and the use of social media as a means of advertising.  
3.4.1. Introduction:  
There are several important aspects related to accountability that arise from the analysis below.   They 
will be drawn out through the presentation of the case study at each relevant stage.    
The first accountability related aspect centres on the interplay between the internal accountability 
system and the external or public system under scrutiny in the EU policy process. The nature of the 
business of advertising is to reach the widest public possible.  As a member of the public, the EU citizen 
acts as a consumer of products and services but also as a receiver of any form of information visualized 
or heard. 
The advertising sector is highly regulated through self regulation, devised on both an international and 
European level but implemented in the respective signatory countries.   The integrated system seeks to 
ensure accountability of advertisers through a process of adjudication that includes civil society.  This 
applied, internal system, works alongside the activity related to the European Alcohol and Health Forum 
(EAHF) in which I identify the components of a public accountability mechanism.  
The second question deals with the suitability of the actor to bring about the desired outcome of the 
accountability mechanism which also raises the question of representation. The WFA’s commitment to 
the EAHF under scrutiny is worded very closely to that of the “Market Responsibly” commitment and 
guidelines drawn up by Spirits Europe (the EU association dealing with alcohol spirits) , currently applied 
and reported on in the monitoring system.  What is the added value of the WFA Pact to the public?  
Thirdly, the role of the pure CSOs and the joint decision of some of these to leave the Forum highlight 
the difficulties inherent to cooperation between business and civil society on issues of contention.  
Importantly, the action of these pure CSOs provides insights into the level of deliberation within sections 
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of civil society claiming to act in the public interest and therefore to the quality of the “public” 
components of public accountability.        
The case study’s key empirical questions are addressed below through an analysis of the documents 
related to the WFA commitment and DG SANCOs initiatives.  The advertising sector, which is the topic of 
this case study, is complex and deeply networked from an international to local level.  It is necessary to 
gain an understanding of the diverse organizations and the self regulatory system itself to ascertain the 
overlap of the internal accountability and public accountability components.  This is described in the first 
section.   
I then present the unit of analysis, the World Federation of Advertisers (WFA) and the perspective of its 
Public Affairs Director on the rationale for participation, the association’s goal of self regulation on social 
media on an international level and his assessment of the role of pure CSOs in the Forum.  
The European Alcohol and Health Forum is described with its monitoring process and rules of 
participation. I then have focused on the 2012 independent evaluation of the Forum that used the 
actions of the Marketing Task Force working on commercial communications and sales as a case study.  I 
have chosen two particular aspects for further analysis; the effectiveness of self regulation because it 
potentially relies on the public accountability of the participants, and the independence of the process 
which is related to questions about the quality of the public elements of the process.   
The following section deals with the actual commitment made by the WFA, that is, the Responsible 
Marketing Pact.  The content and wording of this commitment is very close to that of commitments 
made by Spirits Europe, in cooperation with other relevant EU level forum member organizations.  Is 
there therefore an added value that is brought by WFA acting on an international level? This in turn 
raises the above mentioned questions as to the suitability of the actor who is in effect self-appointed.  
This last brings us to the matter of public scrutiny and role of the pure Civil Society Organisations in the 
Forum.  Do they act as the “public” in the context of a mechanism of public accountability? Furthermore, 
has the emphasis on self regulation, both in the Forum and in the nature of the commitments made by 
industry undermined the belief of some pure CSOs in the former’s motivation to reduce alcohol related 
harm? I have set out in this section an email discussion between WFA and a pure CSO copied to the full 
Forum group of participants, which highlights the tensions between the two sectors represented.  The 
press reported exit of concerned pure CSOs from the platform is dealt with before last, including the 
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report of an interview with Active Europe.  The focus of that last section is on the level and nature of 
deliberation and the relationship with a potential European Public Sphere.           
Finally, I draw up a mapping of the process and an initial assessment of its potential to qualify as a public 
accountability mechanism.     
3.4.2. The advertising industry’s self regulatory system: internal professional accountability:  
The internal accountability system of the advertising industry supports the contention that any public 
system is based on an internal process that allows for tracking, monitoring etc.  The advertising industry 
derives its rules from the International Chamber of Commerce, to be applied through national 
advertising standards authorities.  Compliance with these rules is closely monitored on a national and 
then European level and a well used system of complaints and adjudication is in place.  The European 
Advertising Standards Alliance (EASA) representing the national advertising authorities and their 
respective self regulatory organizations (SROs) also operates a cross border complaints system which 
refers the complaint to the country of the origin of the advertisement and publishes reports on its web 
site every two months.  All EASA members have signed a charter of Advertising Self Regulation.                  
 The SROs are funded by the industry, a fact that the EASA web site, www.easa-alliance.org, refers to 
specifically, “the fact that self regulatory organisations are funded by the advertising industry creates an 
even higher incentive for these advertising watchdogs to oversee the code independently as they tend to 
be scrutinized more by consumer groups than organisations that draw their funds from government”.  
The code applied for adjudication of a complaint is the national level transposition of the International 
Code of the International Chamber of Commerce.  The core purpose of the WFA commitment to the 
EAHF discussed below is to add rules concerning social media and alcohol advertising to that code.  Once 
incorporated into the wording the new rules would be transposed into the European and national set of 
rules and implemented through the respective level organisations.  
When a member of the public complains because of the content of an advertisement, it is against the 
national Code that it is evaluated by a complaints jury.  So, who assesses? The SRO complaints panel is 
usually composed of industry practitioners, lay experts and also representatives of civil society.  Once a 
complaint has been registered, adjudication will usually take about three weeks.  If a complaint is 
upheld, the advertiser responsible will be asked to modify the material so that it complies with the code, 
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or to withdraw the campaign and they should provide a written assurance that they will do so.  All 
adjudications are published and can therefore badly damage an advertiser’s reputation.   
If the advertiser does not act on the adjudication, the media which runs the ad is asked to withdraw it.  
The media itself can see its license revoked if it continues to air or publish banned material.  Repeat 
advertising offenders are required to have their marketing material pre cleared before airing or 
publication.  In the most serious cases, the SRO can refer the matter to the public authorities to initiate 
legal proceedings.     
3.4.3. World Federation of Advertisers (WFA), a summary:   
The unit of analysis is the World Federation of Advertisers, an association incorporated in Brussels as an 
international not for profit association.  It describes itself (WFA 2012a) as the global organization 
representing the common interests of marketers.  The main activity of the organisation is to champion 
responsible and effective marketing communications worldwide.    WFA claims to represent, “around 
90% of global marketing communications spending, almost US$ 700 billion annually”.   
The WFA operates within a network but does not act as an umbrella organization or federation.  As a 
global organization it claims a network of around 60 national advertiser associations on five continents 
and over 70 of the world’s top marketers.  Its direct company membership allows for a high level club of 
the larger players who would seek to ensure more flexibility than maybe inherent to federations which 
will also cater to the smaller players in the industry.  The WFA approach (see Lohan below) allows for the 
leaders to progress more quickly towards the declared goals and to create a path or platform for the 
other regional organizations that might be less nimble in decision making, to follow or join.  The WFA 
includes the four largest Spirits and four largest Beer producers worldwide in their membership.  
For purposes of comparison and to initially address the question of representation and most effective 
composition of membership for accountability purposes, it is worth noting that Spirits Europe 
(www.spirits.eu) represents all eight of the main Spirits producers marketing in Europe.  It also concludes 
agreements on marketing with the Brewers of Europe and the Comité Européen des Entreprises Vins 
(respectively, the umbrella organizations for the Beer and Wine producers of Europe) and delivers pan 
sectoral best practice to the EASA. 
After having summarized the key points related to the composition and constitution of the unit of 
analysis and highlighted the elements of contrast with Spirits Europe, which are of relevance to the 
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questions raised in this case study on the European Alcohol and Health Forum, I set out below the 
overview of the WFA and its relationship with the EAHF.   
Malte Lohan, Public Affairs Director at WFA provided insight into the organisation’s motivation for 
participating in the EAHF.  Lohan saw participation as a means of avoidance of regulation and an 
opportunity to shape possible future regulation.  He pointed out that participation does not exclude a 
regulatory option but that avoiding banning legislation is “avoiding costly legislation which is also costly 
to implement”.    Lohan stated that the EAHF builds a stronger political consensus around the notion that 
pure legislation is not the only way to fix a problem, “especially when there are transborder or cross 
border networks involved on EU and international level, and you consider the challenge of adopting 
global public health measures when regulatory models are all national.  It is therefore necessary to 
mobilise business as transnational actors”.  
Lohan underlines the advantages of the platform approach in that, “anything that helps build a political 
consensus around what works can only be constructive; “co” or “self” regulation”.  He added that, “the 
platform showcases the added value of WFA and provides a degree of formalization and endorsement.  
The dynamics are inherently favourable to industry because it provides a forum to do so in a sober way 
as opposed to in an EP hearing where no one would be interested in the position of WFA.  The forum has 
strengthened progress towards self regulation”.     
It is of note that Lohan makes no mention of reputation management of the industry as a goal for 
participation in the EAHF, as Beaumont and Spencer did respectively in the previous two case studies.  
The thrust of his description lies in breaking new ground in self regulation through pioneering rules on an 
international level.  His mention of business as transnational actors relates to the work of Koenig 
Archibugi (2010) on accountability in a transnational context. Koenig Archibugi refers to surrogate 
accountability where accountability holders cannot sanction the surrogate and the surrogates are not 
links in the chain of accountability.  WFA operates in a transnational context operating on an 
international, European and national level.  However, in the EAHF, the accountability relationship with 
NGOs is indirect, DG SANCO acting as a form of buffer between both parties.  The Commission however, 
unlike with the obesity platform, cannot sanction the association by removal from the database for 
failure to progress a commitment within the year.  By contrast, the pure CSOs participating in the alcohol 
platform would indeed act as surrogates of the public by imposing a sanction on business associations 
through an accountability procedure.  Koenig Archibugi (2010 p. 1145) points to a major obstacle to 
surrogacy in this transnational context which is revealing for this case study in that the greater physical 
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and social distance between surrogate sanctioners, here the platform participating NGOs and the 
intended beneficiaries, the EU public, “reduces the ability of the former to understand the preferences 
and situations of the latter”.  This reflection highlights the importance of the interaction between pure 
CSOs and the public and the extent to which the flagging and monitoring that they undertake leads to 
deliberation sufficient enough to constitute democratic participation.               
Lohan also positioned WFA as responding to the COWI evaluation report and the co-related need of DG 
SANCO to demonstrate progress to the NGOs.  This identified need however fits well with the pre-
existing WFA declared mission of championing responsible and effective marketing communications 
worldwide.  Finally, Lohan mentioned the role of DG SANCO in dynamising and not judging the 
motivation behind the commitments made and its need to derive validation from the presence of NGOs 
in the Forum.   
3.4.4. Presentation of the European Alcohol and Health Forum   
The Forum was established by Charter in 2006 as part of the Commission’s EU strategy to support 
Member States in reducing alcohol related harm.  According to article 2 of the Charter establishing the 
forum (European Commission, DG SANCO, 2007), “the overall objective of the Forum is to provide a 
platform for all interested stakeholders at EU level that pledge to take up actions relevant to reducing 
alcohol related harm notably in the following areas…”, which include as a last bullet point of 6, 
“cooperation to promote responsibility in and prevent irresponsible commercial communication and 
sales”.  The Forum is based on the anticipated action of its stakeholders and is intended to complement 
and act alongside ongoing other activities undertaken at EU and Member State level.   
The Charter addresses the operation of the Forum and emphasizes transparency as a manner of 
operating.  Indeed, it provides for two plenary meetings of the Forum per year but also, once a year, that 
of an Open Forum “to give interested non-member bodies and organizations from the EU and beyond an 
occasion to follow the work of the Forum and to make their opinions known” (article 3).  This article also 
provides for the setting up of a Science Group to provide scientific advice and Task Forces that would 
report to the Forum.    
The Commitments made under the Charter by participating members must be in line with the stated 
objectives and be expressed in a detailed and measurable way.  Of note at article 4 on Commitments is 
the level of detail requested on the realization of the activity and the fact that the action plans are made 
public on the Commission’s website and in publications. 
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The Charter prescribes the approach to monitoring and evaluation of the Commitments and underlines 
the importance of this approach as a means of creating trust.  The rationale is that accountability 
(amongst other attributes – see below) will bring about greater involvement that will build the sought 
trust; “all members of the Forum agree to monitor and evaluate the performance of their commitments 
in a transparent, participative and accountable way, so that there is sufficient outside involvement in 
reviewing progress and outcomes to create trust in the process”.  These members must, according to 
article 4, adhere to the Monitoring Commitment at Annex 2 of the Charter.  
The logic behind the inclusion and the role of accountability in the DG SANCO system is clear in that 
transparent active participation that is monitored allows for a calling to account of the actor. The 
intention would be that this will build trust which would usually lead to enhanced cooperation and an 
increased quality of deliberation and commitments.  
Before turning to an analysis of the key elements of the all important monitoring system, it is worth 
looking at the Charter’s wording on membership (at article 5) and its will to be all inclusive at both the 
EU and national level of relevant organizations or federations and their respective individual or group 
memberships.  The Charter uses the term “umbrella organizations” which indicates the inclusive 
approach, an intention to attract a wide spread of participants beyond the formal boundaries of 
association memberships, and to be representative of actors sharing the concerns of the Forum.  
However, in adopting this approach to membership and the respective actions of the members, the 
Charter also permits overlap of members for different commitments.  For example the same members of 
different organizations, can enter their commitments via the two differing organisational platforms, 
thanks to the last bullet point of article 4; “Commitments from umbrella organizations at European level 
may include actions taken by all or part of their membership.  Commitment for action at European level 
made within the Forum process may need to be implemented in agreement with national or local 
stakeholders, and in varying ways at national and sub-national level”.  In 2006 at the signature of the 
Charter, both the European Spirits Organisations and WFA appear as Founding Members.  There were 26 
founding members of which eight were public interest focused “pure” civil society organizations, 
amongst them, EuroCare and the European Youth Forum.  
The DG SANCO specification of the type of organization to join the platform raises the issue of 
representativity of the organizations, business and NGOs alike.  The definition implies that the 
Commission is not seeking to ensure the inclusion of all encompassing hierarchical federation type 
organizations, boasting national associations in all 28 Member States and carrying an overarching 
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secretariat on a European level.   They seek the inclusion of all interested parties.  It is possible that this 
choice has led to the stark divide between the two factions of business and pure CSOs.  These last tend 
by their nature to be issue specific. The organizations dealing with sobriety and temperance are indeed 
likely to participate and stand in opposition to business producing or promoting alcohol.  It is not likely 
that a pure CSO should embrace a tolerance towards alcohol consumption as a cause for promotion.  The 
design of the platform draws out the elements of direct conflict between participants and intrinsically 
supports the divide.   The creation of the Science Group was intended to provide participants with 
common neutral ground on which to base their actions and advise on directions to adopt in reducing 
alcohol related harm.   
3.4.5. Monitoring Process and Forum rules:  
These rules are set out at Annex 2 of the Charter and were recently updated to reflect the findings of the 
COWI Consortium’s report on the results of the assessment of the quality of the monitoring of the 
commitments.  The main changes are reflected in the current shift from a process based approach to an 
evaluation oriented approach (as described in more detail below).  
Accountability and its expected benefits are clearly set out in the introduction to the Annex, “monitoring 
of commitment plays a vital role in developing engagement, accountability and trust, in mapping process 
and confirming the commitments undertaken”.   The key components of all commitments made must 
include relevance to the goals of the Forum, clear milestones in achieving the said goals, an indication of 
inputs or resources used and outputs, as in achievements made public.  On the first element of 
relevance, accountability is again specifically addressed in that; “the primary purpose of describing the 
relevance is to ensure that there is clarity as to; how it achieves the aim of the Forum.  This is an 
essential step in building trust and data and in supporting a transparent, participative and accountable 
process.”     
The actual process of monitoring itself is based on an annual calendar whereby the “owning” entity, the 
committing umbrella organization, inputs it commitment into the public database by 31st March and 
seeks to complete the commitment within one year.  This annual process is somewhat lighter than that 
adopted for the obesity platform which is larger in remit and number of participants.    
The Forum meets twice annually, once in November and once in April.  The Open Forum day takes place 
after the April plenary meeting.  At the time of writing, the last plenary took place on 21st November 
2013 and I was able to be present as an observer.  At this meeting, the consultants, COWI, presented a 
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report on the quality of the commitment holder’s reports on the implementation and achievements of 
commitments to action under the EAHF. They noted problems on input and output indicators with 
limited information on outcomes and impacts.  They also found difficulties encountered by members in 
assessing short, medium and long term effects and a focus on the quality of reporting and not on the 
measurement of the actions.  They recommended that the evaluation method be set out at the time of 
submission of the commitment and that enforcement and awareness-raising be part of the activities 
anticipated.   They suggested that the Commission provide more guidance to the members of the Forum 
and revise Annex 2 of the Charter to reflect agreed changes.  They pointed out that the DG SANCO run 
platform on Physical Diet, Health and Obesity provides a user guide online and suggested that the new 
user guide for this Forum be tested prior to being placed online. They recommended the provision of 
definitions of “evaluation of commitments” and “impact measurement”. 
Page 7 of the updated submission of commitment form (European Commission, DG SANCO, undated) 
clearly mentions “evaluation details” with a request for tools and methods to be used in the description.  
It states at point 4, Interim Report Date, that “commitment owners are expected to report on the 
implementation of their commitment yearly and at the end of the period of operation.  At least one 
interim report date needs to be filled in”.  I sought clarification on this interim report from the EAHF 
administrator at DG SANCO, Madalin Amzolini, who informed me that this was not an “obligation” for 
remaining in the database and that he was aware that this contrasted with the requirements of the 
Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health.          
3.4.6. The 2012 Evaluation of the EAHF and the Task Force on Marketing and Communications: 
The Forum was independently evaluated at the request of DG SANCO in December 2012. The report 
entitled, “Assessment of the added value of the EU strategy to support Member States in reducing 
alcohol-related harm” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG SANCO 2012b).  Annex 3 of the report dealt 
directly with a case study on the marketing aspects of the Forum such as the work carried out by the 
Task Force on Marketing and Communication and the member commitments under the action area, “of 
cooperation to promote responsibility in and prevent irresponsible commercial communication and 
sales”.          
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The report underlines that self regulation is framed by legal provisions at both national and EU level and 
that it acts at multiple levels.  The Task Force on Marketing Communication of the EAHF was established 
to pursue the work initiated by the Advertising Round Table.             
The Round Table defined four basic components for self regulation best practice in advertising; 
effectiveness, independence, coverage (of all forms of commercial communication) and voluntary 
industry funding.    The following analysis of the evaluation report on the task Force will focus on 
commenting the aspects related to the effectiveness of the self regulatory system such as complaints 
handling and sanctions, and to the independence of persons involved in the development and application 
of these self regulatory codes.   The assessment in the report is based on 2012 data and deals with 
information provided by the concerned economic operators, members of the EAHF, as well as the web 
sites of SROs.    
 Effectiveness of the self regulation:  
The Best Practice model of the Advertising Round Table section on effectiveness refers to provision of 
copy advice, complaint handling and consumer awareness (p. 140).  The evaluation report findings show 
that extensive progress was achieved in the areas of sanction procedures for non compliance; provision 
of copy advice (prior to launching the advertisement), and commitment to publishing decisions.   But 
only limited progress was reported on staff training on compliance procedures and evaluation of results.  
The alcohol producers’ commitments tend to involve activities aimed at spreading the implementation of 
existing self regulatory codes and further developing self regulatory schemes such as training.  The spirits 
sectors noted that the Forum had enabled a long term comprehensive approach for the development of 
responsible practices in their commercial communication activities.  This led to the adoption by the 
industry of a 2015 Roadmap which is an umbrella commitment spanning a five year period of new 
activities across the EU by 2015. The first objective of the Roadmap concerns the conclusion of national 
agreements to include a responsible drinking message on marketing communications.  
The advertising media sector initiatives tend to involve gathering information on regulatory and self 
regulatory practices and disseminating that information across the sector. The most recent initiative of 
note is the Responsible Marketing Pact led by the World Federation of Advertisers which regroups the 
beer, wine and spirits sectors on three new activity areas including common standards for advertising in 
social media, implementing the 30/70 audience composition rules (avoiding advertising where the share 
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of under 18s in the audience is more than 30%) and reinforcing standards to ensure that minors are not 
targeted or appealed to.       
The combination of strengthening compliance monitoring means and ensuring publicity of information 
was reported by EAHF members as being crucial to high levels of respect of the code.  The report even 
underlines that, p. 152, “industry members indicated that, to a significant extent, this results from the 
way in which they have been challenged by both the European Commission and civil society 
organizations in the context of the Forum”.  Members also noted how the Forum “contributed to mutual 
surveillance and cooperation in terms of observance of self regulatory codes”, p. 152. 
There is a clear outcome of greater compliance in the words of the business sector itself, through the 
mere participation of the pure CSOs in the platform.  Indeed, there appears to be little scrutiny per 
industry commitment practised by the pure CSOs which focus on the process of the forum and the 
underlying principle of participation or not.  Can one assume therefore that their presence and 
participation alone of the pure CSOs have admittedly encouraged adherence to the commitment and 
hence might have had a beneficial if but indirect impact on the EU public?  
 Independence of the process:  
The Best Practice model of the Advertising Round Table section on Independence refers to the 
involvement of interested parties in code drafting and the involvement of independent persons in the 
complaints adjudication process.   In contrast with the aspect examined above which relies on factual 
data on compliance or not, this second aspect appears more opaque from an assessment viewpoint.   
Regarding involvement of independent professionals at the drafting and reviewing of codes stage, 
economic operators pointed to the Forum as a trigger for greater stakeholder consultation.  However, 
the consultations undertaken have not been very successful in engaging Forum members that are not 
economic operators.  According to EASA (EASA Charter Validation progress report 2005-2011), 87% of all 
advertising SROs were, in 2012, “consulting with external stakeholders when drafting or updating their 
codes”, p. 157. However, “non-industry EAHF members contended that the involvement of non industry 
actors in self regulatory code drafting had been limited thus far,” p. 157.  
Interestingly, concerning the involvement of independent persons in the complaints adjudication 
process, there was disagreement amongst the members of the EAHF Advisory Group on the balance to 
be achieved between the expertise provided by each member of a jury and the stakeholder group they 
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claim to represent.   The EASA 2011 figures quoted at p. 157 show that “91% of the SROs currently have 
a “number of jury members that are academics, consumer representatives etc”.  Indeed, as industry 
representatives welcomed this as a sign of progress, non industry actors described the adjudication 
processes as presenting a representativeness deficit.  
This remark highlights the question of the “public” credentials of participants in the sanction phase of 
the internal accountability system, through their participation in the adjudication process or in the 
devising of the codes.  
Finally, transparency and consumer awareness elements need to be highlighted.  Indeed, the best 
practice model points to the need to publish complaint related decisions and to conduct follow up 
satisfaction surveys amongst complainants.   The sole source of monitoring for this element is the EASA 
web site which reports that “83% of SROs in the EU are actively involved in raising awareness of their 
organisation’s work and informing the general public of the possibility to complain free of charge about 
advertising content.   Regarding the publication of jury adjudications, EASA reports that 21 SROs had 
incorporated this into their procedures as of 2011” p. 158.  The EASA also includes on its home page, a 
“click through” entitled “tour for the general public – how self regulation keeps ads up to standard and 
how to complain if you’ve found one that is not”.      
The WFA issued a press release on 30th September 2013 (WFA 2013).  The release mentions the case 
study on alcohol marketing that WFA refers to as a “test case for the evaluation of the strategy”.  The 
WFA chose to underline that the report indicates that the “EAHF process has motivated stakeholders to 
step up action in this area and has thereby contributed to the development and convergence of alcohol 
advertising self regulatory systems across the EU”.          
3.4.7. The commitment of the WFA in the EAHF:  the Responsible Marketing Pact  
In April 2012, the WFA led alcohol beverage producers, regrouping major company players from the 
three sectors of beer, wine and spirits in a commitment to the EAHF to agree to extend common 
marketing standards to the entire alcohol sector and reinforce self regulation across the EU. They called 
this agreement the “Responsible Marketing Pact”.  
Commenting on this period, Lohan said that the idea of the Pact was essentially a reaction to the way the 
forum was evolving when new “NGOs” came in.  Different parts of industry had already undertaken 
commitments individually and via the EU umbrella associations as Brewers Europe and Spirits Europe.  
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He emphasised that, “the Commission at that time was under pressure to demonstrate results because 
the COWI assessment was coming up and NGOs were constantly shouting for results.  Commissioner 
Borg came to the Forum and suggested that initiatives be taken on marketing.  There was a need for a 
collective approach – to show we shared a common vision.  Industry did not have a great choice”.  The 
approach was that WFA should make a company driven commitment because it could bring the 
companies along.  Lohan said that they thought they would start with the big operators and create a 
snowball effect large enough to already observe a change in what you see.   
The Responsible Marketing Pact contains three pillars of action:  
- Social media: to prevent minors from inadvertently seeing alcohol beverage marketing 
communications on social media  
- Placement: to set a common adult demographic standard for alcohol beverage marketing 
communications across all media, thereby limiting undue exposure 
- Appeal:  to prohibit any alcohol beverage marketing communications that might be particularly 
attractive to minors by ensuring that the content of the ads appeals primarily to adults.          
The press release issued on 16th April 2012 (WFA 2012b) refers to compliance monitoring once the 
industry standards have been agreed.  This compliance monitoring would be undertaken independently 
by Accenture and national advertising self regulatory organizations (SROs across Europe) and would be 
“publicly reported”.   The Pact was entered into the commitments database on the same day (see 
below).   
In their press release, WFA point to their commitment as representing, “a turning point in the long 
standing commitment of alcohol beverage producers to responsible marketing.  The Responsible 
Marketing Pact breaks new ground because it is the first time major companies from the beer, wine and 
spirits sectors have come together to seek unified responsibility standards for alcohol beverage 
marketing communications”.  
The Responsible Marketing Pact was presented in Luxemburg to DG SANCO officials and participating 
parties to the commitments process.  This presentation is succinct and caters to the audience in the 
sense that it highlights the added value aspects prized by the European Commission, namely; industry 
and Europe wide approach with reinforcement of use of existing structures, independent monitoring and 
public reporting of results.   There are three aspects of the commitment worth a closer inspection in 
relation to accountability components; representativity, sanctions and transparency.         
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In the above presentation, the WFA points to their “multi tiered approach covering all parts of industry 
with an adequate framework of proportionate regulation” (WFA 2012c).  The cover indeed touches “all 
parts”, that is the three sectors of alcohol production.  However, it does so via the largest producers 
only; AB inBev, Bacardi Limited, Brown-Forman, Carlsberg group, Diageo, Heineken, Pernod Ricard and 
SAB Miller, which WFA claim represent a “majority of EU alcohol advertising spend”.  What of the rest of 
the sector to ensure representativity and widest coverage? WFA defines their associated partners in the 
Commitment, that is the relevant associations representing the beer, spirits, wine, advertising agencies 
and retail sectors as a “broad representation of the industry”.             
Sanctions are mentioned in the above mentioned presentation of the Responsible Marketing Pact   
commitment on the slide on “Implementation”.  The first phase of implementation deals with 
development of the common standards and their application to the commitment co-owners.  Phase 2 
refers to the incorporation of those standards into national self regulatory systems across the EU that 
apply standards to the entire industry (not defined here, though). Finally, it provides for a mandating of 
the SROs to enforce the standards.  Sanctions are set out as including “naming and shaming, 
requirement to amend/retract ads, mandatory copy advice (enforced pre submission for checking as a 
condition to advertise) and referral to the authorities”. The enforcers of this system are again the 
national SROs.    
Thirdly, the transparency element is presented on the slide entitled “monitoring: ensuring 
accountability”.   It informs that, “compliance will be measured in a transparent and accountable 
manner” and refers to the independent monitoring of placements of advertisements by Accenture.  It 
might be expected that a form of deliberation is undertaken by independent external viewers as they 
validate the social media and appeal of the placements monitored in turn by the SROs.  Finally, the 
system provides for the results of compliance monitoring to be “reported publicly” but does not refer to 
the medium to be used.            
The commitments data base of DG SANCO requires entries for each type of action undertaken with 
specific identified objectives.  The Responsible Marketing Pact therefore was broken down into several 
sub activities with the first of these on social media currently at intermediate stage.  This first 
commitment is the most advanced for WFA so far and will therefore be the focus of the analysis below 
and the subject of the mapping process at the end of this case study.  
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3.4.8. Common standards for alcohol beverage marketing communications on social media: 
This commitment (intermediate report from European Commission, DG SANCO 2012a) summarized by 
WFA in the database refers to the difficulty of enforcing and monitoring rules on social media mainly due 
to the novelty of this means.  It however points to the advantage it presents in that social media is 
individual and therefore allows for more precise targeting towards adult consumers.    
The description of the implementation of the commitment refers to the development of a list of tangible 
safeguards to be put in place by signatory companies on their owned sites and social media.  These 
include age affirmation mechanisms and Responsible Drinking messages.  The application of the 
safeguards would lead according to WFA to restricting access to alcohol marketing communications 
through restrictions of access to the actual web pages and providing solutions to actively encourage 
moderation in alcohol consumption and responsible drinking.  
The committers are requested to render the activity directly relevant to the work of the Forum.  WFA 
therefore states that it, “will improve the consistency and effectiveness with which standards for alcohol 
beverage marketing communications are applied across the EU also for social media.  This will raise the 
bar for advertising standards, contributing to the goal of the Forum to ensure a high level of 
responsibility in alcohol beverage marketing”.     
The resources to bring the above to fruition, the “input indicators”, have to be described in some detail 
according to the Forum Charter’s Monitoring Commitment Chapter. WFA have described this as 2.5 Full 
Time Equivalents (FTE), 1/day/week of an external consultant, 1 part time (not specified) person of EASA, 
4 meetings of the “social media taskforce representing experts of the Pact companies, monthly meetings 
with “leadership groups” (not specified) and “in depth consultation with EASA”.    
The output indicators must set out what would be achieved by the input indicators. WFA has described 
these as an extensive review of the company codes of practice, sector specific self regulation codes and 
advertising codes of practice.  There would also be a gap analysis of the current status quo regarding 
codes, a review of current practices of the eight Pact companies and agreement on a strategic action 
plan with the social media task force.    
Finally, the evaluation tools are described as an independent annual monitoring in a representative 
sample one year after adoption.  
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At the time of writing there has as yet been no such independent monitoring reported and no further 
detail on implementation means other than that entered at the original WFA submission and 
intermediate report.  
3.4.9. The representativity question and the Spirits Europe Roadmap 2015:  
In March 2012, Spirits Europe provided an intermediate report on their Roadmap 2015 programme 
developed to strengthen that sector’s contribution to reducing alcohol related harm in the EU.  The 
Roadmap is articulated around three pillars:  the first seeks to enhance responsible commercial 
communication, the second to enhance responsible drinking and the third to engage more stakeholders.   
Spirits Europe produced guidelines on the development of responsible marketing communications and 
published its brochure in December 2012 (Spirits Europe 2012). They specify at page 3 that, “the 
provisions of the Spirits Europe guidelines for Responsible Marketing Communications apply to every 
type of media, including “electronic media” defined as any media providing electronic, interactive 
communications, such as the internet, online services and electronic and communication networks 
including the telephone.  These provisions apply to every type of promotional or marketing activity or 
event, including all product placements and sponsorships”.                          
In March 2013, Spirits Europe reported on one year’s activity supporting their Market Responsibly 
campaign through training road shows.  The basis of the commitment lies in the Roadmap and a derived 
collective agreement between the spirits sector, the advertising agencies (EACA) and standards 
enforcement bodies (EASA) and WFA to organize training workshops on the Spirits Europe Responsible 
Marketing Communications guidelines with a special focus on digital and social media.          
According to the monitoring intermediate report, the workshops took place in Helsinki, Riga, Athens and 
Madrid between August and December 2012 with 209 participants who were invited to act as relays of 
information for dissemination.  As a result of the workshops, marketresponsibly.eu website registered 
5337 unique visitors during 2012.    The Director General of Spirits Europe estimates the cost 
participation of his organization in the Platform at approximately 250 000 Euros/year, excluding costs 
and fees incurred by members beyond the association’s budget.     
There is clearly an overlap if not a repetition of the goals of the respective commitments of Spirits 
Europe and WFA.  Whilst this underlines the importance and priority of the endeavour, it might not be 
the best use of participation in the platform.  Either one of the respective organisations might have 
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undertaken a different or complementary activity to the other’s actions.  Also, the Spirits Europe 
commitment gained the cooperation of a wider spectrum of participants than that of WFA, organized in 
inter-related sectoral associations.  An overlap in the goals committed to and the responsibility of the 
actors for reaching them raises the question of representativity.     
However, Spirits Europe representatives pointed to the added value of the global level standards as to be 
developed by WFA and the fact that leading large companies with products that are represented in 
several sectoral organizations spearheading the discussion might be more successful in bringing about 
agreement.  
3.4.10. Participation and activity of Civil Society Organisations in the EAHF:  
Participation in and membership of the Forum is carried out on a voluntary basis.  There are four 
categories of Forum membership that represent organizations on a local, regional and national level, EU 
umbrella organisations and individual companies.  They are;  
 Advertising, marketing, media and sponsorship organisations  
 Research institutes and others  
 Production and sales organisations  
 Non-governmental and health organisations  
 
The Evaluation report of the Forum had found that in 2012, non-governmental and health organizations, 
research institutes and others represented 48% of the commitments made, or 33 actions in total.  The 
categories regrouping advertising, marketing, media and sponsorship organisations as well as production 
and sales organizations accounted for 51% of the share, or 35 actions in total.  About half of all members 
operated at EU level, the other half at national level with only one organization covering the EU12 (i.e. in 
each country).  The conclusions on membership indicated that members saw a need for more 
participation from the retail and social insurance sectors.  
Respondents to the survey for the evaluation divided clearly into two groups when asked whether the 
Forum had been a motivation for more action in this field.  A majority of respondents in the category of 
economic operators stated that some or all of their commitments were due to participation in the 
Forum.  By contrast, 41% of respondents from the NGO and health organization categories stated that 
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their commitments would have happened in the same way without Forum participation (p.17 of the 
Evaluation). 
The Evaluation also dealt with the performance of the Forum as a “platform for dialogue, exchange and 
cooperation” and whether the initiative engaged participants on a new level leading to hereto 
unforeseen discussions between organizations on both sides of the issue divide.  The survey of 
participants gathered information on the contribution of the EAHF process “to a deeper understanding 
of the issues on the part of members and to the exchange of good practices”. Whilst the economic 
operator category responded that the Forum had contributed to a great extent to their understanding, 
the NGO and health organization category stated that there was very little such contribution.  At p. 85 of 
the Evaluation, a tentative reason for these findings is set out, “The differences arguably have to do with 
previous background and knowledge of the professionals surveyed. In the EAHF Advisory Group, 
participants from the NGO and health professional sector commented that this is because they already 
had a strong understanding of the issues”. 
On the question of cross cooperation, 70% of respondents reported that participation had led to further 
cooperation with other Forum members.   Although the respondents seemed to cooperate within their 
same sector, (p. 18) “economic operators also noted examples of commitments involving cooperation at 
national and local levels with a broad range of stakeholders, including NGOs, police authorities, 
healthcare organizations and local authorities”.   This seems to echo the comments of Lohan about 
greater cooperation with NGOs on a national level rather than European when he stated on the topic of 
pure CSO cooperation that, “the WFA expectation is that they will not get much value from forum 
attendees so they have now spread their activity to national level where there is a real grass roots will to 
engage.  There is a lot of cooperation with national level NGOs. They see a real benefit in cooperation 
with industry”.  This might also be due to the greater number of pure CSOs on the ground dealing with 
very practical issues such as the provision of information about binge drinking at places of learning or the 
purchase of medical supplies for St John’s Ambulances that park within walking distance of pubs near 
large university campuses.      
The report includes answers from respondents on why there was no greater cooperation across 
membership categories (p.86); “According to some interviewees, mainly the economic operators, at EU 
level, the main barrier to cooperation across sectors is the lack of willingness to cooperate on the part of 
EU-level NGOs and health professionals, stemming from fundamental disagreements regarding Forum 
membership as well as the acceptable remit of commitments. Conflicts of interest on the part of 
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economic operators were mentioned by NGOs and health professionals as the main reason for such 
disagreements”. Some economic operators expressed in turn their frustration at the attitude maintained 
by some non-industry members:  
“We could use a better cooperation among the different stakeholders about the commitments. When we 
try to cooperate with NGOs; for instance in the evaluation of our commitments, they refuse.”                       
Lohan also commented on this topic, “With regard to deliberation, the NGOs see producers as a risk.  
They see the activity as a misuse of their own voice, putting their names to something they do not 
support.  There is no subtlety, they are against self regulation.  The attitude sometimes becomes 
disingenuous as with Nick Sheron” (see below about the exchange of emails and questions about the 
format of the consultation of stakeholders).   
 The cooperation between differing categories seems therefore to have been greatly limited for key 
ideological reasons which are rooted in the fundamental question of participation in the Forum.  As per 
my earlier comments, the design of the platform in relation to the membership categories might also 
lead to two opposing factions.  This in turn raises the questions of how the members interact or not at 
the actual meetings, and whether there is any deliberation which takes place within the respective civil 
society communities acting as components of a European Public Sphere.        
I attended the Alcohol and Health Forum plenary meeting of 21st November 2013 in Brussels with the 
purpose of gaining a better understanding of the level of deliberation and exchange between 
stakeholders and if possible between non-governmental organizations.  The meetings occur twice 
annually in April and November.  
Out of some 40 participants in the room, there were approximately six Commission attendees with five 
consultants presenting (COWI, Milieu etc).  The table was oval in shape.  Interestingly, the Science Group 
attendees, some four people, sat to the right of the Commission representatives, the pure CSOs directly 
opposite and the industry representatives between these groups.  The attendees from the pure CSOs all 
sat together. They were representing the Estonian Temperance Society, EuroCare, the Association of 
European Cancer Leagues, and Scottish Health Action on Alcohol Problems.  The only intervention from 
this group during the morning session was made by Eurocare which underlined that the purpose of the 
Forum was not to make policy in response to an introductory comment from the Commission on the 
remit of the Forum. They did not react either when the Chair declared that several participants from civil 
society had recently decided to leave the Forum.  He pointed out, however, that the evaluation had 
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demonstrated that the Forum was a good mechanism and deserving of greater visibility. The Commission 
had received two new applications from the Liver Patients’ Association and Hotels of Europe.         
Other than participation in the Forum meetings, the Forum members interact on email most notably 
with WFA as part of the latter’s consultation process for the Responsible Marketing Pact.   
I had mentioned above that the Pact had three pillars, the first of which I presented in detail as per the 
entry in the monitoring database.  The third pillar of action of the WFA commitment is entitled “Appeal” 
and seeks to prohibit any alcohol beverage marketing communications that might be particularly 
attractive to minors by ensuring that the content of the advertisement appeals primarily to adults.  The 
implementation of this element of the commitment requires a consultation with stakeholders on how 
they might identify “appeal” beyond obvious visual targeting or use of gimmicks.  This element was seen 
by WFA as requiring more definition prior to the agreement of common standards.  The inclusion of a 
consultation was also a means by which WFA sought pure CSO feedback at the outset to seek to ensure 
support for the later adoption of common standards by all stakeholders.  
WFA therefore asked the Commission EAHF coordinators to circulate a link (monkey type survey) for a 
consultation process to all participants on the “appeal” element of the Pact.  The coordinators did so on 
18th November requesting feedback on the consultation by 2nd December, 2013.   Nick Sheron of the 
Public Policy department of the University of Southampton responded later the same day to all 
participants (all members of the EAHF and registered stakeholders) saying that the link provided was 
related to a summary and that, “I did briefly wonder if perhaps the intention was for people to complete 
the consultation without having studied a detailed proposal, but I think it more likely I missed a link 
here”.   Kelly Walsh of Brown Forman, a member of WFA responded to Nick Sheron informing him where 
the relevant link was in the email (full information and detail being available through the link) and the 
process to be able to input.  Nick Sheron then wrote,  
“Dear Kerry, 
I am truly astonished, you really do expect the health community to start entering feedback for a 
formal consultation without having had the opportunity to carefully study a detailed proposal. I 
would be very happy to take part in this consultation, but before doing so I would like to read the 
proposal carefully and in my own time, is that too much to ask? 
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Dear Philippe (Philippe Roux is a DG SANCO administrator for the EAHF) does this novel method 
of blind consultation come with the support of the Commission? 
 BW 
 Nick.” 
 
Malte Lohan of WFA then responded with the information about how to follow the link and gave more 
information, writing in the text of the email, on the detail of the features on which they sought 
consultation.  Sheron responded by requesting circulation of the detailed proposal so that, “we can study 
it in depth and discuss it with our colleagues”.  
 
This episode of email exchanges is indicative of the relationship between the industry and pure health 
CSO representatives respectively with the Commission being placed in the position of a reluctant arbiter.  
The exchange was continued at the meeting of 21st November, when WFA asked for the floor to better 
explain the procedure of consultation related to the “appeal” elements of the Pact.  The response from 
Sheron was that he wished to see the full detail and set of questions in one document and not presented 
sequentially.  WFA pointed out that the survey allowed for navigation back and forth and that all 
addressees could reserve their right to respond.  A “pdf” version of the full proposal was then circulated 
by Lohan.     
 
The matter of participation of the pure CSOs in this type of exercise in which they will be brought to rub 
shoulders with industry representatives, participate in consultations, provide opinions and be seen as 
part of the decision making procedure highlights the role of these organisations and points to a 
conundrum: to participate or not to participate ?  Furthermore, are these organisations’ roles limited to 
flagging and monitoring?  If they are, then the deliberation and debate can be shifted to the general 
public by the pure CSO concerned.  If the pure CSO in question limits its role to opposing or filibustering, 
the sought-after deliberation might only take place within the organisation’s membership itself.   
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3.4.11. Pure CSO coalition exit from the EAHF:  
Press statements are one of the potential means of creating deliberation and debate in the public 
domain.  The visibility of the EAHF and the potential for a means of public participation will certainly 
have been enhanced by the dramatic decision taken by the coalition led by Active Europe in October 
2013.    
 
The organisation, Active – Sobriety, Friendship and Peace, led the largest temperance society in Sweden, 
IOGT – NTO, the European Youth Forum and the UNF- the Swedish Youth Temperance Association to 
leave the European Alcohol and Health Forum and call for a revised structure and a renewed alcohol 
strategy (Active Europe 2013a). The release clearly calls for excluding industrial interests from the Forum 
and an abandoning of self regulation.  Indeed it calls for stronger regulation.  The coalition states that 
there are no tangible results from the EAHF, as shown by the evaluation report (that is, the “monitoring 
progress” annual report dated October 2013) and they strongly question, “the evaluation’s conclusion 
that the EAHF has contributed to strengthening the self regulatory systems covering alcohol marketing”. 
 
The President of Active is quoted in the release as saying, “the EAHF...has become a platform where the 
work of the civil society is shared but the commitments of the alcohol industry are discussed.  This 
orientation means stepping out of the course of evidence based methods that would lead towards 
alcohol harm reduction”.     
 
Also as a consequence of the publication of the evaluation report on monitoring progress of October 
2013, but maybe also in a direct response to the above CSO walk out, Paul Skehan, Director General of 
Spirits’ Europe wrote an open letter to the Parliament Magazine. He set out the policy of his organisation 
in dealing with the serious issues; “our heartfelt desire is to have 100% of our products enjoyed – in 
moderate quantities – by adult, healthy consumers in happy convivial settings”.   His main statement 
however was that, as the Commission develops a targeted action plan on underage and binge drinking, 
“we strongly believe a solution lies in working together: enforcement authorities, health community, 
economic operators, parents and educators” (Spirits Europe 2013).  
 
In a similar move to that of the Spirits sector, the Brewers of Europe also wrote an open letter to the 
Parliament Magazine but were more explicit in their target.  They point to their enhanced cooperation 
with NGOs on a national level; National Societies of Gynaecology, Consumer Unions, national, regional 
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and local governments, Driving School Associations, Police Directorates, Dietician Associations, Road 
Safety Councils, Youth NGOs and Medical Associations.  They also mentioned the partnership between 
Brewers Europe and the European Transport Safety Council, the premier EU NGO on road safety, as “the 
first ever joint Forum commitment by a pan European business association in collaboration with a pan 
European NGO”.       
 
The letter points to the pure CSO, EuroCare’s call for action against alcohol misuse but states that, the 
choice of some organisations does not seem compatible with “action”.  Similarly, the choice of some to 
oppose any partnerships with the brewing sector is not “action”.  And bemoaning the presence of 
economic operators in the Forum is not “action”. .....However, we will continue to fight against alcohol 
misuse and demonstrate our commitment through dialogue, partnership – and above all – action.  It’s 
what citizens and policymakers expect.” (Brewers of Europe 2013).  
 
Finally on this series of public statements, Active issued a press release on 3rd December 2013, because 
they would “like to address some of the comments that have followed from the side of the economic 
operators and related parties”.  They set out statistics on alcohol consumption and harm and the need 
for more independent research.  The release clearly states that “the alcohol policy making processes 
need to exclude any commercial interests”.  They then describe their own representativity referring to 
voices of more than 100 000 Europeans.  They urge cooperation with stakeholders that have a genuine 
interest in health promotion, “meaning only representatives from the NGOs, researchers and 
representatives from the European Commission”. (Active Europe 2013b). 
    
I spoke with Vasilka Lalevska, Policy Officer for Active – Sobriety, Friendship and Peace (Active Europe) 
about the organisation’s role in the EAHF and their decision to withdraw from the platform. Lalevska said 
that her organisation had participated in the Forum for the past 6-7 years.  She described the Forum as a 
space to talk about alcohol policy and related actions.  At every meeting, the commitments and progress 
reports were presented.  The Commission stated that it did not want to discuss policy but actions.  
However, Lalevska commented, the commitments were not measured and outcomes weren’t related to 
anything – there was no means of measurement.  Lalevska said that, “our members did a testing of a 
commitment.  Eight to ten members in Denmark who were under the age for buying alcohol were able 
to very easily buy alcohol.   The industry is stalling and distracting.  They are for profit organisations and 
that they should go against their core business is debatable.  These stakeholders are making 
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commitments whilst in parallel they are lobbying DG SANCO and the European Parliament.  This is a 
contradiction”.  
 
I asked about her organisation’s own work.  Lalevska said that Active Europe participates twice a year in 
the Forum meetings.  They also participate in other related consultations such as the recently launched 
DG CONNECT Communities of Practice initiative.  They respond on consultations also on the 
independence of regulatory bodies.  They believe that self regulation is not the appropriate method for 
alcohol marketing because research such as by Margaret Chan at the WHO shows that it is ineffective. 
Self regulation in general is not a way forward.   Active Europe has done some awareness raising 
amongst its members on self regulation.  (Lalevska sent me a video 
link:www.youtube/watch?v=DliT664b44U this is a short youth video with members making statements 
such as “self regulation is like asking Voldemort to run Hogwarts”, “self regulation is like letting Bart 
Simpson make the school rules”, or “self regulation is like asking Tom not to chase Jerry”.)  
 
I asked Lalevska about the decision to walk out of the Forum.  She said that after the April 2013 Forum 
meeting, the Active Europe participants held an internal debrief.  They concluded that participation was 
not an effective use of time and that they were already covering this policy area therefore working on 
these policies, and that being present in Brussels entailed an unnecessary cost.  They had tried to bring 
new elements to the table such as relating to composition and the need for more youth representatives.  
They contacted the other CSOs with whom they network at the Forum such as the Swedish NF Swedish 
Youth Forum) and held a joint meeting.  They then debriefed internally and said that they would think 
again until September. 
 
In September 2013, Active Europe still held the opinion that the Forum participation was not an effective 
use of time.  They approached the Youth Forum to ask of their opinion.  The leaders shared the concerns 
and also noted that alcohol was not a priority for them, so they jointly decided to step out.  
  
Lalevska said that the main reason for leaving is that her organisation does not support self regulation.  
As Margaret Chan of the WHO they believe that industry has no place in this debate.  They had 
participated so long in the Forum because they wanted to see what was discussed, listen, and then act. 
They did not want to go for passive participation and to hold grudges.  
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I asked about the internal decision making structure of Active Europe.  Lalevska explained that the 
organisation held a congress of all members and related organisations every two years.  There is a Board 
consisting of nine people.  There was also a political committee which comprised the Board and the 
Policy Office members.  The decisions to be taken are discussed at the Board and political committee.  
The Board then communicated to the full membership.  The decision to leave the Alcohol Forum was 
brought from the Policy Office.  EU issues continue to be of interest to all their members.  Active Europe 
recently endorsed the position of EuroCare  in their response to the new Member State strategy in 
reducing alcohol related harm.’               
 
 3.4.12. Analysis of accountability context and mapping of the process:  
  
This final part of the Chapter will deal with mapping of the process described in the EAHF from the view 
point of the unit of analysis the World Federation of Advertisers.  It will involve identifying the key 
components of the process. Does this process qualify as a mechanism of public accountability presenting 
the accountability features as set out in the generic model?    
 
Beyond the mapping exercise which will ascertain the existence of the components of an accountability 
process there are also aspects of the case that are of particular interest.  These will be addressed in the 
discussion regarding the components.  The first concerns the internal accountability of the advertising 
industry and its links with the public due to the nature of the activity of advertising.  How does this 
compare with the public accountability expected of the EAHF monitoring process?  What are the inter 
actions with the public inherent to each system?  
 
The second aspect centres on the level of representation claimed by WFA and their representativity of 
the sector concerned.  Whilst the membership of WFA is less large than that of Spirits Europe or other 
umbrella organisations in the same market, it might be more influential with regards to reaching the 
stated goals.  What does this mean from an accountability perspective?  
     
The third aspect seeks to ascertain the public quality of the forum via the interaction with pure CSOs. 
Does the activity generated by these CSOs, Active Europe especially, constitute the level of deliberation 
needed to contribute to a European Public Sphere, failing a mandate to represent the public at large?          
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The WFA, deals with accountability issues through self regulation.  The functioning of the advertising 
industry rests on the integrated SRO system that is regulated from an international level and applied via 
the standards setting body, EASA.  WFA stands out from the other related organisations in its industry 
sector due to its direct company membership and its international positioning.  This system of self 
regulation in the context of this analysis acts as an internal accountability process that lies alongside the 
process of the E AHF.  Unusually though, and due to the nature of this regulatory system that rests in 
professional codes, the internal system is widespread and effective.  It is the basis of the functioning of 
the system, is more obvious and solid than the process derived from the EAHF. 
 
Also of note is the three pronged presence of the “Public”, the advertisement consumers, in the internal 
system.  We, as members of the public, all hear and see advertising material, and have the ability to 
complain about advertising as well as enjoying direct access to complaints mechanisms.  The inclusion of 
“independent persons” in the drafting of the codes is actively encouraged according to EASA.  Finally, the 
standards body encourages the inclusion of these “independent persons” in adjudication panels of the 
SROs.      
 
The functioning of the alcohol Forum is similar to that of obesity in many aspects and presents some 
characteristics of a process of public accountability as analysed. 
  
The actor, the WFA, does not directly claim to act in the public interest as UNESDA writes but believes 
that it must be part of the platform created by DG SANCO as a responsible industry representative.  Is 
their mandate handed to WFA by the public, the principal?  Their mandate to act as such rests in their 
mission of promoting self regulation and seeking to gain agreement on an international level for the 
wording of their rules on the use of social media.   It can be argued that the participation therefore rests 
on empowerment of the public and their access to an effective complaints mechanism. The more 
compelling reason seems to rest simply on the promotion and use of self regulation in a sector that lends 
itself to this means more easily than hard law which would lack the speed and ease to deal with all 
complaints in a satisfactory and efficient way.  Also, as Lohan points out, regulation in this sector is very 
costly and problematic to implement.    
 
Although WFA makes no claim to act in the public interest or to derive its mandate from the public, there 
is a “public” nature to the business sector represented and therefore ensuing consequences in a public 
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remit.   The “public” nature or notoriety of the products represented by UNESDA also led to their needs 
of reputation management.  Unlike in the case study on UNESDA though, one cannot construe a tacit 
approval of the actions of WFA from the ongoing participation of the CSOs.    
 
The representation of only eight major alcohol producers via WFA contrasts with the wider European 
spread offered by the alcohol related sectoral organisations.  Yet, whilst the latter might claim more 
legitimacy in the actions, the former, thanks to a less burdened structure and higher level participation in 
association meetings, can be more effective in bringing about industry desired outcomes.  The sought 
after solution for all business players on the matter of social media is that an agreement be reached on 
standards on international level.  To that extent, WFA is the organisation most apt to become successful.   
Finally, there appears to be little vetting on the part of DG SANCO as to the representation of the 
participating bodies other than fitting within the Charter definition.  
  
The accountability definition refers to the actor having an obligation to explain and justify his conduct to 
a forum.  Does the Forum created through the EAHF have a mandate to hear the account, ask questions 
and pass judgment?  What are the public credentials of the EAHF, the Forum?  
 
Through the commitments system prescribed in the EAHF Charter, which is itself drawn up by DG SANCO 
for non regulatory purposes, each committer owes an account to the other stakeholders which is then 
placed on the public website.  The actual mechanism for doing so is clearly provided in the system with a 
timetable which foresees that interim monitoring reports be submitted to the database in a timely way.  
The content of the reporting undertaken in writing is prescribed in detail as per the initial submission of 
the commitments, requiring input and output indicators etc.  The use of the database which is fully 
accessible by the public renders the process and results transparent.  By contrast with the obesity 
platform however, there is no process based obligation to report within a fixed time slot with the threat 
of removal from the database as a sanction.  There is apparently no justification for this difference in 
approach on behalf of DG SANCO other than pointing to the greater number of participants on issues 
related to obesity than alcohol related harm and the correlated need to manage the database in an 
efficient way.   
 
The participants also report in turn orally within the physical Forum meetings which take place in 
November and April of every year.  These reports are included in the reporting undertaken by DG SANCO 
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as chairs of the meetings and duly uploaded for public consumption on the Commission’s web site.   The 
presence of participating stakeholders in the Forum allows for an ensuing discussion to take place and 
questions to be asked.  However, in practice, this does not occur often due to a lack of time in the 
agenda.  The other means by which greater input of a potential public nature might be included in the 
procedure is through the written consultation process as launched by Lohan and to which so far, few 
pure CSOs have participated.        
 
The question of the origin of the mandate to hear the account and that of the possibility to pass 
judgement are intrinsically interrelated.  The Charter of the EAHF does not provide for sanction 
mechanisms which might, nonetheless have been included through agreement between the founding 
members at the time of agreement on the Charter parameters.  In the absence of a public mandate for 
the Forum to hear the account and pass judgment, can one consider the participating CSOs as enjoying a 
de facto public mandate? This question itself rests on the quality of deliberation and interaction with the 
public on the part of individual pure CSOs, as discussed below.  Should a “pure” EAHF participating CSO 
claim a de facto public mandate, which in turn would lend some weight to a claim that the Forum can 
pass judgment in a public accountability mechanism; the pure CSO would not be able to enforce any 
sanction beyond a naming and shaming campaign.            
 
The actual sanction mechanism, as per the obesity forum, would therefore lie in the vocal disapproval of 
participating pure CSOs; a “naming and shaming”.   This disapproval however, need not be exclusively 
collective to be effective.   The decision to leave the EAHF on the part of Active Europe gave rise to press 
reports that were taken up by several and diverse news modes, amongst them the Parliament Magazine.  
Although, this might be viewed as “insider press” it has the merit of being mailed to all MEPs and staff 
and is widely distributed in hotel receptions, meeting venues and office receptions in Brussels.     
 
Concerning the potential of pure CSO deliberation to contribute to the composition of a European Public 
Sphere, is there evidence of a process of deliberation that might qualify to create deliberative democracy 
as per the definition of Tanasescu (see chapter 2.1)?  The representation in the EAHF of all concerned 
parties on the issue might be questioned when we point to the lack of presence of representatives from 
retail outlets, medical insurers and youth organisations, to name a few.   All participants in the EAHF are 
free and equal.  The deliberation does not lead to a binding decision in relation to passing judgment on a 
given commitment but can do so in relation to process.  The deliberations are technically “public” in that 
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participants can openly report on the content and outcomes of the Forum and reports of the meetings 
are posted on the relevant DG SANCO web site.  However, the debate has not reached news proportions 
to the extent that it guarantees the “public” characteristic alone.    
 
Finally, this last part of the analysis looks to the activities of “public” consultation and interaction 
undertaken by Active Europe in their decision to leave the alcohol Forum.  The decision was taken over 
several months and supported by their diverse membership “representing over 100 000 voices and 99 
international non-governmental youth organisations and national youth councils across Europe” (see 
press reports).  Unlike other stakeholder organisations that have a parallel purpose to their existence 
whilst regrouping members of the public, such as consumer organisations, youth organisations protect 
youths and promote youth programmes.   Their members however include minors of under 16 years of 
age which reduces somewhat their respective qualifications to be able to debate and deliberate whilst 
representing the wider public.  The more credible means of involvement of a public element in the forum 
would lie in the role of pure CSOs to monitor and flag issues, and shape the debate in a public sphere.  
The citizen preferences expressed through this pure CSO, that the Commission might take up in policy 
formulation, are expressed in the Forum and in the limited press coverage.  It is to this extent that the 
accountability system might be termed as “public”.  
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Chapter 4: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
The case study conclusions presented individually at the close of each case dealt with the answers to the 
main questions relating to the existence of an accountability process, the potential link with the public 
and the effectiveness in bringing about the desired outcome.  
4.1. Case study conclusions analysis: 
The conclusions below will first reveal how the currently identified components of an accountability 
mechanism played out in practice across the studies.  The literature pointed to the importance of the 
relationship between the principal and the agent and raised questions as to the strength and nature of 
that relationship as well as to the problems related to identifying which organization plays which role.    
The literature also raised questions regarding the public nature of the accountability exercise. Is this 
derived from the mere participation of pure CSOs in a forum gathering that can ask questions and pass 
judgment? Or do the CSOs act as conduits to the public, acting as agents that flag, monitor and frame 
issues for deliberation in a public sphere? What is the quality and the structure of that deliberation, be it 
amongst forum participating CSOs or within each respective CSO, thereby generating a wider “public 
debate”?   Concerning the account giving what format did this take, what was its nature and were 
questions put?  
Addressing the last components in the definition; is there a sanction and is it commensurate and 
enforceable? Does the sanction or its threat bring about the desired consequences?   How are these 
questions answered through the three case studies? 
Secondly, the Bovens perspectives of “democratic, constitutional and learning” will be applied to the 
studies to ascertain the effects of the application of the accountability mechanism.   Thirdly, the 
questions raised by or propositions made by the leading accountability authors in relation to the context 
of the application of a procedure will also be discussed.   
Finally, the study’s initial propositions will be set against the findings for verification or setting aside. 
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4.1.2. Verifying the components: 
The relationship giving rise to accountability: 
Bovens describes the relationship as that between an actor and a forum, and it is social in nature.   Other 
authors refer to a principal and an agent where the former calls the latter to account.  The generic model 
applied for analysis of the case studies showed that whilst the identification of the actor in the three 
case studies has not posed any difficulty, centring on the activities of the respective business 
associations, the nature of the principal appears more debatable.   
The principal would, in the application of a “public” accountability mechanism, represent that self same 
public.  This act of representation should be supported by a mandate to act as such. However, as 
discussed in earlier sections, there is no identified European public to provide that mandate.  In the 
absence of an identifiable demos, the principal takes on a less defined form or is constructed through 
putative CSO activity in a European public sphere where their activity draws the attention of the public, 
via media, to create deliberation and a mandate to act in the public interest.  Mulgan (2000 p.555) 
clarifies that the actor is called to account for his actions, that the caller to account seeks answers and 
the other side responds and accepts, and that those calling to account assert a right of authority over 
those called to account.  Esmark (2008 p. 281) focuses on responsiveness of accountability holdees to 
the holders.    This interpretation of the relationship in a hierarchical way reflects that of Keohane (2005 
p. 37); “accountability refers to a principal agent relationship in which an individual, group or other 
entity makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to impose costs 
on the agent”.      
In the case studies of the World Federation of Advertisers (WFA) and the Soft drinks federation 
(UNESDA), these hierarchical lines of authority are less clearly presented.   UNESDA claims to act in the 
obesity Forum on behalf of the public interest; this is stated on their web site.  The exercise of 
participating in the Forum appeared to be aligned more with industry profiling and policy management 
than a will to be held to account by the public.  It does however offer linkage with the public via 
transparency of the activities of the Forum and the participation of pure CSOs in the meetings and 
ongoing debate.      
UNESDA willingly participated in the Forum and hence renders itself accountable for the activities 
committed to under the monitoring system.  However, the entity that effectively calls to account for the 
actions related to the commitment is the European Commission’s DG SANCO, acting as a potential 
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surrogate in this specific administrative role, for the public.  DG SANCO in turn selected this platform 
format for discussion in response to expressions of concern from NGOs and Member States in relation to 
growing obesity levels in particular for Europe’s youth.  The decision not to regulate or ban certain 
products with a high sugar content will have been founded on many considerations including the need 
for more scientific research, consumer brand popularity and the overall cost of regulation and its 
implementation.    
The WFA by contrast made no claims of public interest motivation for their endeavours and point to a 
need for reputation management.  The self regulatory system of the advertising sector appears well 
established. This last system was set up to address a threat of a ban on advertising certain products 
including alcohol and the recognition on the part of the industry that self regulation would be more 
effective and speedy in dealing with complaints that can emanate directly from the public.    The WFA 
involvement in the alcohol Forum would appear more self serving in that the wording of the 
commitment aligns seamlessly with the mission of the organization.  Furthermore, WFA were able to 
respond directly to the call on the part of the Commission to better integrate rules on an international 
level to address new digital technology and its appeal to Europe’s youth.  WFA responded to DG SANCO, 
and were answerable, as UNESDA, to the Forum, represented by the European Commission.    Both 
associations are held to account for their own commitments, mandated by their respective members to 
do so, but within the framework of the rules set up by the public institution.   There is no evidence in the 
research undertaken of input from pure CSOs or public consultation in the formulation stage of the 
commitments.  Both associations acknowledge however that the commitments have to be worth 
undertaking - no “window dressing”- and indeed pure CSOs would be quick to point out weaknesses in 
the ambition of the tasks.   Although the Commission services can call participants to account within the 
framework of the agreed rules, acting as a form of secretariat for the Forum, all participants have equal 
access to the data and information and so carry the ability though might lack the formal right to do so.  
This last point lies in contrast to EPACA where the ability, as far as information is concerned, to call to 
account on the part of the forum, or surrogate public, is not present.  The Professional Practices Panel of 
EPACA, acting as the forum, was constituted ex post facto and was mandated to hear the account by the 
EPACA Management Committee who then transmitted the information to the Chair of the PPP.  The 
information on the complaint registered was not in the public domain at the time of the sitting of the 
Panel which did not seek a “public” mandate or interaction with representative pure CSOs.  EPACA the 
actor was called to account via application of its own rules.  
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As far as the form of representation is concerned, the three cases tend to reflect a certain freedom on 
the part of the actor to formulate and undertake the activities, as described by independence theorists 
(Pitkin 1967 p. 146).  The independence theorist’s expert bears an obligation to reach a required 
outcome; the account giving therefore centres on that obligation.   Indeed, the choice of course adopted, 
as well as the means used to achieve diverse goals remain with the actor.  However, the framework 
within which to achieve these goals can be quite prescriptive taking the form of the DG SANCO 
monitoring processes for both the obesity and alcohol platforms. These processes frame the activities in 
such a way as to derive a de facto mandate should the organizations fulfil the detailed conditions of 
participation.  Again, for EPACA, the actor mandates itself to set up the PPP given a certain set of 
circumstances and decision making on the part of the Management Committee.   The rules applied to 
the activity on which the account is given are those set out in the Code of Conduct which regulates the 
profession for its own benefit but also that of the wider public.  
Despite the detail of the framework, such as the need to engage independent auditors to prove reaching 
of goals for UNESDA and WFA, and the prescriptive process for discussion in the PPP for EPACA, the 
actors were treated as experts with a strong measure of freedom in formulating the activities 
undertaken.  This reflection supports my proposition that the more independent the representative, the 
more fundamental the question of accountability and the more complex the account giving is rendered.                
The forum: 
In this section, I will address UNESDA and WFA together before analyzing the EPACA case study.  The 
Forum plays a pivotal role in the narrow understanding of accountability.  It is also the component from 
the definition from which we might derive the public nature and impetus of the exercise.  Following 
Steffek’s (2008) bid to re emphasize the “public” within public accountability, we are looking for a critical 
debate in the public sphere that engages the EU public.  Placed in the context of the supranational EU 
structure, the presence of a duly mandated EU public is lacking in the forums of our three case studies.  
For the purposes of an accountability mechanism that imposes sanctions on the actor, the measure of 
the public quality of the CSO would require more than a claim to be “acting in the public interest”.  The 
CSO in question can initiate several actions to seek that public mandate by proactively consulting their 
members and stakeholders and creating publicity on the matter that will generate public debate. The 
absence of the EU public might also be bridged by pure CSOs acting as conduits of the public opinion 
derived from debate and information generated by the CSOs. I would add that this last form of putting 
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the public back into public accountability should be underpinned by internal accountability measures 
that deal with the quality and format of the debate, as per Tanasescu (2009 p. 21).  
For UNESDA and WFA the accountability Forums correspond to the Platform for Action on Diet, Physical 
Activity and Health (obesity Forum) and the European Alcohol and Health Forum (alcohol Forum) 
respectively.  The Forums present both passive and active characteristics.  The passive element lies in the 
transparency of the procedures as presented on the databases of DG SANCO and the access to 
commitments and activity reports for the general public.  The active, “live”, part lies in the physical 
participation of all stakeholders including the pure CSOs in the plenary meetings.   Although the 
European Commission is a public institution, there is no public-specific mandate on which the set up 
rests, be it to ask questions or to pass judgment.  It is however noted that the approach of regrouping all 
likely stakeholders to report in plenary on the evolution of commitments made and to comment on 
statements heard contains an intention to create deliberation and debate.   The Forum structure indeed 
allows for “reason giving”, regroups “all parties potentially affected by the decision or representing all 
relevant points of view” and all participants are “free and equal” as identified by Tanasescu (2009).     It 
does not include the key element of leading to a binding decision though nor does it present the political 
principles as stated by Fischer (2012 p. 447) relating to, for example, the reliance of the deliberation on 
the empowered involvement of ordinary citizens.              
In the absence of the presence of the “EU public” in the two Forums, might the activity of the pure CSOs 
present constitute necessary deliberation and debate in the public sphere as to create a public opinion 
on the respective commitments of the units of analysis, or at the least on the issues covered by the 
Forums?  
In the UNESDA case study, the activity of the Forum appears more dynamic and harmonious than that of 
the alcohol Forum.  However, my research on the statements made by the obesity Forum participants, as 
well as any comment they might place in the public domain via their respective web sites did not reveal a 
level of reporting or interaction that might equate to a public debate.  They do however monitor and 
participate in the Forum.  UNESDA has sought to create dialogue around the reporting of their activities 
but not in the form of a debate.  The proactive initiative of presenting key reports to leading NGOs prior 
to their airing in the Forum was essentially based on the will to pre-empt negative comments.     
Similarly to UNESDA, WFA sought to consult all stakeholders of the alcohol Forum prior to formulating 
wording required by their commitment on use of social media.  Again, although this initiative led to some 
  
170 
 
interesting email exchanges, it was not intended to stimulate or frame a debate in the public domain but 
to elicit initial reactions as part of a buy-in process for acceptability of the end wording.   
By contrast, the walk-out of the pure CSO, Active Europe, from the alcohol Forum led to a string of 
statements, press releases and press reports made by key stakeholders in the debate.  The activity of 
Active Europe and its alliance partners went some way towards flagging the main issues of the Forum 
(again, not the WFA commitment on social media analyzed alone) and to frame the debate around the 
viability of self regulation in this matter.   The pure CSOs present at the meeting I attended in November 
2013 focused on a monitoring role of the statements made, although their vigilance seemed centred 
more on the intentions of the European Commission than that of the industry representatives.  
A comparison of the activity in the two respective Forums would lead one to interpret the WFA case as 
more closely providing the potential for an emulation of a European Public Sphere via the activity of the 
pure CSOs acting as conduits for the public. Their framing and translating of the issue for wider 
consumption, in particular for vulnerable teenagers, brought the debate to the attention of the Press.  
Looking at the internal accountability steps however, the level of consultation with the wider public 
beyond their stakeholders appears very low.  
It would seem clear also that the potential for greater and wider public coverage of a policy debate rests 
on the nature of the polemic.  The more polarized the positions and sensitive the topic, the more likely 
there is to be an EU wide followed discussion.   In this case, alcohol consumption has proven more 
controversial a topic than that of sweetened non alcoholic beverages.              
Finally, on the public elements of the WFA and UNESDA case studies, one must recognize the nature of 
the products and services provided by the members of both organizations as being known to the public 
at large and not being limited to a certain section of EU society.                            
Concerning EPACA, the main public element related to the case can be found in the nature of the activity 
and profession under scrutiny.  The Forum does not comprise a public nature nor is it intended to.  The 
deliberations are not held in public as prescribed by Tanasescu nor is the design of the PPP intended to 
lead to a practical outcome (although the decision made led to significant amendments to the Code of 
Conduct).  Participation in the hearing is limited by Charter to the two parties, the Panel appointees and 
two Management Committee observers.  Also, the placing on the web site and hence in the public 
domain of the results of the hearing appear to be the only truly public feature of the accountability 
process examined.   The intention to further widen the remit of potential scrutiny on the part of the 
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public was entrenched however, in the amendments and widening of rules on locus standi for registering 
a complaint, adopted by the organization in March 2013.                
The obligation to provide an account and the account giving itself: 
As stated earlier (chap 2.3.), the “obligation” that Bovens describes as a justification of the conduct 
undertaken on the part of the actor does not sit well with the soft law context of accountability 
mechanisms.   The compelling nature of the obligation to provide an account would be better derived 
from the nature of the commitment and the fact that it is undertaken on behalf of another entity, the 
principal, to whom a report is owed.  Mulgan (2000) underlines the external nature of the account giving 
which reflects practice for UNESDA and WFA.  He also points to the ability to provide an account as a 
factor of consideration, linked to the problem of identifying the actor.  Although the identity of the actor 
is not an issue in the UNESDA and WFA case studies, the ability to provide an account comprises 
administrative and financial implications that the business associations have to take on board from the 
outset.            
The particular nature of the Platform systems in which UNESDA and WFA participate respectively is 
based on a detailed account giving of activity against the commitment made.  Indeed, the emphasis of 
the systems themselves is in the account giving with a large proportion of activity focused on providing 
indicators against measures taken.  The requirement for independent assessment and audit of activities 
carried out under a commitment provides authenticity to the outcome and supports the building of trust 
amongst the participants.  But it is also costly and time consuming.  This emphasis on the monitoring 
process detracts from the other features that DG SANCO might have enhanced such as the stimulation 
for more deliberation between and at the plenary meetings or a focus on broader representation of 
stakeholders.  More importantly, as taken up by the respective assessment reports of the obesity and 
alcohol Forums, the reporting does not include measures on proof of the tangible effects of the activities 
as to the reduction of obesity and alcohol related harm.         
Despite the above criticism of the inclusion of an obligation in a voluntary commitment system, the 
UNESDA case study revealed a clear administrative obligation at the reporting stage of the Platform 
process.  This becomes an obligation once the non fulfilment of it carries a sanction.  The UNESDA case 
points to a removal from the database of commitments if the committing entity has not furthered or 
begun to enact its commitment six months into the annual process.  This is evident from the monitoring 
database to all stakeholders and is reported in plenary. However, its inclusion might be deemed by the 
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participants as an administrative incentive related to process and not as a potential sanction of the 
accountability mechanism.  This obligation is not present in the alcohol Forum system followed by WFA 
and its absence is not considered as important by DG SANCO.  This difference in approach might also be 
seen as a reflection of the lack of importance of the measure, considered as administrative and not 
fundamental to the Platform philosophy.  The rationale behind its inclusion was based on organizational 
priorities of cleaning up the database to free up room for a greater number of participants and ensuring 
a focus on activity.  It is possible that DG SANCO did not take into consideration the potential impact of 
the obligation on the qualification of the process as accountability based when they introduced it.     
The context and priorities are slightly different for the EPACA case study.  There are two levels of 
obligation to provide an account.  The first is part and parcel of annual adherence to the EPACA Code of 
Conduct and does not involve directly reporting to a Forum.  However, non adherence to this code leads 
to removal of membership and hence a removal from the EPACA web site membership list.  The 
obligation involves reporting on a full understanding of the Code, the process for staff signing and that of 
internal training on the Code of Conduct.    
The second level is related to the account of the defendant company before the PPP.  This is provided for 
in the Guidelines to the Code of Conduct where the defending company is required to respond to the 
complaint submitted and under consideration.  The deliberations of the Panel and the account provided 
by the parties to the hearing however are not made in public and do not reflect the ideal Tanasescu 
(2009) elements of reason giving by all participants who are free and equal or the institutional design 
components of Fischer such as the reliance of the deliberation on the empowered involvement of 
ordinary citizens.   
The findings of the case studies provide another aspect to the direction of the discussion in literature on 
the account giving component of the accountability process.  Ebrahim (2003) refers to “inducement” 
over obligation (Bovens) which is a less coercive term and fits more easily in the voluntary soft law 
context.  Keohane (2005) refers to reporting on the activity through the nature of the relationship 
between agent and principal where the latter “makes demands” on the former.  All three case studies 
however reflect a quasi administrative requirement related to membership of an organization or 
participation in a Platform.   The evidence from the studies indicates that this component of the process 
carries less importance in practice than that allocated to it in the literature.  A reporting does indeed 
need to take place but the actual existence of the report is vital to the process whereas the reason 
behind the report giving, be it based on a obligation, compulsion or inducement is not.  
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The questioning and passing of judgment with possible consequences:  
Under the Bovens definition, whilst the actor has an obligation to report, the forum has a possibility to 
ask questions and pass judgment with possible consequences.  I commented earlier that the difference 
between the terms “an obligation” and “a possibility” seems asymmetrical and typifies an imbalance in 
the Bovens approach.   Grant and Keohane (2005 p.42), moreover, writes clearly of “costs”, where a 
“group or other entity makes demands on the agent… and has the ability to impose costs on an agent”.   
This sanction stage of the accountability process includes the all important potential for scrutiny which 
denotes the difference between transparency and accountability (Papadopoulos 2007 p. 473). 
 Also of importance in this final stage of the process is the absence of a reference to the mandate of the 
forum to ask questions and to pass judgment as well as to the enforceability of the sanction.  Esmark 
(2008 p. 290) points to a negative outcome between a mandate given and decision made by an 
accountability holder as the trigger for punishment of the punishee (holdee) by the punisher (holder).    A 
trigger however cannot equate to a mandate when punishment is a possible outcome. 
 The above remarks reflect the unease of accountability authors in addressing the meting out of possible 
sanctions.  The lightest form of sanction is favoured by Vibert (2007), in the form of disclosure, 
monitoring or evaluation.   He eschews a penalty based system in favor of measures that better reflect 
the voluntary nature of the NGO context, such as monitored self regulation.  However, since the case 
studies examined rest within a context of influencing policy outcomes, dealing with actors operating 
under conditions of EU policy participation, the influence oriented activities of the pure CSO sector 
acting in the public interest and the business association sector representing commercial interests do not 
differ greatly.  Credibility is prized above representativity and also legitimacy to a certain extent; “naming 
and shaming” is therefore a viable sanction for all stakeholders.  
In the Platform process analyzed for UNESDA, the Commission enjoys a form of punishment in that they 
can remove an organization from the database for failure to submit an interim report.  This sanction 
however, is administrative and does not conform to the parameters of an accountability process.  The 
sanction in the identified public accountability process is that of “naming and shaming” on the part of 
the pure CSOs participating in the respective Forums.  It is worth noting also that the decision to sanction 
is individual in that the Forums do not each act as a body but allow for reactions from each participating 
organization separately.   
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The UNESDA participating obesity Forum does not seem to give rise to the level of scrutiny or 
antagonism between participants that would generate a sanction of “naming and shaming”.  As the 
EuroHealthNet Communication officer remarked, their intervention in the press is only likely for such 
claims as a pizza being presented as a vegetable.  
The walk out however of the Active Europe alliance covered in the WFA case study and its subsequent 
press statement provided a naming and shaming of not only the advertising and alcohol producing 
industries but also of the Commission’s DG SANCO.  The industry’s credibility was undermined in that its 
monitoring rests on a self regulatory system.   The Commission’s was also indirectly affected for 
condoning the self regulatory system.  The active reactions on the part of the pure CSOs in the WFA case 
study, unlike those of the UNESDA case study, might be due to the polarization of stakeholders on the 
topic of reduction of alcohol related harm.  However, the monitoring, flagging, framing and translating 
(for example in the form of the video on self regulation for youths) constitute a difference between 
public and stakeholder accountability.  The CSO activity could potentially create the level of deliberation 
and consultation necessary for a European Public Sphere.  
The EPACA case study involved the possibility of sanctions but these would be limited to exclusion from 
the membership of EPACA as a final measure.  Even this measure must comply with Belgian law on the 
not for profit sector and would call for the convening of an extraordinary general assembly of the 
members to specifically vote on a motivated proposal to exclude.  Although the PPP, composed for 
hearing a given complaint, acts outside the profession and is external to the organization its powers are 
limited to recommending measures only back to the EPACA Management Committee.   
Notwithstanding the lack of existence of the application of this sanction, since EPACA has not as yet 
excluded a member, the effect would be close to that of a naming and shaming as per the respective 
obesity and alcohol platforms.  The missing element of enforcement of this form of sanction requires a 
greater level of communication between stakeholders that decide to decry the activities of the business 
association in question.  In the UNESDA case study I highlighted the lack of press statements made by 
pure CSOs participating in the platform and the potential for press publications for enforcing a “naming 
and sharing”.  The same can be said for the web sites of the relevant organizations including the 
Commission.  The absence of reporting of the fact that Active Europe quit the Forum might indeed have 
reflected negatively on DG SANCO who only refer to the matter in a meeting report saved as a pdf. on 
the Forum web site (deeply embedded in that of DG SANCO).  This lack of posting of more press worthy 
results of the meetings on the DG SANCO web site might indicate that the purpose of the Forum is seen 
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on the part of the Commission to include a process based legitimization of their own output.  A walk out 
would not only be seen to criticize and condemn a tacit condoning of the self regulatory system on the 
part of the Commission but also an undermining of the rationale behind the existence of the Forum 
itself.  DG SANCO funds the participation of pure CSOs to these gatherings to re balance access of all 
stakeholders between industry and pure CSO representatives but also to seek legitimacy of output.  
“Sanctions” or “facing of possible consequences” needs to be interpreted from the viewpoint of the 
agent or actor and be relevant to the context in which they operate or the particular process at hand.  In 
the three cases examined the nature and level of the sanction corresponds to the policy and credibility 
network context of vying organizations seeking favorable policy outcomes.  This supports the assertion 
by Benner et al (2004, p. 200) to the effect that loss of credibility “is one of the more effective negative 
sanctioning mechanisms to further accountability in and of networks”.   The sanction is therefore the 
same for all stakeholders, pure CSOs and business associations alike, given the particular context at 
hand.   
The sanction component of the accountability system renders it “thick” to Harlow and Rawlings (2008, p. 
313) and I would add that an accountability process without a sanction mechanism and a reasonable 
expectation of enforceability of that self same sanction cannot carry the “accountability” denomination.  
The co relation of the forum’s possibility to ask questions should also systematically lead to judgment – 
with positive or negative consequences - in order to justify the effort undertaken to deal with 
accountability in an organization and to balance out the duties and obligations of the parties in the 
process.  Moreover, it is the context in which the actor operates that would indicate the most effective 
type of “consequence”, whether the organization claims to act in the public interest or not.  A greater 
polarization of the diverse positions on each side of the issue’s divide will garner higher press visibility. 
Below is Figure 4. Flow Chart of Processing Mapping, mapping each respective process of the case 
studies against the definition.  The model of accountability derived from the comparison differs markedly 
in emphasis from the Bovens interpretation in that the identification of the principal is less evident in 
particular relating to a public mandate.  The obligation to provide an account is related to the monitoring 
or reporting of the activities and the composition of the Forum directly impacts the public quality of the 
outcome.  There is however evidence of a clear pattern of steps undertaken in accountability 
procedures, bearing in mind the modifications discussed, that lead to a generically composed process 
and a model framework from which to assess accountability.     
  
176 
 
Figure 4. Flow chart of Process Mapping : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3. The perspectives from which to assess “accountability”:     
In addition to the components of the process, Bovens (2007) provided three perspectives from which to 
assess the effects of accountability.  As commented earlier in chapter 2.3.2., this approach seems 
somewhat overworked but does provide insight into the rationale for applying accountability processes 
and desired outcomes.  The purpose of this exercise is to reflexively apply the theory, developed initially 
without empirical evidence, in order to measure its use and the quality of the yield of its application to 
the actual case studies.  I apply these perspectives to the case studies in turn.  
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Democratic perspective and popular control:  
Bovens refers to public accountability here to state that it provides the citizen with information and the 
means to judge governmental conduct.  Translated into a context of actors under conditions of EU policy 
participation, the popular control element would be derived from the respective obesity and alcohol 
Forum members holding the actor, UNESDA and WFA to account.  Their access to information via the 
databases provides the necessary basis from which to judge activities.  However, as per the analysis of 
the Forum for both case studies, the “public” character of such a process would require underpinning by 
a wider representation of the EU public engaged via the activity of the “pure” CSOs. 
The structure is even further removed when applied to the EPACA case study which lacked the public 
nature of the account giving even where the members of the association were concerned.   This 
perspective therefore is more aptly applied to the classical democratic accountability scenarios of 
governments, democratic elections and voters than to the context of EU policy participation.  
The constitutional perspective; prevention of corruption and abuse of power:  
Here describes potential curbs on excessive power of central government through an independent body 
with judicial powers are described.  This relationship would refer to the division of powers whereby 
courts enjoy powers of judicial review applied to governmental administration.  Whilst the case studies 
provide the Forums and the EPACA’s PPP with sufficient basis to “judge” an actor, corruption and abuse 
of power would not be the subject of any indictment.  This perspective might be translated into a 
prevention of exaggerated claims on the part of the actor in relation to results achieved in the case of 
WFA and UNESDA.  Regarding EPACA however, there is little scope for abuse of power on behalf of the 
actor unless an aware, wider public should be convinced that EPACA “abused” the Smoke Free 
Partnership in the PPP process and decision taken. 
The learning perspective; enhancing government effectiveness: 
This perspective deals with a scenario closer to the accountability relationships analyzed in the case 
studies in that it refers to an open process in which governmental delegates have to justify their acts and 
citizens can ask questions in order to increase the acceptability of the government.   Although the role of 
the actors is different, in that WFA and UNESDA are independent entities unrelated to a centralized type 
of government, the CSOs of the respective Forums claiming to enjoy a public mandate can ask questions 
to increase the acceptability of the commitment achievements towards a wider public.  Questions put in 
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the plenary meetings and their answers are reported on as part of the meeting summary and placed on 
the relevant website. Although I would be skeptical as to how many EU citizens would read the meeting  
reports with the aim of increasing their support for the commitment of the business associations, the 
reporting has the merit of placing the information in the public domain, thereby providing a basis for 
learning.  
This perspective is certainly relevant as an outcome for the EPACA case study with regard to the 
professional accountability relationship, internal to the organization.  The association literally amended 
its Code of Conduct to adapt to the outcome of the PPP recommendations.  The result of the application 
of the Code led to a decision to first accept the complaint made since there were sufficient grounds for 
suspicion of misconduct on the part of the member, then to decide however that the Smoke Free 
Partnership did not qualify as a complainant.   The learning perspective led to the PPP acknowledging 
that this result was not in the spirit of the Code and duly suggesting amendments which would 
effectively deal with this state of affairs as well as addressing the weakness of the procedures in relation 
to trainees.  
The above analysis using the Bovens perspectives provides some insight but might be better applied in 
the discussion on the expected outcomes of the accountability process application, a subject left 
somewhat aside by the author who focuses on the steps of a process as opposed to the context and 
purpose of the application.  
4.1.4. Propositions from the literature and other findings: 
The elements drawn from the analysis of the literature of leading accountability authors taken up in 
Chapter 2.2.2., as well as the further questions I identified to which they give rise, need to be held up 
against the case study findings.  The purpose of this application is to verify or set aside the propositions 
made by the authors after the case study analysis and contribute thereby to defining the criteria for the 
context which gives rise to accountability situations. A common strain to the authors was the continuous 
breakdown of types of accountability leading to various denominations of accountability given the 
nature of the actor, that of the obligation or the forum amongst other drivers.  My assertion is that the 
breakdown of accountability types has little practical application when the process or mechanism 
applied can be generic, applied to business and pure CSO organizations alike.  Nonetheless, the context 
and reason for the use of an accountability process is directly related to the desired outcome of its 
application and practice.           
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Turning to the potential for accountability of transnational actors in this business association context 
there are several points and findings from the case studies, as well as verifications from individual 
authors’ contentions that I will address with observations in turn.  
The first deals with the co-existence of internal and external accountability processes.  Whilst their 
mention is pervasive across the authors addressed, they do not refer to the inter-reliance from an 
administrative tracking view point that is a practical necessity.  Indeed, an external accountability 
process relies on internal tracking, monitoring and record keeping.  A further observation is that 
adherence to a code of conduct, acting as an internal accountability process, when undertaken by all 
actors fulfilling a given mandate, can provide the potential for amounting to external accountability.  
Interestingly, the inter reliance does not necessarily operate both ways.  Indeed, the existence of an 
external accountability process is underpinned by internal means, but internal accountability systems 
such as that of EPACA’s internal self regulatory system, stops short of external accountability 
qualification.  The interplay between an internal process and accountability is addressed further below in 
the analysis of the initial propositions against the findings.  
The second point relates to the situating of the practice of accountability as lying beyond legal 
compliance. Indeed, the research of Piewitt et al (2010 p.252) demonstrated a lack of cohesion amongst 
the CSOs examined as to where the boundaries of legal compliance end and governance preferences 
start; one organization referring to legal compliance as a form of self regulation.    Yet, all three case 
studies deal with business associations that opt to conform to burdensome monitoring practices (for 
UNESDA and WFA) or compliance measures (EPACA members adhering to the Code and updating of 
training) that are not required by the law of the land.  Accountability processes appear redundant in the 
presence of laws and “legal accountability” carries an unnecessary double emphasis.  However, the 
added value of accountability appears to be greater in the presence of legal compliance rather than in its 
absence.  The accountability means observed are applied in a sophisticated policy context, concerning 
businesses that are already fully legally compliant with the laws of the countries in which they operate. 
The application of the accountability measures arises where the business association wishes to increase 
the positive reputation of its sector in a very specific policy context.  It is this elitist EU level policy 
development context which also limits the application of the process to the remit of the stakeholders.  
This remit in turn reduces the importance, from the Actor’s viewpoint, of the truly public credentials of 
the process.              
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The third point is made by Ebrahim when writing of self regulation and long term change involving codes 
of conduct and where she claims that the “inducement” is the risk of “erosion of public confidence due 
to scandals and exaggeration of accomplishments (external loss of funds and internal loss of reputation)” 
(Ebrahim 2003 p.825).  For WFA and UNESDA, a poor performance in the alcohol and obesity Forums 
respectively would likely lead to a certain loss of reputation in relation to the authenticity of their 
commitments.    However, as business associations, it would be unlikely that they risk a loss of funding, 
as might an international NGO, since this is derived from the membership fees.  The purpose of the 
setting up of the complaints system by EPACA was indeed reputation management for the purposes of 
the profession.  Ebrahim also makes a fourth point which is supported by the findings, in that she claims 
that the inducement for public accountability is closely related to the core purpose and activity of the 
organization in question.   WFA wishes to promote the self regulatory system adopted by the advertising 
industry and promote agreement on wording to an international context.  A means of achieving this 
without dealing with individual negotiations on a company or association level is to seek to gain approval 
from the alcohol Forum which regroups a wide array of stakeholders providing therefore increased buy 
in to their system. This would go a long way towards ensuring smooth implementation but also 
compliance even prior to the rules and wording being adopted internationally.    UNESDA’s motivation 
for participation in the obesity Forum is directly linked to reputation management fears arising from bad 
press coverage relating to the sugar content of the products of their members.   Their inducement arises 
from the risk of reduced sales, a matter directly linked to their existence itself.  The EPACA case study 
deals with the bid for recognition of a profession and consequently its reputation management.   The 
motivation to better regulate and render transparent complaints procedures is founded in a bid for 
professional recognition.  This is further compounded by the extra step taken by the adoption by the 
EPACA Management Committee of the recommendations of the PPP - recommendations that were not 
required as part of the procedure but were optional.  
Goodin’s market accountability is also borne out by the literature and constitutes the fifth point.  He also 
refers to internal and external aspects of accountability; the internal process referring to a firm’s officers 
facing its shareholders and the external side referring to the way in which that market sector justifies 
itself to society at large and consumers in particular (2003).  The visibility of the market sector in 
question to society at large clearly impacts heavily on the accountability choices.  The advertising 
industry examined in the WFA case study is directly linked to most individuals as citizens in society who, 
in turn, have a choice to complain or not about advertising, encountered daily in many varying modes 
through their own single click button on a web site.  This greater visibility implies increased risks to 
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reputation management and a heightened need for each member company to comply with the self 
regulation in the best interests of the overall profession.  The recognizable brand names regrouped in 
UNESDA enjoy the same notoriety, visible to most EU citizens on a daily basis.  These organizations aspire 
to Goodin’s market accountability where the bottom line is measured in income and profit.  He makes a 
useful distinction borne out by the findings between non profits that hold each other accountable 
through network based mechanisms, a form of peer accountability or “reputational sanctioning among a 
group of like minded others”.  This form indeed, does not reflect the findings in the case studies where 
vying factions – the industry and public interest representations - are prevalent in the respective obesity 
and alcohol Forums.    
The EPACA complaints system would allow for peer accountability in that any entity that fits the now 
enlarged complainant criteria can submit a complaint against a member.  This however, is unlikely due to 
the heightened competition in the market place and the awareness of scrutiny of pure CSOs towards the 
lobbying profession.  In practice, such matters are usually settled internally by one on one meetings of 
the consultancy leaders involved.  Peer accountability carries the risks inherent to the homogenous 
nature of the actors, described by Goodin as “conspiracies against the public or cosy cabals covering one 
another’s incompetence…” (2003 p.387).  The presence of peer or network accountability amongst 
similar actors in the not for profit sector does not however preclude the equal use of market 
accountability for the same actors.  The competition for funding from donor organizations as well as 
individuals, brings accountability scenarios amongst pure CSOs very close to those of the for profit 
sector.  “Naming and shaming” would be equally damaging as a sanction to the sectors and under that 
interpretation, market accountability can be also applied to the pure not for profit sector.  
In the context of professional accountability, Deleon neatly addresses the internal – external divide by 
asserting that individuals can be held accountable for their professional accountability but that a 
profession has to deal with public accountability (1998).  This would seem to reflect the case of EPACA 
where the conduct of a profession is the reason for the drawing up a code of conduct and subsequent 
hearing of the case.  The underpinning of the credibility of the EPACA application of their code of 
conduct might have occurred through a more “public” addition to their PPP, a representative enjoying a 
public mandate through a pure CSO and more independence from the Management Committee.   
Deleon is the only author quoted that refers to codes of conduct as an organizational philosophy taken 
up by a profession.  The case of WFA also includes, via the self regulatory system, a form of all pervasive 
code of conduct which reflects not only the conduct of the profession and its limits of tolerance as well 
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as which professional steps to take in certain given circumstances.     Deleon’s emphasis on the need for 
enforceability of the codes of conduct reflects the weaknesses of the WFA case where self regulation and 
its enforcement are not accepted by an engaged and participating CSO as a viable approach.  The 
accountability of the profession based on the application of the code was not established, thus verifying 
the problem identified by Deleon and constituting the sixth point.    
Moreover, the question of accountability tends to arise around “expert” type tasks mainly due to the 
administrative effort and cost required to implement such a process which would seem neither cost nor 
time effective for more everyday type tasks.  This pattern is also the consequence of the relative 
freedom accorded experts on the course to adopt in achieving the desired results.   This greater freedom 
of process however, carries a greater obligation to account for the method, reflecting the greater 
obligation carried by the expert in the Pitkin Independence theorists’ scenarios.   
Finally, Koenig Archibugi (2010) points to the possibility for accountability mechanisms to be built into 
the governance of the organizations, as reflected by EPACA and the internal self regulatory system of 
WFA.  Although the main activity of UNESDA revolves around the obesity Forum, the accomplishing of 
the commitments made the presenting of the tracking process, the documents related to its Constitution 
do not refer to this fact.  Turning to the matter of legitimacy, Koenig Archibugi, finds reasons to believe 
that accountability can “enhance the legitimacy of power in the eyes of those who have delegated it and 
of those who are affected by it – as well as being normatively desirable from a more impartial point of 
view”.   Just as the requirement for externally imposed constraints such as advisory boards is concerned, 
the addition of an external, but informed element, to assessment exercises makes for a more balanced 
and impartial result.  This would potentially have enhanced the acceptability of the decisions of the PPP 
for the EPACA case study and ensured that the application of the outcome had wider consequences.  
Equally, an independent and impartial assessment of the internal self regulatory system of WFA would 
have at least provided argumentation that might justify such an approach so that this choice of approach 
alone – the focus of the Active Europe walk out - need not detract from the main activity of the Forum.      
The potential for legitimacy enhancement and the desirability of accountability mechanisms from a more 
impartial point of view are verified in the case studies and make for the seventh point.  
Below, Figure 5. Matrix for Cross case Analysis, sets out the conclusions drawn from the case studies in 
relation to the components, and typology of accountability.  The matrix allows for matching of content of 
process and set of circumstances giving rise to the process. The matrix also reveals causal links between 
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the process and the outcome and thereby allows for clear identification of the weaknesses in relation to 
the “public” nature of the processes (see Findings column of Figure 5.).  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Matrix for cross analysis of Accountability case studies: causal link between process and outcome? 
 
 UNESDA EPACA WFA FINDINGS 
P
ri
n
ci
p
al
 
 No mandate from public or consumer 
groups 
 Statement of acting in “public 
interest” 
 Pre-consultation with CSOs on 
presentation of commitment results 
 Regular consultation with parents and 
head teachers, deriving a tacit 
mandate      
 DG SANCO acts as surrogate public ?  
 No mandate from public or consumer groups to EPACA 
to self regulate or hear complaint 
 Will to profile public affairs profession  
 EPACA management committee mandates PPP to hear 
complaint  
 Self fulfilling mandate via mission and 
membership 
 High visibility of product (advertising) to 
public, i.e. no need for awareness raising 
on issues    
 DG SANCO acts as surrogate public? 
Little evidence of public based motivation in  
participation  
Rationale of context lies in reputation management 
Element of  interaction with CSOs and public on ad 
hoc consultation within  formal process or audit 
A
ct
o
r 
 UNESDA and its 9 company members, 
participating in the Forum and 
representing 80% of market.  
 EPACA (for profession) 
 Interel (within EPACA hearing)  
 The trainee (within Interel) 
 WFA and its members Public interest concerned with good professional 
practice and moderation in consumption of certain 
products  
Professional activities of lobbyists inherently 
indirectly impact wider public  
Fo
ru
m
 
 Obesity Forum system allows for 
scrutiny in passive form (via database) 
as well as active (Forum) meetings to 
ask questions 
 About ½ members of Forum are “not 
for profit”  
 Lack of deliberation amongst and 
within CSOs and wider debate in 
media   
 Not representative of the public, the PPP is a 
professional panel  
 Meets in private, hears complaint and response in 
camera  
 Is concerned for public opinion 
 Alcohol Forum allows for scrutiny in 
passive form (via database) as well as 
active (Forum) meetings to ask questions 
 CSO walk out was directed at self 
regulatory approach and not focused on 
social media case study 
 CSO deliberated internally,  discussed 
with alliance partners and engaged 
media, eliciting more press coverage  
EPACA forum was professional and internal 
although decisions will impact “stakeholders” (since 
March 2013 
Obesity Forum CSOs not contributing to creation of 
EPS through consultation,  deliberation and 
publicity 
Alcohol Forum CSOs created deliberation in press, 
sought mandate from internal public, initiated 
discussion amongst CSOs to lead alliance 
A
cc
o
u
n
t 
gi
vi
n
g 
 “obliges” progress on account within 
fixed time frame via Forum database 
 Prescribes format of report and 
independent auditing (cost)  
 Obligation to provide an account in circumstances of a 
hearing is linked to membership, just  as undertaking 
regular training for all staff and signing of Code   
 Code process was closely implemented 
 No “obligation” to progress 
 Prescribes format of report and 
independent auditing (cost)   
Hence, the efficiency of the monitoring process and 
the co-related providing of an account, impact 
directly on the accountability of the outcomes.   
C
o
n
se
q
u
e
n
ce
s 
 Forum has mandate to hear report but 
not to pass judgment 
 Participants can do so individually, 
acting in “public interest” (CSOs)  
 
 
 PPP enjoys mandate from management committee 
and membership to hear case 
 Imposes sanctions, such as membership withdrawal 
(did not occur)  
 Ability to recommend amendments to Code (occurred)   
 Individual CSO led small alliance walk out 
 Self regulatory approach of advertising 
and alcohol producers branded, 
“shamed” in “insider” press as self 
serving  
 WFA continues to  support self regulation  
 CSO walks out of Forum because it has 
failed to deliver promised discussion on 
reducing alcohol relate harm.      
No unit was sanctioned in these cases, although 
alcohol Forum advertising and alcohol producing 
members were named     
Little evidence of enforceability of sanctions  
More clarity on role and purpose of sanction would 
lend teeth to process    
TY
P
O
LO
G
Y
  Stakeholder accountability 
 Market accountability   
 Professional accountability  
 Market accountability 
 Stakeholder accountability   
 Stakeholder accountability 
 Market accountability   
 Public accountability (weak) 
 Need for CSO active deliberation, 
greater publicity and means of grass 
roots consultation  
 Improved role allocation in process  
 Enforced sanctions   
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4.1.5. The study’s initial propositions – verified or not? :  
 My initial four propositions were presented at Chapter 1.2.  and were set up to better guide questions 
for salient data collection and provide depth to the criteria for analyses. They are an intrinsic part of the 
evaluation framework and contribute in particular to defining the circumstances in which an 
accountability mechanism might be applied to yield an expected outcome. They are presented and 
discussed in turn below.        
 Public accountability mechanisms are desirable in particular given contexts of policy 
development dealing with issues of a sensitive nature combined with concerns of reputation 
management in a highly competitive interest representation environment.  
 
The initial search for case study units of analysis demonstrated the narrow remit of the scope of research 
in particular combining the condition of EU policy participation with an external process.  The second 
difficulty lay in the mapping of the process and it’s satisfying of the criteria related to the inclusion of a 
public vocation.  The number of potential associations was therefore limited by the criteria and quickly 
revealed specific circumstances.  These are related to the sensitive nature of the industries examined 
and their potential to harm.  A heightened sensitivity comes in play when children or young adults are 
involved such as for UNESDA and WFA.  EPACA deals with the reputation management of the lobbying 
industry, which suffers from a poor reputation.  The context of these analyses is the influencing of policy 
outcomes where the respective industries are confronted with a non-governmental sector that 
specializes in limiting the spread of the business.  An observer would deplore the geographical limitation 
of the debate to the Brussels bubble since the topics addressed engage on a much wider scale and would 
benefit from a greater balance as regards science over political positioning.  The European Commission 
set up the respective Forums on issues that deserved wider consultation and which polarized the 
populations.  These are also sectors in which regulation is undesirable for several practical reasons such 
as the lack of a chain of responsible actors that are easily identifiable by law, or an activity where there is 
too great a number of potential rule contraveners.  Regulation might also be undesirable due to a 
prohibitive tracking cost or delays caused in bringing the case through a classical justice system, such as 
with advertising.  The measures, however, undertaken by the respective business associations lie beyond 
legal compliance, and thus demonstrate a will on the part of the private sector to meet expectations of 
policy makers and stakeholders within well defined limits.  
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 All business organizations that comply with public accountability arrangements boast internal 
governance structures which allow for accountability mechanisms to be applied. 
 This proposition is taken up in the literature and apparent in the case studies, as commented.  My initial 
assertion rested on a practical consideration in that external accountability with the requirements in the 
account giving to describe steps and demonstrate progress, would require administrative tracking and 
annotation at each stage.  This tracking itself would rest on an internal accountability procedure dealing 
with record keeping and providing evidence of tasks accomplished.   The governance structure of each 
organisation would, at the least, need to allow for such an internal system.  This is more evident for WFA 
and EPACA than for UNESDA.  
The WFA internal accountability system is at the core of the association’s existence; its members all 
operate under the self regulatory code of practice.  The rules and implementation of the internal system 
are transparent, it provides for tracking and is set in a procedure that operates EU wide.  Its applicability 
is however questioned by NGOs in the framework of the public accountability system.  This last 
questioning potentially undermines the principles on which the system rests.  
The EPACA case study remains focused on the internal system embodied in the Code of Conduct of the 
association.  The professional accountability type lacks somewhat the causal link with the public 
although the amendments to the Code can be construed as demonstrating a will to widen liability, a 
result of accountability.   
The sanction mechanism discussed when analyzing the UNESDA case study was described as the 
potential for naming and shaming in the Forum remit.  I analyzed the founding documents of the 
association and queried as to the internal tracking system on which the commitment lay.  The secretary 
general referred to internal discussions having occurred when a member appeared to fail to reach the 
targets set out by commitment and this led to a resolution of the problem, it seems, with no formal 
procedure followed.  This approach might be the co-relation of the fact that the main activity of the 
organization is the inputting to the obesity Forum itself.                 
 Business organizations have had little call for developing processes of public accountability and 
have been reluctant to assert a public role that might impact market stability.   
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And,  
 Existing accountability mechanisms in business associations engaged in EU policy participation 
were historically not widely promoted towards the EU public.   
What is the motivation for the private commercial sector to engage in exercises that render a business 
association publicly accountable? Business organizations are notoriously wary of torts cases (where a 
plaintiff might demand damages) and therefore limit their liability through contractual clauses which 
come into effect upon purchase.  Any closer link with the public might be seen as increasing the 
likelihood of liability and therefore adversely affecting market stability.  The situation changes however 
when reputation management is required.  Furthermore, the respective DG SANCO Forums and the 
EPACA web site are relatively safe environments from which to engage in accountability processes.  The 
absence of main stream media from the Member States and leadership by the services of the 
Commission who choose not to communicate the work of the Forums on their front page ensure that the 
potential wider coverage is limited.   
The result of the above situation, coupled with the Brussels centric remit of this assessment lead to the 
fact that business associations have not been widely promoted to the EU public.  The increased use of 
internet however and new social media as a vehicle to discuss societal concerns and emit citizen 
opinions could greatly impact this state of affairs.  There is likely to be greater involvement of grass roots 
activity in the future where missing links and knowledge gaps will be filled, including better research 
about how organizations function and profile themselves.  Add to this the new procedural rules of the 
Lisbon Treaty which reduce the duration of the decision making procedures and increase the need for 
lobby alliances and coalitions earlier in the process.  These coalitions might give rise to the new and unto 
now rather incongruous matching of business and NGOs claiming a public interest.  The public 
accountability of that coalition and the professional accountability of duly mandated actors will become 
of heightened importance.        
4.2. Final conclusions:    
This final section of the thesis summarises the conclusions of the case studies and reflects upon the 
adequacy of the theory as presented in Chapter 2.  These reflections lead to the proposal of means of 
improvement to the structure and the method of application of the accountability framework.   
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The discussion above reflects the findings of the case studies against the questions raised from the 
literature and my criticism in relation to it. The research has established a tenuous causal link between 
public accountability and business associations acting under conditions of EU policy participation. There 
is evidence of constitutive elements of public accountability for business associations, albeit based on an 
interpretation of the European Public Sphere where CSOs acting in the public interest foster debate with 
the wider EU public.  This deliberation has however proven limited in part due to the context of industry 
association profiling in which the issues of accountability arise and the specific policy setting framework 
of the EU which lacks media coverage and grassroots citizen engagement.    
In the absence of an identified public to act as the principal in the main relationship of the accountability 
process, there is a need to better embed the mandate of the principal with a link that proves stronger 
than “acting in the public interest”, as claimed by UNESDA.  This public mandate can be sourced in DG 
SANCO of the European Commission, whereby the officials seek a mandate through public consultation 
on the work of the Forum. The second potential source lies in the involvement of the European 
Parliament in a consultative capacity for the results of the respective Forums.  The third and last source 
for such a potential mandate lies with the pure CSOs and their link with the public and their own 
mandate to act in the public interest.  
The quality of deliberation of the CSOs acting via their public mandate or as interested parties in the DG 
SANCO Forums can be improved.  The deliberation formats are unstructured, be they internal to the 
CSOs and therefore too limited in remit or in and around the Forum meetings and activities.  There is 
little evidence of discussion across CSOs prior to or at the Forum meetings and little reflection, other 
than for Active Europe, of their activity in their publications and reports.   
The last means of improvement at this stage of the process lies in the generation of deliberation as wide 
and diverse as possible on the part of the CSOs to act as conduits to the public, attaining a level 
equivalent to a European Public Sphere.  The pure CSOs might then derive a public mandate on the 
issues through flagging, framing, monitoring and translating, for the benefit of the wider public and 
transmitting knowledge and findings in exchange for debate and an eventual public mandate.       
The research has also demonstrated the generic nature of the accountability model process with 
however, some amendments in emphases.  Indeed, the “obligation” to provide an account might better 
be described as an integral part of the relationship between the principal and agent, as opposed to a 
separate step in the process.  Equally, the definition could more easily refer to the “providing of an 
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account” instead of referring to explanations and justifications of conduct.  I would argue for the 
inclusion of the “asking of questions” on the part of the Forum but render this more formal; a type of 
obligation that will underpin the deliberative nature of the account provision.  Finally, “passing 
judgment” appears weighty and synonymous with the formal order of courts, whilst this process rests 
clearly in the realm of choice, voluntarism and soft law.  In contrast, the “facing of consequences” allows 
for reward as well as sanction, thereby avoiding anticipating the outcome.  The improved enforcement 
of decisions, as well as the mandate to sanction and reward, would make for a more credible process 
and result. Whilst the account giving and deliberations might be carried out in public, the decision should 
equally be made public and recorded for means of precedent setting.   
The analysis of the UNESDA and WFA case studies in particular pointed to the need for greater scrutiny 
of the activities of the other participants in the process.  Indeed, the main relationship lies between “an 
actor and a forum”.  The comments above have centred on the nature in particular of the Forum and its 
“public” credentials derived from pure CSOs and their purported interaction with EU citizens.  However, 
as the possible surrogate for the public, DG SANCO might play a greater role in stimulating greater 
deliberation internal to or amongst CSOs, or even proscribing the structure for that deliberation.  DG 
SANCO might also have made efforts to publicize the work of the Forums through its media links, 
thereby generating a greater CSO and citizen following.  The European Commission’s role cannot be 
solely limited to bringing diverse parties to the table. Regarding the EPACA case study, the inclusion of a 
pure CSO representative, duly mandated, such as Transparency International, in the Panel would prove a 
significant step towards demonstrating the public vocation of the accountability process.  
Finally, the greater “public” quality of the accountability process is attributed to WFA mainly thanks to 
the activity of Active Europe in increasing the public credentials of the Forum and having brought the 
debate to the attention of the wider public.  The UNESDA case study pointed to the increased potential 
for deliberation thanks to the diversity of the Forum participants and the need for greater media 
coverage and action on the part of pure CSOs.  Lastly, the EPACA case study would not qualify as a case 
of public accountability because of the closed nature of the account giving and deliberations.  The result 
of the case focus however, led to amendments in the EPACA Code of Conduct that opens locus standi to 
all stakeholders, and potentially, the EU public.   
All three case studies present features of market accountability (Goodin, 2003), catering to concerns of 
reputation management and stakeholder accountability (Lord and Pollack, 2010) where the Forum 
assumes a different role to that of its simple sum of parts and the actor is a representative, not acting in 
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a personal capacity.  The EPACA case study clearly presents elements of professional accountability, 
dealing with the need for integrity in the accomplishment of public affairs tasks.  
The business associations have demonstrated a will to position themselves beyond legal compliance, to 
do more than was legally required to operate.  They have voluntarily rendered themselves accountable 
not only to their constituents but also reaching a wider audience of stakeholders.  This deliberate 
approach of reputation management is specific to the policy context and can be contrasted with a wider 
public relations campaign where consumer engagement is the goal.  The legitimacy sought would lie in 
the application of the process, its rigor and independence. The audit requirements and their cost 
(UNESDA and WFA), as well as the scrutiny to which a profession is willing to be subject by placing a 
report of the complaints process and its outcome on their own website (EPACA) attest to the vocation of 
public accountability.      
The research has provided evidence of the existence of public accountability in a limited form as 
practised by business associations under conditions of EU policy participation.  In doing so, the rationale 
behind the application of such a process was defined and the formula applied refined.  The observance 
of the practice of accountability by complex organizations should shift away from a goal of qualifying the 
type of accountability according to a nomenclature limited to the framework of the study but focus, as 
per the generic model, on the origin of the mandate for the actor and forum as the key trigger of the 
process.   
As the multiplicity of actors increases in the field of business associations acting under conditions of EU 
policy participation, the relationships within public affairs networks will become more complex, the 
dividing lines between private commercial interests, citizens and the state more blurred.  The public 
accountability credentials of those actors operating through prescribed governance models in this 
specific context allow for a clarification on purpose and transparency of desired outcomes thereby 
providing a model for accountable democratic engagement.            
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